NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SEES LACK OF CLARITY ON BOTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001862

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E.MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SEES LACK OF CLARITY ON BOTH
SIDES OF PEACE PROCESS

REF: A. COLOMBO 1856


B. COLOMBO 1852

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The Norwegian ambassador observes that
&neither side is clear8 in the peace process. The LTTE was
markedly less negative of President Kumaratunga in the
Norwegian,s discussions in Kilinochchi last week.
Balasingham in particular made clear that the ISGA is subject
to negotiation. The next major step will be the November 27
Hero,s Day speech by LTTE leader Prabhakaran which the
Norwegians will analyze carefully but fear will be similar to
previous years, speeches -- or perhaps have even a harder
line than last year. Solheim may return to Sri Lanka in
early December; Balasingham told the Norwegians he may be
back in &several months.8 End Summary.


2. (C) In a November 17 discussion with the Ambassador and
DCM regarding last week,s high-level Norwegian visit to Sri
Lanka, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar underlined that
the genesis of the visit had been a request from Sri Lankan
President Kumaratunga (CBK) to Norwegian Foreign Minister
Petersen when the two had met in New York on the margins of
UNGA. CBK had issued an invitation which the Norwegians had
felt that they could not refuse (&there would have to be a
heck of a good reason not to come8) even though Oslo had
concerns about the timing. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) leadership, Brattskar commented, had also
wondered if the timing was propitious.

Initial Confusion
--------------


3. (C) Brattskar noted that the run-up to the visit had
gotten bogged down on the question of which side was more
committed to the &Oslo Declaration,8 when in fact there is
no such thing. He speculated that the erroneous term stemmed
from a confusion of several Oslo meetings, various documents
which had been issued, and the Tokyo donor meeting in June
2003 which had resulted in a declaration. He also noted that
reaction to the book released by London-based LTTE luminary
Anton Balasingham (portrayed in the media here as rejecting
federalism as a solution and holding open the option for an
independent Tamil state) on the eve of the Norwegian visit
had also muddied the waters although Brattskar was of the
view that the book did not contain anything new. Balasingham
has always talked about &internal (read: federalism) versus
external (read: separate state) solutions,8 Brattskar said.
The Norwegians had hoped the LTTE would, either before or
during the visit, give the GSL a &fig leaf8 by publicly
recommitting to the Oslo principles of a federal solution but
the LTTE did not, Brattskar stated.

LTTE Better Disposed Towards CBK
--------------


4. (C) Brattskar stated that there had been ¬hing new
from Kilinochchi8 during the Norwegian visit. That said,
the LTTE side (headed by Prabhakaran) had been markedly
&less negative8 about CBK compared to previous discussions
and seemed to be convinced of her &eagerness.8 The LTTE
was extremely concerned about the role of the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and told the Norwegians they needed
assurances that the JVP supported CBK on the peace process.
The Norwegians, Brattskar said, told the LTTE that they
didn,t need to worry about the JVP. It is up to CBK to
deliver the JVP, the Norwegians said, and when she says they
are on board the LTTE should take her at her word. Brattskar
said the Norwegian impression was that the LTTE feared
&being led into a process that goes nowhere -- and then
being blamed by the international community for the failure
when they pull out.8 Brattskar commented that the Norwegian
discussions with the LTTE have developed over time into
free-wheeling, wide-ranging conversations, much less
structured than the &formal sessions8 the Norwegians
inevitably have with CBK.


5. (C) Asked about the LTTE endgame, Brattskar noted that,
just as the Norwegians were leaving the Kilinochchi meeting,
Prabhakaran (described by Brattskar as &impatient8) had
said he wanted talks to resume. In the same vein, when
Brattskar and Solheim had met Balasingham at Colombo airport
before the LTTE leader returned to London (note: Brattskar
said that an LTTE ¢ral committee8 meeting had been held
after the Kilinochchi meeting but before their airport
Balasingham chat),Balasingham had been &eager8 for talks
to resume on the LTTE,s interim self-governing authority
(ISGA). Balasingham (who had ¬ been part of8 internal
LTTE discussions on the ISGA) had made clear &once again,8
Brattskar said, that the ISGA was a &starting point8 and
&subject to negotiation.8 Brattskar noted that erroneous
reports that the Norwegians had carried a specific proposal
on how to restart talks back from Kilinochchi to be delivered
to CBK were due to a translating error by one of the
newspapers.

Speeches and Interviews
--------------


6. (C) Brattskar noted that Prabhakaran's annual &Hero,s
Day8 speech on November 27 will be a useful gauge of LTTE
reaction both to the Norwegian visit and to the GSL posture
in general. Balasingham told the Norwegians not to expect a
speech much different from previous years -- or even a bit
more hardline. The problem is that such a speech can be read
many ways, as it will have both good and bad parts.
Brattskar said he fears that such a speech would elicit a
negative reaction in the south and exacerbate mutual
suspicions. He saw CBK,s November 16 press interview with
the government media (septel),in which she invited the LTTE
to return to the peace table within a month, as a vain
attempt to influence the contents of Prabhakaran,s speech in
a positive direction.

&Neither Side Clear8
--------------


7. (C) Brattskar noted that &neither side is clear8 on
next steps. CBK is focused on parliamentary maneuvering and
the economy. The problem, Brattskar opined, is that the LTTE
will react defensively if it perceives that the peace process
is anything less than the GSL,s top priority. The
Norwegians, efforts to engage CBK on whether peace is higher
on her agenda than political survival or the economy had not
been well-received by the President, Brattskar noted wryly.
Brattskar noted that Peace Secretariat chairman Jayantha
Dhanapala swung between optimism and pessimism which,
Brattskar commented, is not helpful in a long, tedious peace
process. Brattskar and the Ambassador agreed that Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar, who has not appeared to always be in
CBK,s inner circle on peace process issues, now clearly is a
player again, and that given Kadirgamar's legalistic bent,
this might not be helpful.

Next Steps
--------------


8. (C) Brattskar said that the Norwegians will wait for the
Hero,s Day Speech, analyze the fallout and then decide how
to proceed. Solheim will visit with Balasingham in London
(after his Hero,s Day speech there) and try to ascertain
LTTE thinking. Brattskar said that, based on what happens in
London and here on the ground, Solheim may return to Sri
Lanka in early December. Balasingham had told the Norwegians
that he might also return to Sri Lanka &in several months.8
Brattskar commented that at the beginning of the Norwegian
visit, Solheim and Helgesen had told him they thought the
odds of a timely return to the peace table were &two out of
ten.8 At the conclusion, one of them saw the odds as
&three out of ten,8 the other &four out of ten.8


9. (C) Brattskar noted that he continues his efforts to
start a dialogue with the JVP in order to explain the
Norwegian role and to hopefully temper some of the chauvinist
party,s more apocalyptic pronouncements about the
Norwegians. So far, the party has refused such a meeting
(although Brattskar has seen some JVP leaders in their
ministerial capacities). Brattskar,s impression is that the
JVP definitely does not want to leave the government since
the party would no longer be able to steer government
resources to their areas.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Brattskar confirmed the impressions we have received
from others (reftels). Petersen came without a clear
objective and left without a clear outcome. And neither of
the contending parties seems to have an idea how to break the
deadlock and move on. For now, the Norwegians seem content
to let things stay that way, mildly encouraged by the
apparent desire of both sides to resume negotiations -- even
though no one seems able to figure out how to get there.

LUNSTEAD