SRI LANKA: VISIT OF S/CT COORDINATOR AMB. J.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001510

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: VISIT OF S/CT COORDINATOR AMB. J.
COFER BLACK

Classified By: JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, Deputy Chief of Mission. REASON: 1
.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In meetings with Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)
officials on September 8, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Ambassador J. Cofer Black underscored U.S. appreciation of
Sri Lanka's support of the Global War on Terror. He
emphasized USG commitment to helping the GSL achieve a
peaceful resolution to Sri Lanka's lengthy ethnic conflict,
while stressing that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) will remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations
list until it renounces violence in word and deed. GSL
interlocutors thanked Ambassador Black for the firm line the
U.S. has adopted against the LTTE, asserting that the U.S.
stance had helped convince the Tigers to sign the 2002
Ceasefire Agreement. Most interlocutors attributed the
recent spike in violence to LTTE efforts to quell internal
dissension in the East, but agreed that the Tigers are not
contemplating a return to full-scale hostilities. Ambassador
Black also addressed a well-attended media roundtable with
local print, radio and television journalists. End summary.


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MEETINGS WITH MFA, SECURITY AND
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS
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2. (U) On September 8 Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Ambassador J. Cofer Black met with Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) officials involved in foreign affairs, security,
defense and intelligence. Interlocutors included Foreign
Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara; Secretary of Defense Cyril

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Herath; Secretary of Public Security, Law, and Order Tilak
Ranaviraja; Director of Internal Intelligence Keerthi
Gajanayake; Director of Military Intelligence Major General
Kapila Hendawitharana; and Inspector General of Police Indra
De Silva. Ambassador Black was accompanied by the Charge.

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SRI LANKAN COOPERATION IN GLOBAL ANTI-TERROR EFFORTS
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3. (C) Ambassador Black opened the meeting with the Foreign
Secretary by thanking Palihakkara for his government's

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support in the global campaign against terror. He attributed
recent progress made against al-Qaeda to the successful
cooperation the U.S. has received from its international
partners in this fight, but noted the need for greater and
more concerted international pressure to be levied against
state sponsors of terrorism. In particular, he urged the
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to exert its influence with the
governments of Iran and Syria to cease their support of
international terrorist organizations. Sri Lanka has every
reason to support the global war on terror because it has
suffered so much from acts of terrorism over the past two
decades, Palihakkara responded, adding that the GSL in the
past has used its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement,
APEC, SAARC and other international and regional groupings to
push stronger counter-terrorist agendas. As Sri Lanka's
Ambassador to Thailand (mid-2001 to mid-2004),Palihakkara
said his mission had worked closely with USG law enforcement
agencies to exchange information and to improve surveillance
of suspicious individuals and organizations.


4. (C) Dr. Rohan Perera, Legal Advisor for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, noted that the
GSL has taken its obligations under UN Security Council
Resolution 1373 very seriously. Chairing the Ad Hoc
Committee on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
the GSL is spearheading efforts to draft a nuclear terrorism
convention and a comprehensive counter-terrorism convention.
He reported hearing "more moderate voices" from OIC member
states during the June Working Group meeting on the nuclear
terrorism convention, adding that even Syria was "much less
strident than usual," while Jordan offered "some constructive
proposals." Turkey was especially helpful as Chair of the
last Working Group, he said, noting that he expects upcoming
OIC Chair Morocco to play a similarly cooperative role during
the 6th Committee meeting in October. During the most recent
SAARC Summit in Islamabad, he continued, the GSL had taken
the initiative to call for a protocol on terrorist financing.
The GSL's special efforts not to ascribe an ethnic or
religious dimension to terrorism in these international
fora--not to "Islamicize" terror--have helped keep
counter-terrorism cooperation and initiatives "moving along,"
Palihakkara observed. Ambassador Black commended the GSL for
being "a force for positive change behind the scenes."

