Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1558
2004-09-20 10:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

NORWEGIAN ENVOY SOLHEIM FINDS GSL AND LTTE

Tags:  PREL PGOV CE NO LTTE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001558 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SOLHEIM FINDS GSL AND LTTE
COMMITTED TO PEACE PROCESS

REF: COLOMBO 1555 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 1.4(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001558

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SOLHEIM FINDS GSL AND LTTE
COMMITTED TO PEACE PROCESS

REF: COLOMBO 1555 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Solheim is frustrated with the stalemate in
the peace process, but the cease-fire has saved thousands of
lives. He thinks bold steps are needed to resume the talks.
He thinks talks will resume if the wording of the agenda
regarding an interim authority is resolved. The Tigers are
feeling international pressure and resent what they perceive
as "bias." Norway sees this as a long-haul process in which
concerted donor action will be important. Solheim may visit
Washington in early October. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim briefed the
donor group September 17 at the end of his four-day visit to
Sri Lanka. Solheim had met Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eela
(LTTE) official Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi on September 16,
and had seen President Kumaratunga the morning of the 17th.
He also met with Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.

FRUSTRATION WITH STALEMATE, BUT BETTER THAN WAR
-------------- --


3. (C) Solheim began by noting that press pieces that
morning had carried his public statement expressing
"frustration" with the stalemate in the peace process. It
was important, however, to put this in context. Over the
last two years of the ceasefire, some two to three hundred
people had been killed. If the war had been ongoing, that
number would have been two to three thousand. Solheim also
noted that he saw no signal that either side wanted to go
back to war. Obviously hostilities could resume through some
inadvertent incident, but, he believed, there was no
deliberate plan by either side to resume fighting. The
bottom line was that the "no war/no permanent peace"
situation was certainly preferable to a resumed war.

BOLD STEPS NEEDED TO RESUME TALKS
--------------


4. (C) The question then was how to move to the next phase.
Solheim had told both sides that a bold step was needed. At
present they were bogged down in small issues, namely the
wording of the agenda with regard to the Interim Self

Governing Authority (ISGA). Thamilchelvan told Solheim that
the LTTE had already showed flexibility when it gave up its
demand for a separate state, which had been the mandate of
Tamil parties since the 1970s. By contrast, the government
had done nothing to prepare the Southern public to accept
federalism, Thamilchelvan said. This will take time, so an
interim setup was needed. Therefore, Thamilchelvan said, the
LTTE cannot be flexible on the formulation for talks.
However, once talks started they could be flexible on the
ISGA proposal, and were ready to discuss alternate proposals.
Thamilchelvan thought the government was now in a better
position to enter talks based on the ISGA because of the
entrance into the ruling coalition of the Ceylon Workers
Congress, and because of statements by the opposition United
National Party (UNP) that it would support the government if
it entered negotiations based on the ISGA. The LTTE,
Thamilchelvan said, would not put forward any further
conditions. The Tigers were now preparing for a seminar they
would hold in Geneva in two weeks, which would be followed by
visits to some European countries. The Tigers, Solheim said,
were in no particular hurry, and saw no need to help any
particular Southern political party.

KUMARATUNGA SUPPORTS NORWEGIAN ROLE
--------------


5. (C) President Kumaratunga, Solheim said, was eager to get
to talks, but he had not achieved any breakthrough in his
discussion with her. Ambassador asked if she had any
reaction to Solheim's request for "bold steps." Solheim said
that she was considering what she might do. (n.b., President
left the following day for the UNGA session and will be out
of country for 7-10 days, so nothing should be expected in
that time frame. Ambassador will see Kumaratunga upon her
return.) Ambassador noted that Kumaratunga had made a very
positive statement about the Norwegians after her meeting
with Solheim, and presumed that was not coincidental.
Solheim said that was correct. He had told Kumaratunga that
Norway had been put into an awkward position the last few
months. It faced constant public criticism in the South
since it was working with the Tigers, but this was part of
its role as facilitator. Kumaratunga had then issued her
statement, which was part of her running battle with her
coalition partners, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
Kumaratunga for her part had told Solheim that it would help
if the Tigers would reiterate their commitment to a federal
solution.

CEASE-FIRE BROADLY FOLLOWED
--------------


6. (C) On the status of the cease-fire, Solheim said that
both parties were broadly adhering to it, but neither party
was strictly following it. The government had tried to use
Karuna to weaken the LTTE, while the LTTE continued its
campaign of assassinations of its opponents. Hence both
sides were playing with fire.

TIGERS FEELING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE?
--------------


7. (C) Solheim said that Thamilchelvan complained about
"bias" from the international community. International
pressure was one-sided, Thamilchelvan said, and directed
against the Tigers. August statements by the US and the EU
were examples, as were comments by the US Counter-terrorism
Coordinator Ambassador Cofer Black during his recent visit.
He also complained specifically about high-ranking military
visits from the US and India. In a private aside, Solheim
told Ambassador that LTTE theoretician Balasingham had told
him that the mid-August statement by Deputy Secretary
Armitage had been useful as it put pressure on the LTTE to
stop murdering its opponents. Solheim asked that comment be
kept strictly private. (COMMENT: Good, the Tigers are
getting the message.)

INFLUENCE OF EAST?
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador told Solheim that his (Solheim's) emphasis
seemed to be on resolving the agenda issue as the roadblock
to resumed talks. However, many in the South were saying
that the Tigers would not come back to the table until they
were able to reassert their control in the East. Did he
think that was the case? Solheim said he did not agree. If
the President met the LTTE demands on the agenda and ISGA, he
said, the Tigers will come to the table. Solheim also said
that Balasingham would resume his role as chief negotiator
for the Tigers.

LONG-HAUL APPROACH
--------------


9. (C) Solheim concluded by saying that the Norwegians were
in this for the long haul. The donors needed to think, he
said, how to use their money to underpin the peace process.
They needed to assist not only the government and the LTTE,
but also civil society.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Solheim's entire visit was conducted in a low-key
manner. His comments to the press were minimal, and press
coverage was largely confined to the inside pages -- a sharp
contrast to previous visits. As noted above, the Tigers seem
to be feeling some international pressure, but it is not
clear if it has actually changed their behavior in any way.
His assessment that neither side wants or is planning for a
return to war is hopeful -- if it is accurate. His further
assessment that only the ISGA formulation remains as a
roadblock to new talks can only be tested if the Government
comes around on that point. It is also quite possible that
the Tigers will just come up with new conditions.


11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The LTTE meeting in Geneva,
which will be attended by Tamil expatriates from around the
world, could be useful if the expats argue for a return to
talks without further conditions. Department contacts with
potential US-based participants could be helpful, and we
would encourage them. END COMMENT.

SOLHEIM TO WASHINGTON?
--------------


12. (U) After the meeting, Solheim told Ambassador that he
was thinking of visiting the US soon -- perhaps the week of
October 4 -- to renew contacts and share ideas. Ambassador
said he thought this would be useful. Norwegian Embassy may
be in touch to discuss a possible trip.
LUNSTEAD