SRI LANKA: MUSLIM ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS LARGELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001838

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E.MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2014
TAGS: PREL KISL CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MUSLIM ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS LARGELY
IRRELEVANT

REF: COLOMBO 1794 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The majority of Muslims in Sri Lanka live in
the southern, western and central regions of the country, are
traders and businesspeople, and support the largest political
parties, the leaderships of which are dominated by the
Sinhalese majority. In contrast, Muslims in the east are
farmers and fishermen and support more "communal" Muslim
political parties. Eastern Muslims and Muslims from the rest
of the country are largely indifferent to each other's
political concerns. Years of conflict led eastern Muslims to
organize politically, an endeavor which was initially
successful and gave them power in forming governments. Now,
however, eastern Muslim parties are very fragmented and have
lost their political strength. Eastern Muslims vehemently
oppose the LTTE's proposal for an interim authority, but the
President will likely ignore their repeated requests to
participate in any future peace negotiations. Rather than
acting as a roadblock to an eventual settlement between the
GSL and the LTTE, or fully participating in future peace
talks, the badly fractured eastern Muslim polity is likely to
pose little more than a speed bump that the GSL and LTTE can
easily drive over on the road to a lasting political
settlement. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Sri Lanka's 1.5 million Tamil-speaking Muslims are
moderate Sunnis and may be viewed as two groups. The larger
group, (two-thirds of the Muslims) is comprised of traders
and businesspeople scattered in central, western, and
southern Sri Lanka. The remaining one-third is comprised of
fishermen and farmers concentrated in the east. The two
groups are largely indifferent to each other's political
concerns.


3. (U) Many members of the larger, "majority" Muslim group
are wealthy, and in addition to speaking Tamil, usually also
speak Sinhala. Majority Muslims have long aligned themselves
with large Sinhalese-dominated parties, and often see Muslim
"communal" parties like the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
as radical. According to many Muslim and non-Muslim
interlocutors, majority Muslims -- nearly all businesspeople
-- care about the business implications of the peace process.
They did not experience the conflict in the same (often
devastating) way northern and eastern Muslims did and are
only somewhat concerned with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) proposals for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA) in the north and east. Majority Muslims
nominally care about the fate of eastern Muslims and their
experiences in the conflict, but have not applied much
political pressure to aid Eastern Muslims. They are
reluctant to antagonize the Sinhalese, lest they lose market
share in the primarily Sinhalese areas in which they do
business. Getting along is important to them. Majority
Muslims draw their elite from Colombo and Kandy, and perceive
eastern Muslims to be lower in status.


4. (U) Eastern Muslims typically speak only Tamil and are
roughly a third of the population in the east, the highest
concentration of Muslims in Sri Lanka. In contrast to
majority Muslims, eastern Muslims are deeply concerned about
the LTTE and its ISGA proposals because they do not feel
secure in LTTE areas. They have good reason: during the
conflict (and in some cases after the 2002 cease-fire
agreement (CFA)),the LTTE intimidated, abducted, extorted,
and murdered Muslims in the north and east. The LTTE also
appropriated many Muslims' land, a critical issue for eastern
Muslim farmers in particular. In 1990, the LTTE forced
50,000 Muslims out of the north in 24 hours and demanded that
valuables, jewelry, and land deeds be left behind. Almost 15
years later, thousands of northern Muslims are still
displaced and live in welfare centers in Puttalam and
Anuradhapura. Only about 100 Muslim families have returned
to Jaffna.


5. (C) Eastern Muslims have an ambivalent relationship with
the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL). While the GSL did not
always protect them from LTTE aggression, GSL security forces
were their only hope for protection for two decades. Eastern
Muslims demand that their lands be returned to them and that
the GSL protect them from further LTTE terrorism. Many are
skeptical about LTTE assurances that they will be treated
fairly under an ISGA, and are angry that the GSL has not
allowed a separate Muslim delegation to enter the peace
process. One such skeptic, S. Zubaideen, Joint Secretary of
the Peace Foundation in Akkaraipattu (60 km south of
Batticaloa),told poloff that the LTTE "will never change"
and explained that Muslims fear a double standard in which
Muslims would have no rights under an ISGA. Despite their
concerns, eastern Muslims still think it is important to
maintain cordial relations with the Sinhalese and with
majority Muslims.

