Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1686
2004-10-08 08:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

MALDIVES: GOVERNMENT LIFTS EMERGENCY FOLLOWING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM MV 
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080821Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001686 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: GOVERNMENT LIFTS EMERGENCY FOLLOWING
AMBASSADOR'S VISIT

REF: A. STATE 216176


B. COLOMBO 1610

C. COLOMBO 1582

D. COLOMBO 1516

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001686

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: GOVERNMENT LIFTS EMERGENCY FOLLOWING
AMBASSADOR'S VISIT

REF: A. STATE 216176


B. COLOMBO 1610

C. COLOMBO 1582

D. COLOMBO 1516

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an October 6-7 visit to Maldives, Ambassador urged
the President, Attorney General and Cabinet Ministers to
relax the State of Emergency, continue the process of
democratic reform, and improve conditions for detainees,
including restoring the right to legal counsel. He
emphasized that reconvening the Special Majlis (which is
scheduled for October 12) without the participation of
Members in detention could raise serious questions about the
credibility of Government reform efforts. In an
unprecedented move, the Government also allowed the
Ambassador unsupervised conversations with detained Members
of the Special Majlis. President Gayoom indicated to the
Ambassador that he believes that some of the detained MPs
were involved in a plot to overthrow his government and will
likely be charged accordingly. Just before the Ambassador's
departure the evening of October 7, the Government Spokesman
informed him that the State of Emergency will be lifted
before October 12 and that the President had decided to allow
the detainees access to legal counsel, reading materials and
exercise. (Note: The Government lifted the State of
Emergency early the following day. End note.) President
Gayoom asked for an update on the status of Guantanamo
detainee Fowzy. The Government seems anxious to repair the
diplomatic damage wrought by its earlier rebuff of visiting
EU Chiefs of Mission (Ref D) and to defuse international
criticism of its actions after August 12-13. If, however,
the Government reconvenes the Special Majlis without the very
Members who pushed for its formation, the credibility of its
commitment to reform will continue to be questioned. End
summary.

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GOVERNMENT VIEW: UNDER SIEGE
--------------


2. (SBU) The Ambassador visited Maldives October 6-7 and met
with President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom; Deputy Foreign Minister
Shihab Hussain and Foreign Secretary Abdul Zakariyya; Home

Minister Umar Zahir; Defense Minister Ismail Shafeeu; and
Attorney General Hassan Saeed. In addition, he also met with
members of the Maldives Human Rights Commission, Indian High
Commissioner S. Gavahi, UNDP Resident Representative Moez
Doraid, and Members of the Special Majlis detained after the
demonstrations of August 12-13.


3. (C) With Government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM)
interlocutors, the Ambassador welcomed the October 5 signing
of a Memorandum of Understanding between the GORM and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (Note:
ICRC will likely have its first visit to detainees in
November after Ramadan. End note.) Noting GORM plans to
reconvene the Special Majlis on October 12, he cautioned that
holding such a meeting without the participation of more than
10 percent of its membership (who remain in detention since
the demonstrations) could severely diminish the credibility
of the Special Majlis as a reform body and raise serious
questions about GORM intentions about reform. If reconvening
the Special Majlis is viewed as a facade to pass only
cosmetic reforms, it could be worse than not reconvening the
body at all. The desire for reform among ordinary Maldivians
appears both broad-based and deep-seated; attempts at
suppression could subvert that healthy desire into negative
and destructive channels like radicalism, he warned. As a
friend of Maldives, the U.S. wants to see the country
progress along the path to reform and greater
democratization. Moreover, the credibility of evidence
against detainees gathered under a State of Emergency, when
the normal checks and balances of the legal system have been
suspended, may be questioned by the international community
and ordinary Maldivians, he said.


4. (C) He pressed the President to lift the State of
Emergency and continue with proposed reforms as soon as
possible. The Ambassador noted that while none of the
detainees he interviewed showed signs of physical abuse, many
seemed to display symptoms of acute psychological stress,
which could be attributed to their extended solitary
confinement. Many complained that they had been interrogated
only briefly and wondered why they were being held for
"investigation" if they were not being investigated, he
reported. If the Emergency cannot be lifted for reasons of
national security, he urged the Government to restore the
detainees' right to legal counsel and make other improvements
in their conditions, including allowing them access to
reading material, exercise and more frequent family visits.
(Note: Detainees are allowed one visit every 20 days. A few
prominent detainees have had more frequent visits. End note.)