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LTTE AND PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
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5. (C) Foreign Secretary Palihakkara thanked Ambassador
Black for the USG's "constructive position" on designating
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO),which he described as
supporting the GSL's efforts to urge the LTTE back to the
negotiating table. International "disapproval" is essential
to making the Tigers realize that they must approach
negotiations with more flexibility and a greater willingness
to compromise than they have demonstrated so far, he stated.
Despite many recent "challenges," primarily from LTTE
violations and assassinations of political opponents, the
Ceasefire Agreement is still holding, he asserted, with no
imminent fundamental threat to its continuation. The GSL has
decided to take "a patient line" in response to LTTE
violations, Palihakkara said, because maintaining the
Ceasefire Agreement is crucial to further progress toward
negotiations. In a separate meeting, Public Security, Law,
and Order Secretary Tilak Ranaviraja also expressed his
thanks to Ambassador Black for the consistent USG message
regarding the Tigers' designation as an FTO, in addition to
the United States' constant call for a political solution to
the ethnic conflict.


6. (C) The lack of progress toward resuming negotiations is
not due to any fundamental disagreement on substance between
the two parties, Palihakkara said, adding that the GSL
already had "gone more than the extra mile to accommodate the
LTTE's pre-negotiation demands," including consideration of
the Tigers' proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority
(ISGA). Even the recalcitrant Janatha Vimukti Peramuna
(JVP),the Government's pro-nationalist coalition partner,
has agreed to allow the ISGA as part of a possible agenda for
talks. The LTTE knows, moreover, that reverting to
full-scale conflict is "not an option." Nor would it want
to, suggested officials from the Directorate of Internal
Intelligence (DII). The LTTE has made thousands of dollars
in "taxes" collected from travelers since the road to Jaffna
reopened and is busily building the infrastructure of a de
facto "interim administration," the DII officials charged.



7. (C) All GSL interlocutors identified the LTTE's new
feeling of "vulnerability" as stemming from the unprecedented
rebellion last March of its powerful Eastern military
commander and his cadres as the key obstacle to resuming
talks. Once Karuna's approximately 6,000 cadres disbanded in
the East, the LTTE has had difficulty re-establishing a
strong armed presence in that region. The LTTE feels
weakened by this internal fragmentation and is unlikely to
pursue negotiations until it believes it has successfully
faced down this threat from within its own ranks. Secretary
of Defense Cyril Herath, Director of Internal Intelligence
(DII) Keerthi Gajanayake and Director of Military
Intelligence (DMI) Major General Kapila Hendawitharana
provided a similar assessment to Ambassador Black, with
Herath asserting that the LTTE would never reestablish full
control in the East. While the GSL realizes the Tigers' need
for internal stability and has decided it can wait until the
LTTE feels ready, the Foreign Secretary said, the
international community can play a helpful role by "reminding
the LTTE they need to show by their actions they have learned
the art of compromise." Noting that Norwegian Special Envoy
Solheim is scheduled to visit Sri Lanka next week,
Palihakkara reported that the GSL has indicated to Norwegian
facilitators that it is "ready to discuss with the LTTE
(possible modalities of) interim authority at any time,
including the ISGA," as one of the proposals on the table.
The U.S. wants to support GSL efforts to secure a peaceful
resolution to the lengthy conflict, Ambassador Black told all
interlocutors, and will continue to emphasize that the LTTE
will remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List until
it renounces violence in word and act.

