SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001502

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS FOR DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: X6
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)
RESPONSES FOR COLOMBO AND IRANAWILLA

REF: SECSTATE 185263

Classified By: RSO Alex Moore - Reason: 1.4(d). Exempt from declassifi
cation - Reason: 1.6(X6).

(U) Embassy Colombo convened an EAC on 09/07/04 to discuss
and approve responses to questions posed in Reftel. The
responses below are keyed to the format provided in Reftel.

--------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
--------------


1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS


A. YES - There are communities in Sri Lanka capable of
conducting anti-US demonstrations.


B. NO - There have been no anti-US demonstrations in the
past 12 months.


C. YES - Other forms of demonstrations have taken place
outside USG facilities.


D. Demonstrations usually average 350 people.


E. YES - Anti-American demonstrations in the past have been
triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives and/or military
action.


F. Demonstrations are generally non-violent but can be
unruly. On March 28, 2003, a demonstration involving up to
2,000 left-wing JVP members and Muslims became unruly and
police used tear gas when the crowd overran the designated
boundaries.


G. NO damage to USG property.


H. No penetrations of US facility perimeter.


I. Yes, there have been anti-SLG demonstrations in the past
12 months, none were violent.


J. YES - Demonstrations have taken place near USG facilities.


K. Average size is in hundreds, but can be as low as 30 and
as high as 10,000.


L. Anti-Government demonstrations are generally non-violent
but can at times become unruly. The last serious incident of
political disturbance was Oct 2002, when Muslim/Sinhalese
rioting lasted for two days in extreme northern Colombo near
the airport, resulting in a government-imposed three day
curfew. A number of private homes were burned in the
rioting, including the home of a locally employed staff
member. The Embassy Warden System was activated during this
period.


M. No damage to USG property.



2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS



A. Intrastate conflict exists, however the 18-year
insurgency by the Tamil minority LTTE against the Sinhalese
majority government has been under a cease-fire agreement
since February 2002. In 2004, eastern LTTE leader Karuna
broke away from central LTTE leadership, leading to
LTTE-on-LTTE violence throughout Sri Lanka. That conflict is
still ongoing.


B. When the insurgency was active and ongoing, fighting took
place primarily in the north and eastern provinces, although
LTTE conducted multiple operations in Colombo, primarily
suicide bombers. Now, the internal LTTE violence promarily
has taken place in the East, but has recently moved into
Colombo.


C. N/A


D. Yes, one political party, the left-wing Sinhalese Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has historically expressed an
anti-western and anti-American orientation. The JVP was
brought into an alliance with the President's party in the
April 2004 national election called by the President.



3. (C/NOFORN) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES

A. Local law enforcement is moderately capable in certain
police matters such as crowd control, anti-insurgency
actions, bomb disposal, and some major crime investigative
matters. Capabilities in other areas such as lower-level
criminal investigations and forensics are limited. Responses
to residential crime and traffic control are severely
limited. Political interference in police matters greatly
erodes police effectiveness.


B. A limited number of Sri Lankan police officers have been
trained through INL and ATA funded training programs, but ATA
training has been curtailed since 2002. Police have
responded well in certain areas of training, such as VIP
Protection, bomb disposal and post-blast investigation.
Because of constant turnover at the senior police level due
to political interference, however, much of the other ATA
training has been lost to attrition. In one notable example
of police training deficiencies, a July 7 suicide bomber was
suspected by the police to in fact be a bomber, but the
suspect was never handcuffed when she was taken into custody.
As a result, the suspect was able to manually detonate
herself inside the police station, located across the street
from the Chancery, killing herself and four police officers.
INL monies have been identified this year for narcotics
interdiction and community policing. UK, Sweden, China and
Japan have conducted some police training.


C. YES - Corruption within the police is a problem.


D. The principal intelligence service in Sri Lanka is the
Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII). This service is
moderately competent within Sri Lanka using human collectors.
However, intelligence gathering directly related to the LTTE
is limited, and done mostly through the Directorate of
Military Intelligence (DMI),which has limited HUMINT and
SIGINT capabilities. Technical capabilities of the DII are
believed to be limited, but RSO has used DII telephone
information in the past. The other intelligence
organization, the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI),
focuses on the international community. The DFI is
underfunded, understaffed, and is believed to have very
limited human and technical capabilities.


