Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1516
2004-09-13 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

MALDIVES: EU DELEGATION DENIED ACCESS TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL MV 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001516 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: EU DELEGATION DENIED ACCESS TO
PRESIDENT, PRISONERS

REF: A. STATE 191997

B. COLOMBO 1470

C. COLOMBO 1427

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001516

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: EU DELEGATION DENIED ACCESS TO
PRESIDENT, PRISONERS

REF: A. STATE 191997

B. COLOMBO 1470

C. COLOMBO 1427

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) After the Government of the Republic of Maldives
(GORM) turned down requests by an EU delegation for meetings
with President Gayoom and prisoners detained after the
demonstrations of August 12-13 (Ref B),EU Heads of Mission
issued a stinging press release on September 8, decrying the
prolonged detentions and continued State of Emergency as a
"disproportionate reaction." Not to be outdone, the GORM
issued a retaliatory press release on September 9, charging
that the EU statement was "not factual" and questioning the
basis of EU concern in Maldives' "difficulties." EU Missions
in Colombo, especially the Dutch Embassy, intend to keep
pressing the issue. Although one Maldivian contact reported
that conditions had improved recently for the more prominent
detainees, the protracted detentions of so many key champions
of reform continue to raise questions about GORM commitment
to democratic change. End summary.

-------------- --
NO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT;
JUST FEISTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR EU DELEGATES
-------------- --


2. (SBU) An EU Chiefs of Mission delegation that traveled
to the Maldivian capital of Male' on September 6 to discuss
the State of Emergency and the continued detention of at
least 11 MPs was not granted a request to meet with President
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. The delegation's request to meet with
detained Members of the Special and Regular Majlis was
similarly spurned. The delegation, composed of the Dutch
Ambassador (representing the EU presidency),British Charge
and a representative from the EU Mission in New Delhi, was
following up on findings from an earlier, lower-level EU
delegation that traveled to the atoll August 23 (Ref C).


3. (C) Instead of the President, the EU delegation met with
Foreign Minister Fathulla Jameel, whom UK Charge Peter Hughes
described as "spectacularly belligerent." According to
Hughes, the irate FM subjected the delegation to an

eighty-minute tirade in which he questioned, among other
things, the diplomats' right to request a meeting with the
President and the EU's right to question Maldivian internal
affairs. Attempts by the delegation to defuse the outburst,
read out a prepared demarche and lead the discussion back to
the purpose of the visit proved fruitless, Hughes said.
Unable to meet either the President or the detainees, the
delegation returned to Colombo the same evening.


4. (C) Gayoom contacted the Dutch Ambassador by telephone
in Colombo later the same evening, Hughes reported. The
President (somewhat disingenuously) expressed surprise at the
delegation's early return to Colombo, claiming that their
inability to meet him was the result of a miscommunication,
rather than a calculated stiff. (Note: Hughes agreed that
this scenario seemed unlikely. The small size of the
Government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM) and the
President's firm grip on its operations generally minimize
possibilities for "miscommunication." That said, the Foreign
Minister is known to be a hard liner, and it can't be ruled
out that he kept the EU visit from Gayoom since, according to
many, Gayoom remains committed to some sort of reform
process. End note.) According to Hughes, Gayoom told the
Ambassador that he would have been glad to meet the
delegation and reiterated his continued commitment--the
prolonged detention of pro-reform activists
notwithstanding--to democratic reform. On September 9 the
state-owned website ran a cheery banner headline proclaiming
"Gayoom briefs EU presidency on recent political
developments." Further down the text of the article notes,
in more modest print, that the briefing took place by
telephone.

--------------
DUELLING PRESS STATEMENTS
--------------


5. (SBU) EU Chiefs of Mission, apparently unpersuaded by
Gayoom's blandishments, on September 8 issued an
uncharacteristically sharp press statement, criticizing the
State of Emergency and "subsequent mass arrests" as "a
disproportionate reaction by the Maldivian authorities to
what was a largely peaceful demonstration." The statement
called on the GORM to continue the still-incipient process of
democratic reform and urged the early conclusion of the
proposed agreement with the International Committee of the
Red Cross (Ref C). The final sentence of the release listed
the names of the detained MPs to whom the delegation was not
granted access.


