TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT LTTE ACTIVITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 002002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PTER EFIN CVIS KCRM PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT LTTE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead
1.4 (b, d)


1. Summary and Action Request (C): The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is
engaging in numerous fundraising activities
worldwide, from both "legitimate" sources and
organized crime activities. As much as $200
million of funds raised from their organized
crime and "legitimate" fundraising activities
around the world is being used to finance illicit
weapons procurement. Anecdotal and other
evidence suggests that the LTTE and related
organizations may be raising significant amounts
of money in the U.S. We recommend a concerted
USG effort to look into this, a step that would
quickly catch the LTTE's attention and send a
message to the Tamil diaspora. End Summary and
Action Request.

Turning Up the Heat on the LTTE


2. (C) In light of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam's poor human rights record and
obstructionist approach to the peace process,
Embassy Colombo has been looking at ways in which
the U.S. might increase pressure on the LTTE, a
designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO)
under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act since 1997. To date, the "sticks" we
have used include frequent public statements
condemning LTTE behavior and calling on the
Tigers to recommit to the peace process, as well
as a standing policy to deny the LTTE legitimacy
by not meeting with LTTE representatives at the
political level.


3. (C) One obvious area in which the USG could
do more to increase pressure on the LTTE is by
taking a hard look at LTTE fundraising (and that
of related organizations) in the United States.
To date, Post is unaware of any focused
interagency effort on this issue. Such a USG
effort should, inter alia, focus on the
activities of the Tamil Relief Organization
(TRO),an "NGO" closely affiliated with the LTTE,
which raises extensive amounts of money outside
of Sri Lanka (as much as $40 million annually
according to some Embassy contacts). Indeed, the
TRO has a U.S. branch which is a registered
charity, has a website (www.trousa.org) and
openly raises money in the U.S., purportedly for
rehabilitation and relief activities. In
addition, the USG should also examine the
activities of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),
a political front party for the LTTE with 22
seats in Parliament. TNA members have traveled to
the U.S. in the past to raise money at TRO-
organized events (there are also unconfirmed
reports that the TNA plans to open an office in
Washington). Even if USG efforts fail to
uncover substantial amounts of LTTE fundraising
in the U.S., just the announcement that we were
taking a closer look would have a significant and
positive effect here.

How the LTTE Operates Elsewhere


4. (C) The LTTE has an impressive money-raising
network among Tamil diaspora populations around
the world. Embassies representing countries with
substantial Sri Lankan Tamil populations report
significant LTTE fund raising activities through
both "legal" means and organized crime
activities. Econoff has queried counterpart
embassies of countries where significant Sri
Lankan Tamil populations reside regarding the
LTTE and their legal and illegal fundraising
activities. A summary of reported LTTE financial
activities in some of those countries follows:

United Kingdom


5. (C) The U.K. considers the LTTE a foreign
terrorist organization (FTO) and it is illegal in
Britain to fundraise for or donate funds to the
LTTE. Scotland Yard has concluded in a recent
report that the LTTE is sponsoring numerous
organized crime activities in the U.K., including
extortion and threats against U.K. and Sri Lankan
resident Tamils. They also engage in financial
crimes, primarily credit card fraud in LTTE
owned/financed gas stations and shops. Some
Tamil U.K. LTTE sympathizers commit bank fraud by
borrowing money from British banks and absconding
back to Sri Lanka with the funds. The revenues
from all of these financial criminal activities
are estimated up to 10 million British pounds per
year, or more. The LTTE also engages in human
smuggling activities, facilitating the illegal
immigration of thousands of Tamils to the U.K.
annually. Once in the U.K., they often file
asylum claims and receive temporary working
status, paying a percentage of their income to
the LTTE. The British High Commission here
admits that HMG does little to enforce legal
restrictions on LTTE activities since the
resources that would do so are focused on post
9/11 actors instead.

Canada


6. (C) There are over 300,000 Sri Lankans,
mostly Tamils, living in Canada. Many now hold
Canadian citizenship. The LTTE is not listed as
a FTO in Canada. However, the Tigers qualify as
a FTO under Canadian terrorism laws, in that its
members engage in the activities of a terrorist
organization, but are not listed as an FTO as a
"carrot" to the LTTE to continue with the peace
process. If the government were legally
challenged, the LTTE would likely be listed as a
FTO through the courts. The Canadian High
Commission here believes that if fighting
resumes, that cabinet level policy will quickly
change. Canadians are not permitted to donate
funds to the LTTE, and the LTTE may not fundraise
in Canada. The TRO and TNA are both considered
a part of the LTTE by Canada and may not
fundraise legally in Canada. LTTE members, TNA
politicians (several TNA members of Parliament
were recently refused visas) and TRO management
are all ineligible to travel to Canada under
their terrorism laws.


