In readout, Japanese Ambassador sees visit by

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000155

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01-27-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA EU LTTE
SUBJECT: In readout, Japanese Ambassador sees visit by
Special Envoy Akashi as net positive for peace process

Refs: Colombo 150, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 26, Japanese Ambassador
Suda provided Ambassador Lunstead and the other local
co-chairs of the Tokyo process with a readout of Special
Envoy Akashi's recent visit to Sri Lanka. In Akashi's
meeting with the LTTE, the group requested that more be
done to funnel aid to the north/east. While concerned
with the cohabitation confusion in the south, the Tigers
indicated that they remained committed to the peace
track. Akashi also met separately with both the
President andtwice with the Prime Minister. Both
principals indicated that they wanted to resolve the
ongoing cohabitation impasse, but blamed the other for
the situation. Suda thought that Akashi's visit was a
net positive for the peace process. We agree and think
that the visit helped set the stage for the meeting of
the Tokyo co-chairs in Washington scheduled for February

17. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Late January 26, Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda
provided the local co-chairs of the Tokyo process with a
readout of Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi's January 19-25
visit to Sri Lanka (see Reftel for review of the Tokyo
followup meeting hosted by Akashi on January 23 in
Colombo). The meeting was attended by Ambassador
Lunstead, and representatives from Norway and the EU,
including the Netherlands in its role as rotating
president (Ireland does not have representation in
Colombo).

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Akashi Meets the Tigers
--------------


3. (C) Suda kicked off with a review of Akashi's
January 22 meeting with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) Political Chief S.P. Thamilchelvam. The meeting
took place in the LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi in
northern Sri Lanka. Suda said Thamilchelvam had
expressed concerns that aid was not getting through to
the north/east. Thamilchelvam had also expressed
concern over political developments in the south.
According to Suda, the Tiger official repeatedly
stressed that the LTTE did not think political consensus
would be reached in the south any time soon and said the
Tigers were very skeptical that they could find a stable
negotiating partner there at any point soon.
Thamilchelvam reiterated, however, the LTTE's continuing
commitment to the peace process and its position that
the group would negotiate with anyone in the south who
could take firm responsibility for peace negotiations.
Akashi also asked Thamilchelvam to reconsider the LTTE's
decision not to send a representative to the January 23
Tokyo followup meeting in Colombo. (Note: The Tigers
were invited to the conference, but declined to attend.)
Thamilchelvam expressed his appreciation for the
invitation, but demurred, saying the situation was
complicated, and due to a lack of political clarity in
the south, the Tigers would not send a representative to
the meeting.

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Meeting with Kumaratunga
--------------


4. (C) Suda reported that Akashi had briefed President
Kumaratunga late January 23 on that day's Tokyo followup
meeting. Akashi explained the donors' view that it was
imperative that aid continue to flow on an island-wide
basis in support of the peace process despite the lack
of progress in peace negotiations. President
Kumaratunga agreed with this strategy, noting that
during earlier times of political uncertainty
development work had gone forward. Kumaratunga
expressed what Suda reported as "harsh" views toward the
LTTE, lauding the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) listing of the group. She also averred that "too
much flexibility with
the Tigers" would not be positive, citing the group's
record on, among other things, child recruitment.


5. (C) Turning to the cohabitation crisis, Suda said
Kumaratunga had reacted dismissively, noting that what
others were calling a "crisis" had been in effect since
the Prime Minister took power in December 2001. She
asserted that there was a lack of communication with the
PM that was his fault. Kumaratunga said she would like
to resolve the cohabitation impasse, but that she felt
she had done "all she could," and that the initiative to
compromise was with the Prime Minister. Akashi urged
her to be flexible and to work in the national interest
toward a compromise with the PM. Kumaratunga said she
would like the Prime Minister to proceed with the peace
process, and claimed she would not interfere in his
decisions. Wrapping up, Kumaratunga noted that she was
not totally happy with the recent alliance between her
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the radical Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),but that she had been "forced
into it because of the Prime Minister." In a related
vein, Suda said Akashi had also met with Opposition
Leader and senior SLFP MP Mahinda Rajapakse, who was
skeptical about how long the SLFP-JVP alliance would
last.

--------------
Meetings with the Prime Minister
--------------


6. (C) Suda noted that Akashi had met twice with Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe, once on January 20 in Colombo,
and again on January 24 in the north-central town of
Anuradhapura. In his discussions with Akashi, Suda
said, the PM mentioned mistakes the GSL had made
regarding development. The PM related, for example,
that the GSL had failed to draft a comprehensive plan to
develop the north/east, and had not developed a
mechanism to provide aid to that region in the near-
term, such as a joint GSL-LTTE committee.
Wickremesinghe commented that the GSL was drafting a 10-
year infrastructure plan for the northern town of
Kilinochchi, which the government would provide to the
Tigers soon. Wickremesinghe also touched on the
ceasefire agreement, noting that specific articles of
that document focused on normalization, which the GSL
was now struggling to implement due to the uncertainty
over who was in charge of the peace process.


7. (C) On the cohabitation impasse, Akashi stressed the
need for the PM to be flexible. Wickremesinghe
responded that he had been studying various ideas on how
to share control of the Defense Ministry. The PM noted,
for example, that he might be willing to discuss the
setting up of a national security council with the
President. Suda reported that during Akashi's second
meeting with the PM, Akashi provided Wickremesinghe with
an account of his meeting with President Kumaratunga.
Akashi again stressed that the Prime Minister should
show a willingness to compromise with respect to
resolving the cohabitation crisis, and give the
President some way to save face. Wickremesinghe said he
was considering compromising but that the extent of any
such effort would depend on the President's actions.

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COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Toward the close of the briefing, Ambassador
Lunstead asked whether Akashi had left Sri Lanka with
any sense of optimism that the cohabitation impasse
would be resolved soon. While the situation was very
complex, Suda related that Akashi saw some positive
threads. Akashi, for example, felt the PM was taking
the situation seriously and seemed willing to work to
resolve the crisis. President Kumaratunga, in the
meantime, had listened to Akashi carefully, and was more
relaxed than in past meetings. Overall, Suda said he
thought the visit was a net positive. We agree with
that assessment. The visit was timely, especially in
reminding the protagonists in the cohabitation impasse
that the international community is watching
impatiently, wanting them to overcome their differences.
In its focus on helping resolve the cohabitation
dispute, engaging the LTTE, and working with donors on
ways to get more aid flowing, we also think Akashi's
visit helped set the stage for the Washington co-chairs
meeting scheduled for February 17. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD