SRI LANKA: LTTE HEROES' DAY ADDRESS SOFTER THAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001920

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: LTTE HEROES' DAY ADDRESS SOFTER THAN
EXPECTED

REF: A. UNCLASS EMAIL TO SA/INS 11/29/2004


B. COLOMBO 1897

C. COLOMBO 1913

Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th
annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in
LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka. In the speech,
Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties and the
President for impeding the peace process by insisting on
peace talks based on a permanent solution to the
conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE is
demanding. He also asked all southern parties to publicly
declare their position on "the Tamil national question."
Expressing his impatience with the current pace of the peace
process, the Tiger leader called on the Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the LTTE's Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers will "...have
no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of
(their) nation." Sources in the diplomatic community said
they expected a much "sharper tone," and did not find the
speech particularly worrisome. While some press reports
indicated that the GSL would reply to the LTTE speech on
November 29, it has not released a statement-- possibly
because it was busy cajoling coalition partner Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) not to make its own independent
statement. Prabhakaran's annual policy speech fell short of
the sabre-rattling rant many feared it might have been, given
the killings and hartals which racked the north and east in
the week preceding the speech. That said, the message did
not sound the conciliatory note many had been hoping for.
The comparative lack of vitriol aimed by Prabhakaran at
President Kumaratunga offers the one slightly encouraging
hint of a possible opening, however narrow, back to the
negotiating table. End Summary.

--------------
Prabhakaran's Annual Address
--------------


2. (U) On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th
annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in
LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka. Clad in camouflage
and flanked by the LTTE flag and a map of "Eelam" (portions
of Sri Lanka the LTTE considers the Tamil homeland),
Prabhakaran delivered what many people in Sri Lanka consider
the most important LTTE policy address of the year. The
speech received widespread print media publicity, and
excerpts were shown on government- and privately-owned
television stations on November 28.


3. (U) In the speech (text sent to SA/INS via unclass
email),Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties
and the President for impeding the peace process by insisting
on peace talks based on a permanent solution to the
conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE favors.
He also asked all "southern" parties to publicly declare
their position on "the Tamil national question," arguing that
unless these parties have consensus in their approach to the
peace process, there is no point in talking about a permanent
solution. The Tiger leader expressed his impatience with the
current pace of the peace process and called on the
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the
LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers
will "...have no alternative other than to advance the
freedom struggle of (their) nation."


4. (U) Highlights of the speech follow:

-- Prabhakaran 's speech provided an LTTE-slanted recap of
selected failures of the nearly three-year old cease-fire
agreement (CFA) between the GSL and the LTTE. The Tiger
leader recalled the six rounds of peace talks in 2003 which
"turned out to be futile," rehabilitation-focused
sub-committees which he described as "non-functional," and
the GSL's participation in the February 2003 donor's
conference in Washington, which he claimed undermined the
LTTE's "status as equal partners in the peace process."
Prabhakaran also noted President Chandrika Kumaratunga's
actions to take over several ministries in November 2003 days
after the LTTE released its proposed ISGA proposal as
"punitive action that plunged the southern polity into a
crisis."

-- Prabhakaran criticized southern political parties, but
especially Kumaratunga's coalition partner Marxist Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The Tiger leader described the
April 2004 parliamentary election as paving the way "for the
hegemonic dominance of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinistic forces
in the southern political arena." Prabhakaran lambasted the
JVP as "an anti-Tamil political party steeped in a muddled
ideology of racism, religious fanaticism and orthodox
communism," and criticized the President's United People's
Freedom Party (UPFA) coalition as "constituted by an unholy
alliance of incompatible political parties articulating
antagonistic and mutually contradictory views and policies on
the Tamil national question." The Tiger leader asserted,
"There is no clear, coherent policy orientation, or a
consensus approach within the political parties of the
coalition government. Since she has aligned herself with
political parties drenched in anti-Tamil racism, militarism,
and Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonies, the President cannot advance
the peace process based on a coherent, consistent strategy
and policy."

-- Prabhakaran cited the humanitarian needs of the Tamil
people as justification for peace talks based on the ISGA.
Surprisingly, he added, "If some elements of our proposal are
deemed problematic or controversial, these issues can be
resolved through discussions at the negotiating table."

-- Prabhakaran spoke about the need for an interim
arrangement before a permanent one. He noted that once "an
interim administrative authority is institutionalized and
becomes functional, we are prepared to engage in negotiations
for a permanent settlement..." He criticized President
Kumaratunga's invitation to talks based on a permanent
solution, citing her need to satisfy the JVP, her desire to
impress the international community with her commitment to
peace, and her desire to prolong peace negotiations
indefinitely "by opting to talk on a most intractable and
complex issue." Prabhakaran charged, "Whatever the real
reason, we can clearly and confidently say one thing; it is
apparent from the inconsistent and contradictory statements
made by President Kumaratunga that her government is not
going to offer the Tamil people either an interim
administration or a permanent solution."

-- Prabhakaran summarized the long-standing arguments for
the Tamil people's right to secede, claiming that, "The
Sinhala political organizations and their leadership, which
are deeply buried in the mud of Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism,
will never be able to comprehend the political aspirations of
the people of Tamil Eelam... None... (are) prepared to
accept the northeastern region as the historical homeland of
the Tamil-speaking people, that the Tamils constitute
themselves as a distinct nationalist and that they are
entitled to the right to self-determination, including the
right to secede."

-- He called on other political parties (including the
constituent parties of the UPFA and the opposition United
National Party (UNP)),"... to declare publicly their
official policy on the fundamentals of the Tamil national
question, particularly on the core demands of the Tamils
concerning homeland, nationality and the right to
self-determination." The Tiger chief asserted that unless
Sinhalese political parties have a "clear, coherent policy, a
proper insight and a consensus approach towards the Tamil
national question, there is no meaning in engaging in talks
about a permanent solution," and asserted that the
President's government is deliberately impeding the peace
efforts by insisting that talks should be based on a
permanent settlement.

-- He called on the GSL to return to talks based on the
LTTE's ISGA, warning, "There are borderlines to patience and
expectations. We have now reached the borderline... We urge
the government to resume the peace negotiations without
conditions, based on our proposal on an Interim
Self-Governing Authority. If the Government of Sri Lanka
rejects our urgent appeal and adopts delaying tactics,
perpetuating the suffering of our people, we have no
alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our
nation."

-------------- -
The Other Heroes' Day - Karuna and Balasingham
-------------- -


5. (C) In a speech posted to his website Neruppu, and
translated by the Asian Tribune (a on-line newspaper based in
Bangkok, the provenance of which is murky),breakaway LTTE
eastern leader Karuna, now leader of the TamilEela Makkal
Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP or People's Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam) delivered a rival Heroes' Day speech on November
27, about hour and a half before Prabhakaran delivered his.
Karuna demanded the GSL solve its problems with the Tamil
people within two years, paid homage to LTTE martyrs, and
criticized Prabhakaran for political killings and exploiting
the Tamil people. In his speech, Karuna asked, "Does one
expect to have a mass killer as the leader of Tamil Eelam?
Are we not ashamed of such a person?" Karuna also asserted
that given its close cultural and geographic proximity to Sri
Lanka, India, rather than Norway, should facilitate the peace
process. Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for
Policy Alternatives, opined that Karuna is trying to make his
presence felt to Sri Lankan and diaspora Tamils, as well as
to irritate Prabhakaran. Not surprisingly, Sinhala and
English media carried reports of Karuna's speech, but Tamil
media ignored it.


6. (C) Meanwhile, a pro-LTTE Tamil daily reported that LTTE
political advisor Anton Balasingham had also given a Heroes'
Day speech in London, which stated that Prabhakaran is ready
for war and that the President must decide if she wants war
or peace. Balasingham also noted that the peace process
cannot be allowed to "drag on forever." Indian DCM Mohan
Kumar told DCM that Balasingham's speeches historically are
often tougher than Prabhakaran's, since his job, inter alia,
is to keep the Tamil diaspora stirred up and in a
money-giving mood. Kumar also opined that Balasingham has
internal problems within the LTTE and thus needs to make
clear he is still a firebrand.