7. (C) The LTTE sponsors a variety of organized
crime activities in Canada, including human
trafficking, drug smuggling, extortion and gang
violence. In 2003, Canada had a 14% asylum claim
rate from Sri Lankans legitimately entering
Canada on visitor visas. The Toronto Police have
created a special Tamil Task Force to combat the
problem. The Canadians estimate the LTTE raises
$10 to $20 million annually in Canada. Former
LTTE cadre, many claiming refugee status,
reportedly form the backbone of the organized
crime operations in both Canada and the U.K.

Australia


8. (C) Australia has a Sri Lankan Tamil
population of approximately 25,000. Australia
has the LTTE listed as a FTO. The TRO is not
considered a part of the LTTE and legally raises
approximately $5 million per year in Australia.
The LTTE regularly engages in extortion of Tamil
residents by demanding that ten percent of income
be donated to the LTTE. Unlike in the U.K. and
Canada, most Sri Lankans living in Australia are
professionals with high incomes who legally
immigrated to Australia.

France


9. (C) The LTTE is not considered a FTO in
France. However, French internal intelligence
monitors LTTE activities quite closely. There
are approximately 100,000 Sri Lankans in France,
the majority of whom are Tamil. Forty percent of
Sri Lankans in France are either currently
seeking asylum or are in France illegally.
Through front operations, the LTTE owns gas
stations and McDonald's franchises with
significant profits going to the LTTE. The LTTE
is also involved in human trafficking, drug
smuggling and extortion of wealthy French Tamils.
There are also reports through the Sri Lankan
Director General of Military Intelligence of the
LTTE running a lottery in France generating as
much as $4-$5 million per month of income. The
French Ambassador told us last week that his
government was organizing a seminar that week to
discuss ways of cracking down on illegal Tamil
activities.

Germany


10. (C) Germany has approximately 40,000 Sri
Lankan Tamil residents. Approximately one third
are illegally in Germany. Germany no longer
accepts Sri Lankan asylum claims. Germany does
not consider the LTTE a FTO. The German embassy
has no information regarding LTTE fundraising
operations in Germany.

Norway


11. (C) Norway, as the facilitator of the peace
negotiations, does not list the LTTE as a FTO.
There are approximately 10,000 Sri Lankan Tamils
living in Norway. The LTTE openly fundraises in
Norway and runs Tamil-speaking schools to raise
money. There are no reports of illegal
activities. The Norwegians believe their status
as moderator of the negotiations keeps the LTTE
from using more aggressive fundraising tactics.
The Norwegians are unwilling to share LTTE
fundraising information without permission from
Oslo.

LTTE Domestic Financing


12. (C) LTTE fundraising in Sri Lanka is just
as impressive as the overseas operation. Since
the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2002,
the LTTE has levied "taxes" in the areas under
its control. The LTTE control of the A9 highway,
which runs from Colombo north to Jaffna through
LTTE-controlled areas, is lucrative in this
regard. According to the Sri Lankan Director
General of Military Intelligence (DGMI),the LTTE
is generating approximately $2 million per year
from A-9 road taxes. A more important source of
funding are the "taxes" paid by businesses in the
LTTE-controlled areas. Business "taxes" are
estimated by the DGMI to be $15 to $18 million
per year. Farmers are also "taxed" a percentage
of their harvests in the North and East.
Overall, the DGMI believes that the LTTE can
finance its internal operations and parallel
"government" from internally generated revenue
sources, leaving foreign fundraising to pay for
weapons purchases. LTTE revenue flows are a
murky subject, but the best estimate from the
DGMI of annual intake from domestic "taxes" is
$25 to $50 million. The best estimates from the
DGMI on foreign fundraising is $150-$200 million
or more.
LTTE Banking

13. (C) Both LTTE-sponsored and GSL-sponsored
banking infrastructures in LTTE-held areas make
it relatively easy to move money to LTTE control
from overseas. In meetings with econoff, Central
Bank Deputy Governor Ranee Jayamaha described the
full-service banking operations provided by the
state-run banks in LTTE controlled areas.
Nothing prevents LTTE supporters or controlled
entities (or LTTE leader Prabakharan himself)
from receiving and withdrawing a foreign
remittance at the People's Bank or Bank of Ceylon
branches in Kilinochchi, the LTTE's heartland.
The LTTE-run Bank of Tamil Eelam (BTE) has 10
branches in LTTE controlled areas and provides
simple banking services. BTE does not clear
checks through the Sri Lankan clearing system but
there could be informal clearing between local
state-owned bank branches and BTE, Jayamaha
speculated. However, according to BTE
advertising, the bank is able to accept checks
drawn on foreign banks, in all forms of currency,
and offers up to eleven percent deposit rates on
foreign currency accounts.

