SRI LANKA: CEASEFIRE MONITOR SEES NO EVIDENCE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001845

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014
TAGS: PTER MOPS CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: CEASEFIRE MONITOR SEES NO EVIDENCE OF
RECENT LTTE BUILD-UP IN TRINCOMALEE

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Summary: In an October 28 meeting with poloff,
Hagrup Hauckland, Deputy Head of Mission of the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM),said his organization has found no
evidence to support Government allegations, widely reported
in the press, of a significant Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) build-up in the eastern district of Trincomalee.
While speculating that the Tigers may well have increased
their positions deep in Trincomalee's jungles, Hauckland
emphasized that the SLMM has been unable to corroborate
Government security forces' charges of substantial new LTTE
positions in coastal areas near Government-controlled
territory. In a separate meeting, Neville Wijesinghe, the
senior police official for the Eastern Range, echoed
Hauckland's views, adding that he believes the Sri Lankan
Navy publicized the finding of a recent LTTE transit camp
"for PR purposes." That said, both Hauckland and Wijesinghe
described Trincomalee, with its volatile mix of ethnic groups
and porous, ill-defined boundaries between cleared and
uncleared territories, as a potential flashpoint. End
summary.

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NO "SMOKING GUN" IN TRINCO
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2. (C) In an October 28 meeting with poloff, Hagrup
Hauckland, Deputy Head of Mission of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM),said his organization has found no evidence
to substantiate Government allegations, prominently reported
in the press, that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) have significantly built up new positions in the
eastern coastal district of Trincomalee, especially around
the harbor. (Note: Hauckland's report of no findings tracks
closely with information provided by then-Army Spokesman Col.
Sumedha Perera in a separate meeting one week earlier. End
note.) The existence of Tiger camps near the harbor predates
the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, Hauckland noted, and
actually began when the Tigers moved into positions in Sampur
(near the harbor) vacated by Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)
troops in 1995. In fact, Hauckland said, some of the
installations identified by the military as purported new
LTTE camps or fortifications have actually turned out, upon
inspection, to be Sri Lankan Army installations.


3. (C) While the SLMM has found no evidence of a permanent
and significant new LTTE presence near the harbor, Hauckland
pointed out that surrounding areas include two dense jungles
that are next to impossible to control and survey. The LTTE
could be hiding camps, arms, personnel--almost anything--in
those jungles, Hauckland acknowledged, but quickly added that
the SLMM had been unable to confirm any such build-up.
Unlike in Jaffna, boundaries between GSL-controlled and
LTTE-controlled areas in the east were never clearly
demarcated before the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed,
leaving significant "gray areas," he noted. Moreover,
GSL-controlled territory is interspersed with pockets of
LTTE-controlled areas, leaving the GSL without (again, unlike
in Jaffna) a continuous, discrete Forward Defense Line behind
which it can secure contiguous blocs of territory. The lack
of clear demarcations, coupled with the dense jungle terrain,
makes moving cadres (and, presumably, arms) in and out of the
east relatively easy for the Tigers, he concluded. (Note:
In an earlier meeting with poloff and DATT on October 20,
then-Army Spokesman Perera offered a similar description of
problems in the east. The military has "never had clear
Forward Defense Lines from the beginning" in the east, he
said, and Tiger cadres can easily pass through "gaps" in
GSL-controlled territory. End note.)

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TRINCO TENSE
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4. (C) While the SLMM had found nothing to confirm the Sri
Lankan military's suspicions of a Tiger build-up in
Trincomalee, Hauckland said that the GSL nonetheless has
ample reason for concern. Existing Tiger positions already
give the LTTE a clear view of harbor activity and could put
LTTE guns within reach of Navy ships. (Note: In fact, the
Tigers likely already have such capability. End note.) The
ease of movement possible under the CFA makes it fairly
simple for the LTTE to transfer cadres from the north to the
east and to infiltrate GSL-controlled territory, Hauckland
observed. Moreover, the ethnic diversity in Trincomalee,
with its Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese populations, increases
tensions. In general, the situation in Trincomalee is
"fragile," he concluded. "If trouble happens, it will be
there."

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TIGERS TRANSITING TRINCO
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5. (U) On October 30, according to local press reports and
the Sri Lanka Army website, naval troops brought SLMM
monitors to the site of an apparent LTTE transit camp in a
jungle area near the Naval Head Works sanctuary in central
Trincomalee. The troops recovered two hand grenades, one
LTTE flag, one VHF antenna, tarpaulins and four axes from the
camp. Five temporary huts were also discovered near the
camp. Reports of the find, with accompanying photographs of
disassembled tarpaulins and poles--and very pointed reference
to SLMM monitors being shown the remnants of the camp--were
given prominent front-page coverage in the local press on
November 2.


6. (C) In a November 8 conversation with poloffs, Neville
Wijesinghe, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police for the
Eastern Range, dismissed the discovery of the camp as
relatively insignficant. Echoing earlier comments by Perera
and Hauckland, Wijesinghe observed that it must be assumed
that the Tigers are moving cadres into the east from the
north. Camps like the one found October 30 are intended to
be used for short-term purposes only--usually just a
night--while cadres wait for nightfall before they attempt to
travel. Because of the discovery of the two grenades,
Wijesinghe speculated, the Navy had decided to exploit
finding the camp "for PR purposes." Nonetheless, the porous
"borders" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas in the east
benefit the Tigers, he acknowledged, agreeing with
Hauckland's assessment of Trincomalee, with its strategically
sensitive harbor and its potentially volatile ethnic mix, as
a particular area of GSL concern.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) The GSL and Sri Lankan military periodically raise
the spectre of an LTTE build-up in Trincomalee to highlight
perceived inequities and deficiencies in the CFA. Another
obvious problem is the relative strength, including strategic
positioning, of the LTTE that existed before the CFA. While
most observers, including the SLMM, agree that the GSL has
cause to be concerned, so far the evidence to support such
claims just is not there. Nonetheless, the intense public
scrutiny focused on the east by the GSL's recurrent
complaints to the SLMM heighten speculation and increase
concerns that, as Hauckland said, "if trouble happens, it
will be there."
LUNSTEAD