--------------
Genesis of the SLMC
--------------


6. (U) While they represent 8.5% of the population, the
Muslim polity is by no means monolithic. Their voting base
is fractured, denying Muslims the political strength their
numbers might otherwise grant them. After independence in
1948, Muslims traditionally voted with Sinhalese majority
parties, especially the United National Party (UNP). In the
ensuing decades, about 10 to 20 percent of Muslims began to
support the other major majority party, the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP). Not until the early 1980s did a distinct
Muslim political identity emerge - and an eastern Muslim
identity at that. After the 1983 riots, in which about a
thousand Tamils were killed in government-sponsored violence,
Muslims began to feel more insecure about their own position
as a minority group in Sri Lanka. Many eastern Muslims began
to feel that the Sinhalese majority parties, specifically the
UNP, did not address perceived Muslim injustices in
government employment and education. In response, M.H.M.
Ashraff, a prominent Muslim politician and lawyer from the
east, formed the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1987.
Ashraff, who had previously aligned himself with the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF) to address minority issues,
was motivated by the experiences of conflict-affected
northern and eastern Muslims. Ashraff's desire to address
their needs via a "communal" political party found immediate
success: the SLMC's debut in the 1989 parliamentary election
yielded 4 seats. In the 1994 election, the SLMC garnered 10
seats. In a break with traditional Muslim loyalty to the
UNP, party leader Ashraff supported then Prime Minister
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's government and was
rewarded with powerful ministerial portfolios in ports and
shipping.


7. (U) While the SLMC garnered an impressive 25 to 30 percent
of the Muslim vote, most Muslims still voted with Sinhalese
majority parties. In the late 1990s, Ashraff began thinking
about expanding the SLMC's base from eastern Muslims to
Muslims nation-wide. His idea for a national platform
yielded the 1999 formation of the National Unity Alliance
(NUA),designed to enlist the support of Muslims and other
groups, including Buddhists. The NUA, legally an offshoot of
the SLMC, was never officially registered as an independent
party. Muslim interlocutors told poloff that Ashraff, who
made his mark as the leader of the "communal" SLMC, planned
to expand the NUA into a national political party, with
Ashraff at the helm. He never accomplished his goal. In
September 2000, Ashraff was killed in a helicopter crash in
eastern Sri Lanka.

--------------
The SLMC Fractures
--------------


8. (U) Whatever unity the young SLMC enjoyed quickly
vanished when Ashraff died. Ashraff's hitherto politically
inexperienced widow, Ferial Ashraff, and his protg Rauf
Hakeem fought bitterly for the leadership of the party.
Their battle resulted in an SLMC divided into two camps:
Rauf Hakeem as leader of the party, and Ferial Ashraff as the
leader of the NUA. Hakeem's opponents cited his relative
youth (at the time he was 40 years old) and lack of eastern
heritage (Hakeem is from Kandy) as reasons he should not
lead the SLMC. Ferial Ashraff's opponents derided her lack
of political background, her hometown (also near Kandy),and
expressed concern about a woman leading the party. Hakeem
and the SLMC later threw their support behind the UNP after
the December 2001 election, allowing Ranil Wickremesinghe to
become Prime Minister, while Ferial Ashraff's (still
"communal") NUA supported President Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga's SLFP.


9. (C) Even after the early 2001 split, the SLMC continued
to fracture. Senior SLMC member A.L.M. Attaullah formed the
National Muslim Congress (NMC) in 2002 in protest against
Hakeem's leadership. Later in 2002, a group of politicians
calling themselves the Ashraff Congress also challenged
Hakeem's leadership and broke away from the SLMC. These
groups were angry that Hakeem failed to consult senior SLMC
leaders about major party decisions--notably Hakeem's
decision to sign an agreement with the UNP in 2001 and to
negotiate a separate agreement guaranteeing Muslim security
and participation in the peace talks with LTTE leader
Prabhakaran in 2001. (Comment: Prabhakaran has largely
ignored this agreement. End Comment). In the April
parliamentary election, National Muslim Congress members and
Ashraff Congress members threw their support to the
President's coalition, the United People's Freedom Alliance
(UPFA). According to Ashraff Congress member S. Shahibdeen,
Hakeem failed to convince the international community about
Muslim participation in the peace talks and also failed to
address the issues of Muslim internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in Puttalam. (Hakeem lost the votes of 35,000 Muslim
voters in Puttalam to the UNP.) The Ashraff Congress itself
split in 2004, dividing into the Democratic Unity Alliance
(without parliamentary representation) and the original
Ashraff Congress group. Some interlocutors observe that
while the Ashraff Congress is trying to become an umbrella
group for various Muslim politicians, no one takes it
seriously. People are even more disdainful of the DUA, which
some see as an opportunist group ready to upset the applecart
for the highest bidder--which, in the case of the April
election--was the President. According to Rauf Hakeem, the
SLMC's success in obtaining a Muslim mandate and becoming a
force in forming governments gives SLMC politicians crucial
leverage that others try to destroy. The lure of majority
party perks continue to draw Muslim MPs away from the
contested SLMC center, most recently in October when four
SLMC MPs (who had also fought Hakeem) jumped to the UPFA and
were granted non-cabinet ministerships (see Reftel).