LTTE Fundraising in the U.S.


14. (C) Although we do not have detailed
information on Tamil activities in the U.S.,
anecdotal evidence suggests that fundraising in
the U.S. by the LTTE and related organizations is
significant. When a USAID employee recently met
with LTTE working-level officials in Kilinochchi
in an attempt to exempt USAID shipments of goods
through LTTE territory from LTTE "taxes," LTTE
officials asked in puzzlement why the U.S. was
trying to avoid giving money to the LTTE in Sri
Lanka "when we raise so much money in the
States." Moreover, the TRO U.S. website reports
a recent fundraising event in New Jersey which
garnered roughly $45,000.

Visas and Passports


15. (C) Beyond financial flows, there are other
key aspects to U.S. Tamil activities. We know
for a fact that some U.S. citizen Tamils (and
presumably some green card holders as well)
travel back and forth openly to LTTE-held
territories and that some of them stay for
periods of time working on relief and
developments projects, etc. Several American
citizens are known LTTE sympathizers and recently
spoke at a Tamil cultural event held in New
Jersey where the LTTE flag was featured and LTTE
fundraising activities likely occurred. Bank
account information possibly involving one Amcit
with potentially sending funds to the LTTE was
recently provided by the DGMI and sent septel.


16. (C) A good example of U.S. Tamil activity
in LTTE areas is Wanni Tech, an information
technology (IT) training center with state-of ?he-art facilities,
largely financed by U.S.
resident Tamils working in the IT sector. Wanni
Tech representatives have briefed Econ and USAID,
seeking (unsuccessfully) U.S. government
assistance. They have been advised of
prohibitions on providing material benefit to the
LTTE. They claim they are able to assure only
legitimate students are enrolled. The Embassy is
aware of Wanni Tech because the organizers came
in to see us; we have to assume there are similar
U.S.-based or funded activities in LTTE territory
of which we are not aware because the involved
U.S. Tamils do not seek us out when they come
into country.


17. (C) The issue of visa issuances ties in
closely to fundraising in the U.S. Presumably
many TNA officials and other Tamil Sri Lankans
seeking visas wish to attend TRO or other
fundraising events in the U.S., even if they do
not explicitly so state on their applications or
in their interviews. For example, Father M.X.
Karunaratnam, the head of the newly established
LTTE-linked human rights organization NESOHR, was
recently in the U.S. and met with the Sri Lanka
desk officer and with some human rights
organizations. A later review of his visa
application showed no mention of human rights
activities but cited attendance at a Tamil
community function as the stated reason for
travel. We might well have chosen to issue a
visa anyway, but knowledge of his plans to attend
Tamil functions at which funds were raised would
have been germane to the adjudication process.

Action Request


18. (C) Post believes that now is an excellent
time to increase pressure on the LTTE by
investigating its fundraising activities in the
U.S. and, where possible, denying access to
sources of funds there. Even just a preliminary
step such as, for example, a request by relevant
U.S. agencies to TROUSA that it come in to
discuss its fundraising activities would send a
clear message to the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora
regarding our impatience with the Tigers'
terrorist tactics and lack of commitment to the
peace process. TRO might be a legitimate
charitable organization, which scrupulously
ensures its funds are not diverted to illegal
Tiger activities. It could also be a front for
funneling funds to the Tigers. Or, it could be
somewhere in between, with some money going to
legitimate relief and some to the Tigers. The
point is that we do not know, and we should.


19. (C) There also may be value in a USG
statement urging any U.S. citizens contemplating
a trip into LTTE-held territory or a contribution
of time or money to any activity in LTTE-held
territory to satisfy themselves that they are not
supporting terrorist activities or be subject to
possible legal repercussions. This would send a
strong public message. At the same time, we
intend to pay greater attention to visa
applications from prominent Tamils who might be
planning to include fundraising in their U.S.
itineraries.


20. (C) We would appreciate comments and
feedback from relevant Washington offices and
agencies on how best to use greater scrutiny of
LTTE and related organization activities to
increase pressure on the LTTE to get back to the
peace table and to turn off money flows that
could be financing LTTE weapons purchases or
terrorist activities.

LUNSTEAD