SRI LANKA: TIGERS HEARING A TOUGHER LINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001632

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIGERS HEARING A TOUGHER LINE

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar delivered
an unambiguous message to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) political chief Thamilchelvan: Tiger violence is
jeopardizing the peace process, undermining the Norwegians'
credibility as facilitators, and angering the international
community. Ambassador Lunstead underscored the same message
to a visiting delegation of pro-LTTE MPs. While it is always
difficult to tell how faithfully these unpleasant messages
are conveyed to the Tiger leadership, the chorus of voices
from the international community is getting too loud for the
LTTE to ignore. End summary.


2. (C) NORWEGIANS TALK TOUGH: Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar September 29 described to Co-Chair Chiefs of
Mission (US, Netherlands, Japan, EU) his discussion the
previous evening with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Political Chief Thamilchelvan. (Thamilchelvan was in Colombo
departing for Europe with the LTTE delegation heading to
Switzerland for consultations with Tamil diaspora figures and
visits to European capitals.) Brattsker said he had decided
to talk to Thamilchelvan "only about political killings" in
order to give an impact to his comments. The talks, he said,
"started pleasant, but ended strained."


3. (C) Brattskar told Thamilchelvan that the LTTE needed to
consider three points regarding the recent spate of political
killings of LTTE opponents: a) the influence on the peace
process; b) the effect on the perception of the LTTE in the
outside world; and
c) the effect on the roles of Norway and the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM). On the first point, Brattskar
told Thamilchelvan the violence was causing difficulties in
the South and was encouraging sub-groups to become active. On
the second, the image of the L:TTE around the world was
suffering. Brattskar drew Thamilchelvan's attention to a
recent move by some Danish opposition parties to have the
Tigers declared a terrorist organization. Brattskar also
told him that it was increasingly difficult for the
Norwegains to arrange meetings for the LTTE delegation with
foreign governments, and that the group should be prepared to
receive some strong messages. Finally, the violence was
making life difficult for the Norwegians and the SLMM. (See
below for details.) The two parties--the Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE--had given defined roles to Norway
and the SLMM in the Cease Fire Agreement. The Tigers were not
respecting that agreement and making it impossible for the
Norwegians and the SLMM to carry out their work.


4. (C) Thamilchelvan seemed "taken aback" and had little to
say in response to his, according to Brattskar. He feebly
tried to blame some of the violence on activities of the
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP),but Brattskar told
him that the general perception was that the LTTE was seen as
responsible for the great majority of the violence.


5. (C) Brattskar told COM's that Norway would not go public
with this criticism, since they had to preserve openness with
the LTTE. He said that he had also told Thamilchelvan that
the Norwegians would like to meet with LTTE supremo
Prabhakaran. Acknowledging that this might not be possible
for security reasons, he made the point that what he had said
should be transmitted to Prabhakaran. He told COM's that the
Government of Norway was considering sending a letter to
Prabhakaran to ensure that he received the message. He said
the LTTE group intended to travel to Oslo, Helsinki, Berlin,
Vienna, Dublin, Copenhagen and the Hague after their Geneva
meeting.


6. (U) Brattskar had discussed with Ambassador the day
before, and repeated for group, his continuing troubles with
the EPDP. (EPDP was a Tamil insurgent group which joined the
political process in the late 1980's. Its leader, Douglas
Devananda, is a leading Tamil opponent of the LTTE, and is a
Minister in the ruling UPFA government. He was the target of
the LTTE suicide bomb attempt in July.) EPDP members have
been the victims in a number of recent LTTE assassinations.
After the most recent assassination, EPDP members staged an
almost-hysterical demonstration in front of the Norwegian
Embassy, placing the coffin of the most recent EPDP victim in
front of the Embassy gates, where it remained for several
hours. Devananda also sent a letter to Brattskar (a copy of
which he sent to Ambassador),in which he accused Norway and
the SLMM of "turning a blind eye to the terrorism of the
LTTE," and concluding that Norway and the SLMM "must give
assurances that such political killings by the LTTE would not
be permitted in the future. Otherwise the consequences would
be dire." Devananda had made similar comments to the local
press.