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NEW AND IMPROVED LTTE?
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8. (C) The freedom of movement allowed LTTE operatives by
the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) has helped the Tigers boost
their intelligence-gathering capabilities, including on
Colombo-based targets, GSL interlocutors complained. DII
Gajanayake cited the LTTE's successful assassination of 24
GSL informants over the past three months as proof of the
Tigers' extensive intelligence network. According to
Gajayanake, the DII has been unable to make similar advances
because of financial and legal constraints. The DII has only
a shoestring budget, while "money is nothing for the LTTE."
He lamented the suspension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(PTA) under the Ceasefire Agreement. Without the PTA,
suspects must be produced before a magistrate within 24
hours--not enough time to "interrogate" them adequately, he
charged. On the military side, Herath and Hendawitharana
expressed concern over the LTTE's growing capability at sea
and the GSL's limited ability to monitor such developments.
Both officials thought that the Sea Tigers, the group's naval
wing, were developing their underwater demolition expertise.
In response, however, the DMI stated that the GSL did not
have the resources to develop adequate naval capacity to deal
with the growing concern. (There were not even enough
resources for adequate coastal narcotics interdiction,
according to the Public Security Secretary.) Despite the
LTTE's military expertise, the DMI added that there was no
evidence the group was in communication or involved with
other known global terrorist groups. Domestically, however,
the ceasefire had allowed LTTE cadre free movement in the
government areas and the DMI and Public Security Secretary
made similar comments that the LTTE has conducted
intelligence gathering on Colombo-based targets. Regarding
border security issues, Ranaviraja told Ambassador Black that
the GSL has approved the draft Memorandum of Intent (MOI)
with the USG for the Terrorist Interdiction Program/ Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(TIP/PISCES) and will be ready to sign the MOI shortly.

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OTHER NATIONS' ROLES
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9. (C) Ambassador Black asked the Foreign Secretary to
describe neighboring nations' roles in supporting GSL efforts
toward a negotiated solution to the conflict. Characterizing
India as "very supportive," Palihakkara said that some
Western countries, especially those in the EU, should adopt a
"firmer line" against the LTTE, especially with regard to
illicit financial transactions. That said, he acknowledged
that the EU's August 16 statement condemning recent Tiger
violations had been "very helpful." Ambassador Black
committed to redoubling USG efforts, including on the margins
of the upcoming UNGA, to persuade EU partners to maintain
such helpful pressure on the LTTE.

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SRI LANKA'S MUSLIM POPULATION
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10. (C) Ambassador Black asked several interlocutors about
Sri Lanka's Muslim community and if there were any signs of
radicalization or militancy. Ranaviraja felt that Sri Lankan
Muslims, in general, were comfortable and went to the Middle
East only for employment opportunities to send money home.
He admitted to some tensions among Muslims in the ethnically
diverse East, but said there was no evidence of arms
collecting. Responding to a query that the Muslims in the
East were acquiring the weapons abandoned by LTTE's Eastern
military commander, Ranaviraja said only a few of the
abandoned weapons had been traced to Muslims but admitted
that the majority of the weapons cache remained unaccounted
for.
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MEDIA ROUNDTABLE
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11. (U) Sri Lankan media coverage of Ambassador Black's
statements and interviews was extensive, with all papers
running front-page or prominent inside page stories, some
with a photo of Black. The stories were based on a media
roundtable Black held with six editors of the main English
and vernacular newspapers. Sinhala-language papers as well
as English newspapers played up Black's denunciation of the
LTTE and his call for the group to renounce terrorism in word
and deed. Tamil papers highlighted his statements calling
for both sides to return to the negotiating table. Sri
Lanka's two leading TV stations, independent MTV and
government-owned Rupavahini, ran lengthy excerpts during
their prime-time evening newscasts (in English, Sinhala, and
Tamil) of interviews they conducted with Ambassador Black.
Both emphasized his call for the LTTE to renounce terrorism.
No editorials have yet appeared commenting on Black's
statements, although we expect a few to be published in the
coming days. The full transcript of Black's press briefing
is available on the embassy's web site.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Ambassador Black's meetings with GSL officials
served to underline our determination to keep the LTTE
designated as an FTO, a stance warmly welcomed by the GSL.
Moreover, GSL officials listened carefully to and largely
agreed with Ambassador Black's presentations on global U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, the broad and prominent
coverage generated by Ambassador Black's media round table
and separate TV interviews helped reinforce to the public our
messages that the LTTE must renounce violence, and that both
sides must move towards a negotiated settlement as the only
possible solution to the conflict. Finally, Ambassador
Black's visit succeeded in highlighting to the GSL and to the
public U.S. satisfaction with the good cooperation Sri Lanka
has shown on counterterrorism issues. END COMMENT.


13. (U) Ambassador Black cleared this cable.
LUNSTEAD