-------------- -
Muslim Political Groups - No Longer Kingmakers
-------------- -


10. (C) The SLMC's status as kingmaker in recent governments
has diminished considerably. The growing importance of a
smaller parties like the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and
Ceylon Worker's Congress (CWC) has reduced the SLMC's
bargaining power to make or break UNP and SLFP governments.
After the April 2004 parliamentary election, SLMC leader Rauf
Hakeem told poloffs that his party had the numbers to give
the President's coalition a majority, but refused to do so.
Hakeem held out for the President's assurance that she would
not attempt to form a constituent assembly and for Muslim
representation at the peace talks. Hakeem added that he
thought a constituent assembly would further destabilize the
government and expressed support for the executive
presidency, which he said is good for Muslim interests and
offers minorities crucial leverage in selecting the
president. He noted that the UPFA asked him to join the
coalition with the promises of discussing his requests
"later." The SLMC declined to support the UPFA.


11. (U) Muslims make up more slots in Parliament than the
SLMC's beleaguered history reveals. Only 30 to 35 percent of
Muslims now vote with the SLMC; the other 65 to 70 percent
vote with the UNP or SLFP (and of those, more Muslims vote
for their traditional choice, the UNP). Even though there
are 24 Muslim MPs in parliament, however, they have been
unable to unite as a single force. In past years, various
attempts to create a Muslim voting block (for example, the
now-defunct Muslim Parliamentary Group),have failed.
Overall Muslim representation in parliament spans the
political spectrum - from the JVP to the SLMC:
- UNP: 7,
- UPFA: 11 (of which 2 JVP, 2 NMC, 2 NUA, 1 PA, 4 SLMC
breakaway),
- SLMC: 6.

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Eastern Muslim Opposition to ISGA
--------------


12. (C) While majority Muslims are often indifferent to the
LTTE's ISGA proposals, eastern Muslims desperately oppose
them and want a voice in the President's handling of the
peace process. SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem explained to poloffs
that, "...it is widely accepted that Muslims are important
stakeholders in the peace process," and that the present
government has marginalized Muslim participation in the peace
process. Hakeem, who participated in six rounds of peace
talks under Ranil Wickremesinghe's government, asserted that
talks should be reformulated so Muslims' proper status in the
process is restored. Hakeem claimed that there must be three
separate proposals on the table: from Muslims, the LTTE, and
the GSL. Hakeem, however, has not submitted any proposals,
and when asked about what theoretical Muslim proposals might
include was vague. Minister of Housing and Construction,
Industry and Eastern Province Education and Irrigation
Development and NUA leader Ferial Ashraff told poloffs that
the LTTE wants everything for itself, and noted that Muslims
who want to be involved in the peace process are not being
consulted at all. She commented that while the LTTE
guarantees a place for Muslims in an ISGA, she lamented the
lack of communication between Muslims and the LTTE and
worried that Muslims will have no say about how they will be
represented. M.I.M. Mohideen, leader of the Muslim Rights
Organization, voiced the fears of many Muslims - that the
ISGA is actually a permanent arrangement. He told poloff
about the eastern Muslim desire for their own "traditional
homeland" in which Muslims live together, independently, with
security.

--------------
Comment
--------------

13. (C) As vehemently as eastern Muslim politicos decry their
lack of representation in the peace process and in future
negotiations for an interim governing arrangement in the
north and east, it seems likely the President will ignore
their demands. When the SLMC functioned as "kingmaker" in
Ranil Wickremesinghe's parliament, its power to influence the
peace process was much greater. Now that the President has
assured her coalition's majority in parliament (just in time
for budget season) from the CWC and angry SLMC defectors,
Hakeem's mainline SLMC is decreasingly relevant. SLMC
interlocutors charged that the President is trying to destroy
the SLMC by "buying off" MPs. While her long history of
meddling with the SLMC supports this accusation, the
President is probably only taking advantage of the
opportunity the SLMC's internal fragmentation and leadership
crisis present. Hakeem is clearly a divisive figure for
eastern Muslims, but no other politician has emerged to take
his place. The SLMC's ability to become relevant will depend
on whether and how the party's leadership crisis is resolved.
Although Muslim leaders like Hakeem and Ferial Ashraff
express hope that the rift in the eastern Muslim polity will
heal and SLMC strength will be restored, there are no
indications that this will be reality anytime soon.


14. (C) Meanwhile, the idea of Muslim interim arrangement
proposals does not enjoy widespread support outside of the
fragmented eastern Muslim polity, half of which is now part
of the President's coalition. Hakeem's seeming discomfort
and indecision about what a Muslim proposal would really look
like further complicates its viability. Majority Muslims may
have the numerical might to augment eastern Muslim opposition
to the ISGA, but they lack the political will to do so. The
GSL, which never went to great lengths to protect
northeastern Muslims in the first place, wants and needs a
settlement with the LTTE badly enough that it will likely
ignore eastern Muslim opposition to an interim arrangement.
The LTTE, which sees Muslims as competition for resources and
an impediment to their influence in the east, is also more
than happy to ignore Muslim concerns. Rather than acting as
a roadblock to any eventual settlement between the GSL and
the LTTE, or as a full participant in the peace process, the
badly fractured eastern Muslim polity is likely to be a speed
bump the GSL and LTTE easily drive over on the road to a
lasting political settlement.




LUNSTEAD