7. (C) Brattskar said he had spoken to Devananda and told
him the atmosphere which he was whipping up was dangerous and
that the last sentence in his letter seemed to be a threat.
He also questioned how a member of the ruling Government
would issue statements at odds with the official government
position. Devananda (who is as weaselly as they come)
admitted that the Norwegians/SLMM had no ability to enforce
the ceasefire or prevent the killings. He claimed that he
had not intended to threaten anyone. Finally, he said that he
had spoken as the leader of the EPDP, not as a member of the
Government. Brattskar also called Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara to complain. Palihakkara was rather dismissive of
the issue, stating that Devananda was under severe pressure
from within his party. Ambassador met Palihakkara on the
evening of September 29 and stressed to him that we also saw
this as a serious issue, and that implied threats to
diplomats and supporters of the peace process were extremely
disturbing. Paliihakkara seemed to take the matter more
seriously, and said that the Government was trying to put
some pressure on Devananda to tone down his rhetoric.
Devananda subsequently sent a follow-on letter to Brattskar,
stating that his mention of "dire consequences" in his first
letter referred to the danger to the peace process if the
Norwegians/SLMM did not "take effective measure to put an end
to the killings by the LTTE."


8. (C) TNA MEETS THE AMBASSADOR: On September 30 the
Ambassador met with Tamil National Alliance (TNA)
representatives Joseph Pararajahsingham, Gajendrakumar
Ponnambalam and S. Gajendran. (Note: The pro-LTTE TNA holds
22 seats in Parliament. Ponnambalam and Gajendran are MPs
from Jaffna; Pararajahsingham is a National List MP from
Batticaloa.) The TNA representatives blamed President
Chandrika Kumaratunga for the stalled peace process, claiming
that her preoccupation with her own political future was
diverting her attention from the peace process. The MPs
recited their familiar, if factitious, mantra of the LTTE
having already demonstrated sufficient flexibility by
declaring itself ready to come back to the table as soon as
the President announces she accepts its proposal for an
interim administration as the basis for resumed dialogue.
All other problems, including the violence in the East, will
subside as soon as talks recommence, they claimed. While not
denying that political assassinations continue, the MPs
lamented "uneven" criticism from the international community,
which, they claimed, castigated LTTE violence while turning a
blind eye to purported GSL complicity in EPDP-orchestrated
killings. The international community, including the U.S.,
should put pressure on the President to resume dialogue as
soon as possible, they concluded.


9. (C) Everyone agrees that dialogue should resume, the
Ambassador replied; that has consistently been the USG
position, both in its public statements and in its private
dealings with the GSL at the highest levels. Both sides need
to be flexible and work to create a conducive environment for
talks, he said, adding that some of the LTTE's recent public
pronouncements have been particularly unhelpful. For
example, the LTTE has not done enough to dispel the popular
perception in the south that the Tigers refuse to consider
any GSL counter-proposals for an interim administration--that
their "proposal" for the Interim Self-Governing Authority
(ISGA) is essentially an ultimatum. While President
Kumaratunga's personal commitment to the peace process does
not seem to be in doubt, she is politically hobbled by her
dependence on the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukti
Peramuna (JVP),he noted. Realizing that, the LTTE should
be willing to give her a little political maneuvering room by
being more visibly flexible on the ISGA and by ceasing
violence, he said.


10. (C) The LTTE's continued campaign of political
assassinations is absolutely unacceptable and is
jeoopardizing the entire peace process, the Ambassador
stressed. The Tigers' persistent violence raises real doubts
about their legitimacy as a negotiating partner on a par with
the GSL, as well as their ability to run any administration
in a just manner, he warned. "How can we accept the Tigers
as the head of an (interim) administration when their method
of dealing with political opponents is to murder them?" he
asked. Moreover, he emphasized, child recruitment and other
human rights violations by the LTTE persist. The Tigers will
remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as long as
they continue terrorist tactics like the July 7 suicide
bombing, he reiterated. Only once they renounce violence in
word and deed can they begin to enter the political
mainstream.


11. (C) THE GSL VIEW: Presidential advisor Mano Tittawella
told DCM September 30 that President Kumaratunga remains very
interested in getting back to the peace table as soon as
possible. Mano said he had communicated this indirectly to
LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan while he was in Colombo
this week enroute to Europe. Tittawella noted, however, that
the President is hesitant to make a bold announcement or take
a bold step since she is not convinced that the LTTE is ready
to resume. Thus, Tittawella commented, "She does not want to
get everything lined up on this, get the JVP on board and all
that, and then have the LTTE decide it's not ready. She
needs a green light from the Wanni (LTTE headquarters)."



12. (C) Comment: The LTTE appears to believe that it can
get away with systematically violating the ceasefire--and
eliminate its remaining political opposition along the
way--because the peace process is too important to the
international community and the GSL for them to jeopardize by
complaining too vigorously about LTTE assassinations.
Brattskar's frank words, coupled with the Ambassador's own
tough message, should put the Tigers on notice that they are
gravely miscalculating if this is their assumption. We will
continue to urge our colleagues in the diplomatic community
to reinforce this message.
LUNSTEAD