5. (C) GORM interlocutors, including the President,
indicated that the State of Emergency would likely be lifted
before the Special Majlis reconvened on October 12. The
President noted that he had drafted some articles for a new
Constitution for the Majlis' consideration. "I don't mean
they have to pass (his proposed draft);may be released in
time to participate in the October 12 session, both the
Attorney General and the President indicated, but others will
likely remain in detention to face "very serious charges" of
conspiring against the Government. The Attorney General is
in the process of drawing up these charges. The
demonstrations of August 12-13 were "the culmination of a
long-time process," the President charged, involving various
groups, including "fundamentalists, political activists and
common criminals" conspiring to overthrow the government.
The results of ongoing investigations, once disclosed, will
substantiate that charge, the President promised. He
undertook to review the conditions of detention the
Ambassador cited, indicating that he would consider allowing
the detainees access to legal counsel, reading material,
exercise and more frequent family visits. (Note: Just
before the Ambassador left Maldives the evening of October 7,
the Government Spokesman told him that the President had
decided to restore the detainees' right to legal counsel and
make other improvements in their conditions and that the
State of Emergency would be lifted in the next few days. The
State of Emergency was lifted early October 8, according to
the Government-owned website. End note.)


6. (C) President Gayoom also asked for an update on the
case of Guantanamo detainee Ibrahim Fowzy. The Ambassador
advised the President that Fowzy's case remains under active
review.

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DETAINEES COMPLAIN OF ISOLATION
--------------


7. (C) On October 6 the Ambassador met with 10 Members of
the Special Majlis detained on Dhoonidoo Island. (Two of the
detainees are also Members of the Regular Majlis.) An
eleventh MP was in the hospital and not available to be
interviewed. At the Ambassador's request, the Government
agreed to allow him some unsupervised discussion with each of
the detainees--the first time the Government has granted that
request to anyone. (Note: Under the agreed arrangement, a
police escort was present for part of the conversation. At
the Ambassador's request, the policeman left at the end of
each interview, giving each detainee an opportunity to speak
to the Ambassador in private. Surprisingly, none of the
detainees said anything during this confidential exchange
that they had not already said during the supervised portion
of the interview. End note.)


8. (C) With the exception of one detainee, who complained
of being roughly handled when he was first arrested, none of
the detainees complained of physical abuse. Each said he had
adequate food and access to medical care. All complained of
severe psychological stress--and many showed evidence of such
strain--because of their extended detention in solitary
confinement. The prisoners are strictly forbidden from
communicating with one another; doing so means the revocation
of "privileges" like food and water, according to one
detainee. Except for the Koran, they are not allowed reading
or writing material. (One detainee's request for a copy of
the Constitution was denied.) Except for a few detainees who
have been given a special exemption for medical reasons, most
are confined in 8x8 cells with no opportunity to exercise.
Family visits are rare and heavily supervised. Most
detainees have been permitted only one visit. Only wives,
apparently, are permitted to visit; even babies and small
children are not allowed. One detainee's request to
telephone his children (one and three years old) was denied.
Many also complained that they had been interrogated only
briefly. One detainee, who said he had been interviewed for
no more than ten minutes in a three-week span, asked
rhetorically why he was being detained for investigation if
he was not being investigated. Many inferred from the GORM's
apparent lack of interest in interviewing them that other
"evidence" against them was being compiled. Some said that
the police had confiscated computer equipment from their
homes several weeks earlier and speculated that the GORM
might plant incriminating e-mails or other documents to build
a case against them. A number of detainees intimated that
the Government seemed to be focusing its attention--and thus
likely its case--on Ibrahim Gasim, a prominent businessman
and popular new Member of the Special Majlis who had seemed
poised to win the post of Speaker.


9. (C) Each detainee denied that he was seeking to overthrow
the government. A few said that they hoped President Gayoom
would finish out his current term and leave a legacy of
democratic reform that the whole country could be proud of.
Gasim himself, who said he had been given anti-depressants
and whose hands were shaking, said he was suffering from
"mental problems" as a result of sleep deprivation in the
early days of his confinement. (Note: He appeared to be
suffering from acute psychological strain. End note.) His
wife was attempting to bring a neurologist from Germany, he
reported, but it seemed uncertain that the GORM would permit
the doctor access to him. He denied ever giving money to
"Sheikh" Farid, a radical Muslim preacher facing subversion
charges. "I want women to be able to run for President," he
declared; "Farid is against that." "People are framing me,"
he concluded sadly. Ibrahim Zaki, a former SAARC Secretary
General and government servant for 38 years, also seemed to
be showing signs of mental stress. Declaring that he was
suffering from heart and back problems, he said that he had
signed a "statement," after which, he believes, he will be
released from detention and given time with his family before
being sent to the hospital.

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COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The GORM realizes it must repair the diplomatic
damage done by its reaction to the events of August 12-13 and
its ill-judged treatment of a high-level EU delegation
reviewing the situation (Ref D). The lifting of the State of
Emergency, promised improvements in the detainees' conditions
and the October 5 signing of the MOU with ICRC are all
encouraging developments. That said, it seems certain that
the GORM will proceed with "very serious charges"--possibly
relating to treason or subversion--against at least some of
the detained MPs. These events will cast a long shadow over
the next sitting of the Special Majlis and could undermine
its ability to pass credible reforms. A reconstituted
Special Majlis, neutralized by the absence of the most active
and vociferous proponents of reform, is unlikely to satisfy
most Maldivians' genuine desire for greater democratic
change.


LUNSTEAD