Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1852
2004-11-12 10:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN ENVOYS' VISIT BRINGS NO

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL CE LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001852 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN ENVOYS' VISIT BRINGS NO
FRESH INITIATIVES ON THE PEACE FRONT--BUT A HINT OF A WAY
FORWARD?


Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001852

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN ENVOYS' VISIT BRINGS NO
FRESH INITIATIVES ON THE PEACE FRONT--BUT A HINT OF A WAY
FORWARD?


Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The November 10-11 visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister
Jan Petersen, Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and
Special Envoy Erik Solheim has brought much talk about the
peace process but little actual progress. There were no
major breakthroughs, but the Tigers might respond positively
if the President can issue a statement of support for resumed
talks endorsed by her entire government--including the JVP.
The Foreign Minister is working hard on the JVP to bring them
around to accept a common position. Helgesen noted to
Ambassador that there is no sign of a desire by either the
Government or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to
return to war. Both, in fact, want to return to talks. The
difference is that the Government is more eager than the
LTTE, and wants a broader agenda, while the LTTE is less
eager and wants an "ISGA-only" agenda. For the first time in
Sri Lankan history, the Opposition supports the Government in
entering negotiations--a unique opportunity. The Ambassador
also met November 11 with Opposition Leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe and Peace Secretariat Head Jayantha Dhanapala.
Wickremasinghe had a cordial meeting with the President on
November 2 and reaffirmed his support for peace talks based
on the ISGA and the Oslo Declaration, but continues to refuse
to participate in the President's National Advisory Council
on peace. Both the LTTE and the UNP question whether the
President is committed more to peace or to a constitutional
change which will allow her to continue in power. End
summary.

--------------
DHANAPALA WANTS LTTE COMMITMENT
--------------


2. (C) During a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador,
Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the Peace Secretariat, was not
overly optimistic regarding Petersen's visit. (Note:
Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen was in Sri Lanka November
10-11.) He doubted that a breakthrough in returning to talks

with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be
achieved during the visit. Dhanapala anticipated that the
November 26 Heroes' Day speech by Prabhakaran, which will
coincide with Prabhakaran's 50th birthday, could be an
important policy statement. Dhanapala said that the Tigers
need to acknowledge their commitment to the peace process and
its continuity between Sri Lankan governments. To that end,
Dhanapala said the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is willing
to agree that the previous government's July 2003 proposal to
the Tigers is still on the table. The GSL also wants the
LTTE to reaffirm its agreement in Oslo in December 2002 to
explore a federal solution within a unified Sri Lanka. A
positive statement to that effect, even by the Norwegians,
would suffice, Dhanapala indicated. He thought that the
return of London-based Tiger theoretician Anton Balasingham
for the high-level Norwegian visit was a good sign, opining
that the LTTE leadership in the Wanni does not adequately
understand the international situation.


3. (C) Discussing domestic politics and its impact on the
peace process, the Ambassador mentioned that some in the
international community have the perception that disputes
among Sinhalese political parties in the south present a real
stumbling block to President Kumaratunga's ability to move
forward with negotiations. Dhanapala noted that the
President's November 2 meeting with Opposition Leader and
head of the United National Party (UNP) Ranil Wickremesinghe
had gone well. He described the President as optimistic
about future meetings and confident that the UNP would join
in discussions in the GSL's National Advisory Council (NAC),
created by the President to discuss the peace process in
different fora. He said the President was pleased with the
inaugural meeting of the Council on October 4, adding that
subsequent meetings of political, religious, and civil
society subgroups had been substantive and productive.
Further, Dhanapala said that Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar and Information Minister Mangala Samaraweera are
working with the GSL's main alliance partner, the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),to educate its members and lay the
groundwork for the GSL's return to talks with the Tigers.