--------------
Donor Co-Chairs Reaction
--------------


7. (C) At a November 29 co-chairs meeting called by
Japanese Ambassador Suda to discuss the growing JVP-led
campaign against the Norwegians and the SLMM (septel),
Norwegian Ambassador Bratskaar said he saw "positives and
negatives" in the LTTE leader's speech. The language on
"advancing the freedom struggle" was cause for concern but he
thought it significant that the sentence had contained no
timeframe or ultimatum. Bratskaar said he found quite
encouraging Prabhakaran's stated willingness to discuss ISGA
differences with the GSL although he had noted on the
negative side of the balance sheet that there had been no
reference to "internal" or "external" self-determination
(internal self-determination is the longstanding LTTE
codeword for federalism). Bratskaar commented that, in light
of last week's provocations by the LTTE (flag raisings, etc.)
and the Sri Lankan Army's clumsy responses, he had expected a
"much sharper" speech.


8. (C) The key element, Bratskaar concluded, is
Prabhakaran's repeated references to the spoiler role being
played by the JVP which prevents, in the LTTE view, any
serious "Southern" effort to get back to the peace table.
"The LTTE never likes to have the ball in its court and JVP
behavior and rhetoric gives them the perfect excuse to lob
the ball back to the government." Bratskaar noted that
Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim will see LTTE luminary
Anton Balasingham in London December 1 and will seek
clarification on both Prabhakaran's speech and Balasingham's
speech in London. Bratskaar said Solheim will then return to
Sri Lanka December 11. His agenda and program have yet to be
determined and will depend on events between now and then.
An "additional visit before Christmas" had been in the cards
all along, Bratskaar said. Bratskaar will not be present for
Solheim's visit; he will be attending an SLMM organizational
meeting in Copenhagen.

--------------
Indian Reaction
--------------


9. (C) Indian DCM Mohan Kumar told DCM November 29 that he
had not found Prabhakaran's speech particularly worrisome.
He described it as "hard line in substance" with no
concessions to the GSL. But Prabhakaran's tone, Kumar
observed, had been almost "apologetic and defensive" in an
attempt to "convince the international community that the
LTTE is not the intransigent party." Kumar said he did not
regard Prabhakaran's comments about "advancing the freedom
struggle" in the absence of a return to the peace table as a
threat to return to war. Rather, he viewed them as "largely
for domestic Tamil consumption" and less belligerent than
previous speeches, concluding, "This was not war rhetoric."
Kumar also said he had found significant that there had been
"no mention of Karuna or Oslo," nor had Prabhakaran trotted
out his familiar language about how a solution in Sri Lanka
could not be "dictated" by the international community.

--------------
Softer for the International Community?
--------------


10. (C) Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for
Policy Alternatives, told poloff that the speech was likely
more subdued for the benefit of the international community.
He noted that Prabhakaran did not suggest a deadline or
ultimatum and indicated that comments on the LTTE's ISGA
proposal would be welcome. Nonetheless, he commented that
the speech still had a very serious tone. Loganathan
speculated that Karuna's absence from Prabhakaran's speech
signaled that the LTTE was indeed having problems with the
breakaway leader, and that the LTTE did not want to show
weakness by mentioning Karuna. Loganathan surmised that
while the LTTE had initially demanded the GSL hand over
Karuna as a condition of returning to talks, the Tigers have
now changed tack and want to return to talks as soon as
possible so that they can neutralize any GSL support for
Karuna in the negotiating process.

--------------
GSL Reaction?
--------------


11. (C) While some press reports indicated that the GSL
would reply to the LTTE speech on November 29, it has not
released a statement-- possibly because it was busy cajoling
the JVP not to make its own independent statement. Eric
Fernando, Director General of the Policy Research and
Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat, told poloff
that the President was trying to rein in the JVP to avoid
complicating the situation further. Sources at the JVP told
political FSN that the JVP had decided not to issue a
statement, because it would be "acknowledging the insults to
the Sinhala people."

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Prabhakaran's annual policy speech was not the
sabre-rattling rant suggested by the killings and hartals
which racked the north and east in the week preceding the
speech (see Reftels B and C). At the same time, while the
Tiger leader's annual policy address was more subdued than
expected, it was not completely conciliatory. The litany of
complaints against the GSL and southern political parties was
familiar, but the failure to mention Karuna, ostensibly the
biggest provocation the LTTE has faced, was surprising. The
softer tone of the speech may be the result of recent visits
to the Wanni by Balasingham and Norwegian Foreign Minister
Petersen, as well as the Tiger delegation's October visit to
Europe, in which a more international perspective was on
offer. While Prabhakaran was hard on the JVP, he was less
vitriolic toward the President than usual, perhaps to offer
her some space to forge a way back to the peace table.



LUNSTEAD