E. YES - The intelligence services are cooperative, within
limits of their capabilities.


F. YES - LTTE suicide bombings have been significantly
reduced, and counter-insurgency operations have been
effective in isolated instances. A true evaluation of
counter-insurgency successes is difficult given the ceasefire
that has been in effect since Feb 2002.


G. YES - A new police unit has been created specifically for
embassy security. The police were very responsive by
providing residential security during the Iraq War. Police
are very responsive to Embassy requests for VIP Protection.


H. GOOD - Since the Colombo Airport was attacked by the LTTE
in July 2001, airport security has been enhanced
significantly.


I. Immigration and Customs controls are generally considered
to be ineffective.


J. Sri Lanka is an island, and maritime security forces are
generally considered to be ineffective, particularly against
the LTTE "Sea Tigers."


--------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------



4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. It is possible there are indigenous, anti-American
terrorist groups in Sri Lanka, but we have no specific
information concerning their existence.


B. N/A


C. No anti-American attack has occurred in the last 12 months.


D. N/A


E. N/A

F. N/A


G. N/A


H. N/A


5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. Yes, there are other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in Sri Lanka.


B. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).


C. Yes, the LTTE carries out indiscriminate attacks
throughout the country, including a July 7 suicide bomber
within one block of the US Embassy. Since the ceasefire in
2002, however, the LTTE has focused on specific
assassinations of its political rivals and government
informants. PolOff reports that 32 such attacks took place
during one six week period between July-August 2004; while
only 36 attacks were reported for the entire year in 2003.


D. The attacks are most always lethal and American
bystanders have been injured in past attacks.


E. Americans have been injured as bystanders but not killed
in LTTE attacks.


--------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------



6. (C/NOFORN) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. Embassy Colombo knows of no foreign terrorist groups that
have a presence in Sri Lanka, aside from the LTTE, which is
recognized as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.


B. EAC has assessed that, absent any new information,
current conditions in Sri Lanka would make a terrorist
operation by an outside group difficult to implement. This
assessment is based on several factors, including the active
intelligence capabilities of the Sri Lankan security services
and a relatively small Muslim population (8 percent) that has
demonstrated little capability or inclination to support
Muslim extremist activities. Embassy Colombo is aware of no
firm link between LTTE and Al-Qaida, nor does the EAC believe
the LTTE would allow any Muslim militant group to operate in
areas that are under LTTE control.


C. The SLG has demonstrated no sympathies for any
transnational terrorist group.


D. Embassy Colombo reported a list of NGOs that might have
links to a transnational terrorist group in 04 Colombo 0950.


E. There could possibly be small ethnic or religious
communities that are sympathetic to transnational terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaida, but they are not considered
significant at this point. That said, the hoax anthrax
letter that resulted in the closure of the Embassy for three
days in August was authored by someone making reference to
Muslims killed in Iraq and signed, "Al-Qaida Sri Lanka."


F. Hostile intelligence services connected to foreign
embassies most likely exist in Sri Lanka, including Iraq (now
closed),Iran, Libya, China, Cuba, Palestine, and Russia.
Aside from occasional reports of possible surveillance
activity, Embassy Colombo has no information that connects
any of these services to anti-American attacks.


G. Due to Sri Lanka's 20-year insurgency with the LTTE,
weapons and explosives are readily available. Several
thousand deserters maintain control of their military-issued
weapons. Breakaway LTTE rebel leader Karuna abandoned large
amounts of weapons when his forces fled the East in March,
many of which are believed to have been acquired by organized
crime and possibly sold to Sri Lankan Muslim groups seeking
to defend themselves against the LTTE. On the black market,
T-56 fully automatic rifles can be purchased for USD 120-180,
and hand grenades cost USD 6. The LTTE produces highly
sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),and uses
high quality explosives to make anti-personnel mines or
armored vehicle mines.

7. Embassy Colombo POC is RSO Alex Moore (94-11-244-8007).
ENTWISTLE