6. (U) The GORM responded with its own press release (sent
under cover of diplomatic note to Colombo-based Missions) on
September 9. The GORM statement justified the declaration of
the State of Emergency as having been "taken in the interest
of public safety and national security in the face of threats
of bombs and arson made by anonymous entities." The GORM
statement disputed the EU's charge that "mass arrests" had
taken place, noting that only 78 individuals remain in
custody. The demonstrations on August 12 and 13 "were aimed
at disrupting and derailing the (reform) process," the
statement asserted. Among those hoping to derail the
process, according to the statement, are "Islamic extremists"
and "dissident groups" who hope to "blame the Government for
failure to realize the reforms envisaged by the President and
the people. . . . Among the people who were arrested by the
Government, none of them is a 'reform leader.'" While not
responding directly to the EU charge that the September 6
delegation was refused access to detained MPs, the GORM
statement notes that the earlier delegation did meet the
detainees and that thus "the statements made in the (EU)
declaration are not factual" and do not take into account the
GORM's genuine efforts to address the "difficulties" arising
from the demonstrations. The final line of the GORM
statement asserts, "Clearly, these difficulties are of
greater concern to the Government of Maldives than to the
EU."

--------------
NEXT STEPS?
--------------


7. (C) UK Charge Hughes said that while the EU intends to
maintain pressure on the GORM, no follow-up delegations,
high-level phone calls, press statements or revised travel
announcements are being contemplated in the near term.
(Note: A possible phone call from British Deputy Prime
Minister Prescott to Gayoom, which was once under active
consideration, seems to have been placed on the back burner
for now. Prescott may see Gayoom if the Maldivian leader
visits London in September. End note.) The EU's most
effective source of leverage, Hughes believes, may be its
disproportionate share of the tourism market. (Note: EU
countries account for nearly 70 percent of international
tourists to Maldives. Tourism is the single greatest
contributor to GDP in Maldives. End note.) Even though the
EU is not considering officially discouraging travel to
Maldives, Hughes said, unfavorable publicity, especially from
human rights groups, might affect demand. Dutch DCM Harry
van Dijk opined that the GORM is digging in its heels in the
hope that international attention will eventually wane,
leaving the GORM free to ignore pressure to reform. His
Embassy, however, plans to continue to follow events closely.


8. (C) Hughes related to DCM several theories from
pro-reform sources on why the GORM persists in holding the
MPs. Some believe that the GORM's investigations into the
MPs' purported connection to the demonstrations will turn up
"evidence" of some criminal act that will render them
ineligible to remain as MPs--and thus unable to continue to
push for reforms. Others have suggested that the GORM may
call snap elections while the MPs are in detention, making it
impossible for them to contest, and leaving the GORM in full
control of "guiding" the reform process. While noting the
difficulty of determining the credibility of such theories,
Hughes expressed general concern regarding the fate of the
MPs in detention, speculating that the longer they remain in
jail the more compelling the need for the GORM to find--or
manufacture--some justification for holding them.

--------------
FAMILY VISITS FOR MPS;
OTHERS INCOMMUNICADO
--------------


9. (C) On September 10 the personal secretary to one of the
detained MPs told poloff that conditions had improved for the
better-known detainees, including the MPs, who are now being
allowed contact with family members. He noted, however, that
approximately 50 detainees (believed to held at a separate
facility on another island) have not been visited or heard
from by anyone. He urged other diplomatic visitors,
including any from the U.S. Embassy, to request a meeting
with at least some of these detainees.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The GORM is not used to international scrutiny and
criticism and, as evidenced by the Foreign Minister's tirade
and the shrilly indignant press statement, does not react
well to it. With 11 of the most vocal proponents of reform
in government custody, the claim in the GORM press release
that none of the detainees is a reform leader is, in the
words that the GORM used to deride the EU statement, "not
factual." Whatever the GORM's reasons for holding the MPs,
the prolonged detentions of more than 10 percent of the
Members of the Special Majlis--which was set up for the sole
purpose of recommending constitutional reforms--does not
suggest progress toward greater democratization is imminent.
Impending visits by the DCM (September 19-20) and the
Ambassador (end of September/beginning of October) will
provide opportunities for us to remind Male' of USG interest
in continued reform and concern at recent developments.




LUNSTEAD