--------------
OPPOSITION VIEWPOINT
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador also met on November 10 with Opposition
Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of Sri Lanka's United
National Party (UNP). On his meeting with President
Kumaratunga, Wickremesinghe said that his response to the
President's request that he participate in the NAC was that
he has not changed his position of withholding participation
until peace talks with the LTTE commence. He told the
Ambassador that he sees the NAC as irrelevant until peace
talks restart. When queried whether the NAC was an attempt
by President Kumaratunga to put pressure on the JVP,
Wickremesinghe responded that he would support her if she
decides to begin peace talks with or without the JVP. First,
however, she needs to decide on her own future.
Wickremesinghe said again that the UNP is always available to
talk about the peace process, but that now the economy is the
key question--not the peace process. He does not want the
public to lose focus on the budget and the deteriorating
state of the economy, which he believes will be a strong
issue in favor of the UNP. Ambassador told Wickremesinghe
that based on his contacts with a wide range of Sri Lankans,
the UNP had hurt itself by its refusal to participate in the
NAC. Sri Lankans do not understand why the UNP refused to
join this process to build a national consensus for peace,
the Ambassador added.


5. (C) Wickremesinghe said he told the President that there
are in fact two proposals on the table: the LTTE's Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and the previous government's
proposal on an interim administration. Her government could
simply pick up where things had been left off. The GSL could
start talks based on the ISGA and then introduce its own
proposal along the way. Wickremesinghe believes that the
President needs to decide if she will take on the JVP--which
opposes resuming talks on the basis of the ISGA--and create a
bipartisan process.


6. (C) Returning to the economy, Wickremesinghe said that
the GSL is trapped by its own rhetoric. He said that the UNP
is telling the GSL it needs to implement the 70 percent
salary increase for government employees that it promised
during the election. He does not see how the GSL can pay for
a SLR 3,000 (Note: approximately USD 30) per month increase,
adding that even the UNP had trouble paying an increase
one-third that size when it came to power. He believes the
President is in a difficult position. Cutting spending could
spell political disaster for her. Increasing borrowings, on
the other hand, would also be disastrous. Wickremesinghe
sees the worldwide increase in oil prices as particularly bad
for the government's budget. The UNP plans to begin a
campaign against the budget, which could include street
protests.

--------------
NORWEGIAN FM LEAVES EARLY;
MISSES DINNER
--------------


7. (C) Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met
President Kumaratunga on November 10, helicoptered to LTTE
headquarters in Kilinochchi to meet LTTE chieftain
Prabhakaran November 11, met Kumaratunga again that same
evening, but was unable to attend a dinner later that evening
hosted by Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar for key Chiefs
of Mission because of his early departure from Sri Lanka to
attend Yasir Arafat's funeral. Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar
Helgesen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim, who had arrived
November 9, were present at the dinner, however. Ambassador
asked Helgesen if Kumaratunga had given Petersen any special
message to take to Prabhakaran. Helgesen replied that she
had not, and that this was a bit disappointing. After all,
he said, Petersen had come to Sri Lanka based on a specific
request from Kumaratunga.


8. (C) During the dinner, Kadirgamar reprised to Ambassador
many of Dhanapala's earlier themes. He thought that the
meeting between the President and Wickremesinghe had gone
very well, noting that they had even been able to issue a
joint communique afterwards. He held out hope that the UNP
would still join the NAC, saying that after the meeting,
Wickremesinghe had held open the possibility, promising to go
back and consult his party. Ambassador told him that he
believed Wickremesinghe was still firm that the UNP would not
participate in the NAC. He also said that he thought that
one reason was that Wickremesinghe was concerned that the
President might still try to implement constitutional changes
through transforming Parliament into a constituent assembly
operating through a simple majority. As long as he felt
threatened by that, he would be less eager to assist
Kumaratunga in the peace process. Interestingly, Kadirgamar,
who is a prominent attorney, made no attempt to defend the
constitutional change proposal.


9. (C) Kadirgamar said Prabhakaran told Petersen that in
order for negotiations to start, Kumaratunga needed to make a
public statement which would have the full support of her
government, i.e., including the JVP. This should happen
before the Heroes' Day speech. Kadirgamar told the
Ambassador that the GSL needs to have agreement from the
Tigers that the negotiations, while based on the ISGA, are
part of a broader framework. Kadirgamar said that he was
indeed working hard on the JVP and that they "have come an
incredibly long way." (Note: Kadirgamar always says this
about the JVP. End note.) He said that he had brought them
"80 percent along" on peace issues. It was possible that the
President might be able soon to make an address to the nation
on peace on behalf of the entire government with JVP
concurrence, the Foreign Minister said.

--------------
VIEW FROM TIGERS
--------------


10. (U) On November 11 the pro-LTTE website TamilNet carried
a statement from Balasingham complaining that "President
Kumaratunga has sent no new message through the Norwegian
Foreign Minister. She has only reiterated her stand that
there should be talks on a permanent political solution."
Balasingham said that the Tigers sent a message to the
President via the Norwegian envoys on how talks could be
resumed. Balasingham was also quoted in the international
media on November 12 as saying "It is not possible to find a
permanent solution under this government," and that despite
the Norwegians' visit, "no progress has been made on the
political level." Press comments that the Norwegians carried
a "secret proposal" from the LTTE to Kumaratunga appear to be
based on these statements.

--------------
HELGESEN/SOLHEIM BRIEF DIPLOMATIC CORPS
--------------


11. (C) On November 12 Helgesen and Solheim briefed the
entire diplomatic corps over lunch. (Note: This was a
departure from normal practice, as the Norwegians generally
brief only the major donors/international organizations/IFIs,
not the entire corps. End note.) Helgesen was studiously
vague in his briefing to this larger group. However,
Ambassador was able to have semi-private discussions with
both Helgesen and Solheim on the margins of the lunch.
Helgesen confirmed that he had carried a message from the
LTTE that they would like Kumaratunga to issue a statement of
support for the negotiations (based on ISGA) on behalf of her
entire government--including the JVP. Would that make the
Tigers more flexible in return, perhaps willing to make a
commitment to explore a federal solution, Ambassador asked?
"That is the hope," Helgesen said. He also said that he had
conveyed two major points to the LTTE. First, this is a
unique opportunity for progress. The President is eager to
move ahead, she wants to bring the JVP along, and she has the
support of the main Opposition--a completely unique moment in
Sri Lankan history. Second, the perception of the
international community is that the President is being
flexible and the LTTE is not. Combined with concern about the
LTTE killings, this is costing the LTTE. Nonetheless, both
Helgesen and Solheim said, the President senses an urgency to
return to talks, the LTTE much less so.


12. (C) Ambassador asked Helgesen if the Norwegians had
raised with the President the issue of her desire for
constitutional change and how that could affect the peace
process. Helgesen said they had, and it had "provoked" her.
She asked if the Norwegians had faith in her government. She
also said that the two were separate issues. She did not,
however, answer the question directly.


13. (C) Helgesen concluded his public briefing by saying that
he had not come with any great expectations, and that
viewpoint had been borne out. Nonetheless, there was no sign
of a desire by either side to return to war. Both, in fact,
want to return to talks. The difference is that the
Government is more eager than the LTTE, and wants a broader
agenda, while the LTTE is less eager and wants an "ISGA-only"
agenda. Helgesen said that he was not overly optimistic, but
he sensed an increasing realization by both sides that if
they don't seize the moment now, there may be a long
stalemate with a consequent uncertainty which may not benefit
them. The President has a unique ability to mobilize the
South for peace, he said--the question for concerned
countries was how to encourage her to take the bold steps to
do so. Ambassador asked Solheim what would happen if the
President issued a statement endorsed by her entire
government showing a willingness to go back to talks based on
the ISGA, and the Tigers then refused. Solheim looked
startled and said: "That would be a total betrayal by the
LTTE of the Norwegian trust."


--------------
COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) As expected, there were no breakthroughs from this
visit. The Tiger desire to see--and Kumaratunga's apparent
willingness to consider--a statement on behalf of the entire
Government supporting the negotiations could show a way
forward, if it can be pulled off. The JVP's unwillingness to
consider the ISGA as the "sole basis" remains a major
sticking point, however, and we don't know if the President
will be able to get the JVP to come around far enough for
that to be a workable strategy. Moreover, even if the JVP
were to come around, the real wild card remains what it has
always been--the dependability of the Tigers as a negotiating
partner. The cordial meeting between Ranil Wickremasinghe
and the President and his continued willingness to support
her in negotiations are hopeful signs, even if he continues
to refuse to join the NAC.
LUNSTEAD