SRI LANKA: GSL RESPONSE TO LTTE HEROES' DAY SPEECH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001937

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA
NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL RESPONSE TO LTTE HEROES' DAY SPEECH
CRITICAL, COMMITMENT TO CEASEFIRE REASSURING

REF: A. COLOMBO 1924


B. COLOMBO 1913

Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)'s
response to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s
annual "Heroes' Day" speech criticized the Tigers' call for
an unconditional return to the peace talks as not conducive
to "good faith negotiations," and reiterated the GSL's
readiness to discuss an interim authority, in tandem with a
permanent settlement, in accordance with the December 2002
pro-federalist "Oslo Declaration." The GSL also reasserted
its commitment to the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA),which was
seconded by the Sri Lanka Army's assertion to DAO that it
will not respond to LTTE provocation. Norwegian Ambassador
Brattskar traveled to Kilinochchi December 2 for a meeting
with the LTTE. The GSL's renewed public commitment to the
CFA is reassuring, especially in light of the JVP's recent
statements (however unlikely) about returning to armed
insurgency if the GSL cedes to Tiger demands for an interim
administration. The Tigers are likely to use the conflicting
signals from the GSL and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),
President Kumaratunga's main coalition partner, to reinforce
their familiar argument that the south does not have the
consensus or will to come back to talks. End Summary.

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Government Responds to LTTE Heroes' Day Speech
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2. (U) On December 1, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)
issued a statement from its Information Department responding
to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Leader Velupillai
Prabhakaran's November 27 "Heroes' Day" speech, in which the
Tiger leader demanded that the GSL return to talks based on
LTTE proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority
(ISGA). In its first response to Prabhakaran's speech, the
GSL characterized the LTTE's "threatening language" as
"scarcely conducive to good faith negotiations." The
statement also conveyed the GSL's readiness to discuss an
interim authority in tandem with discussions about a
permanent settlement, in accordance with the agreement the
LTTE and the GSL made in early peace talks in Oslo in
December 2002. (Note: Known as the "Oslo Declaration," this
agreement proposes federalism as a potential solution to the
conflict. End note.) The GSL's statement also reiterated its
firm commitment to the "strict maintenance of the Cease-Fire
Agreement (CFA)," and condemned "all violations and actions
jeopardizing the prevailing ceasefire," which, the GSL
asserted, are "leading to the undue rupture of the sensitive
balance of ethnic groups presently maintained by the
Government..."


3. (C) Finally, the statement advised that the GSL is
communicating with the Government of Norway (GON),which is
facilitating the peace negotiations, about "future steps to
be taken in the peace process." Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar told DCM December 1 that he would be going to LTTE
administrative center Kilinochchi December 2 on a "low-key"
visit to see LTTE Political Wing Leader S.P.Tamilchelvan.
Brattskar will brief donor co-chairs on his trip December 3.


4. (C) Jehan Perera, Director of the National Peace Council
and longtime mission contact, told poloff that he viewed the
GSL response to Prabhakaran's speech as positive because it
communicated the GSL's willingness to return to negotiations.
However, Perera criticized the GSL for offering discordant
responses to Prabhakaran's speech, i.e. statements made by
GSL coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna JVP) in
Parliament November 30 threatening a return to armed struggle
should ISGA be granted, and ongoing harsh characterizations
of the LTTE in government-owned media. Perera surmised that
the GSL has finally realized that peace negotiations are
partly a propaganda war, and that mention of talking with
Norway was included in the statement to mollify critics who
see the GSL's reluctance to return to the peace table as
political situation in the south--not peace talks with the
Tigers.
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Army Committed to Ceasefire, Trinco Calmer
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5. (C) Meanwhile, the CFA is holding, despite Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Trond Furuhovde's recent
comments to the media that it is under pressure. The Sri
Lanka Army (SLA),for its part, continues to resist LTTE
provocation. In a December 1 meeting, SLA Director of
Operations K. Silva told DAO, other defense attaches, and
diplomats that the SLA will not break the CFA--regardless of
the intensity and repetitiveness of LTTE provocation.


6. (C) After a week of tension, including a November 29
LTTE-called hartal, or general strike and the killing of two
Sinhalese men (Ref A),the situation in Trincomalee is
calmer. Deputy Inspector General of Police for the East
Neville Wijesinghe told poloff that the December 1 funeral
for one of the Sinhalese victims passed without incident. He
discounted rumors about ongoing conflict between Tamil and
Sinhalese communities. Wijesinghe speculated that it would
take another one or two days for the situation to quiet down
completely. Unlike in recent days, there was no curfew in
Trincomalee December 2. The AID/OTI office, which closed
early on December 1, has re-opened and is fully staffed.


7. (C) On December 2, the LTTE called another hartal in
Vavuniya and Mannar, ostensibly to protest the security
forces' disruption of Heroes' Day week celebrations in those
areas (Ref B). According to SLA spokesman Daya Ratnayake,
shops were closed and public transport halted, but only a
small number of people protested. However, the entry (and
exit) points from GSL-controlled to LTTE-controlled areas
(i.e. Omanthai on the A9 near Vavuniya and Uyilankulum near
Mannar) were closed, because International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) monitors could not travel to the border to
patrol the no-man's land due to the hartal. The SLA's
Ratnayake commented that thousands of people who cross the
borders daily were unable to do so. Meanwhile, according to
press reports, a soldier attached to SLA intelligence who was
reportedly attacked by LTTE cadres in Jaffna on November 26
died in Colombo of his injuries.

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Comment
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8. (C) The GSL's reiteration of its long-standing position
that resumed negotiations with the Tigers must be based on
both interim and permanent solutions to the conflict is not
surprising. Moreover, the GSL's renewed public commitment to
the CFA is reassuring, especially in light of the JVP's
recent provocative--if highly unlikely--statements
threatening a return to armed insurgency if the GSL concedes
to Tiger demands for the ISGA. Given the conflicting signals
from the GSL and JVP, the Tigers are likely to use the GSL
statement as reinforcement for their familiar argument that
the south does not have the consensus or will to come back to
talks.


LUNSTEAD