SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF AMB. COFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 001456

SIPDIS

ISLAMABAD - PLEASE PASS TO AMB. BLACK
FOR AMB. BLACK FROM CDA ENTWISTLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC CE MALDIVES'>MV ECONOMICS LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF AMB. COFER
BLACK

Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Your visit comes at an important juncture in the
30-month-old ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A
recent surge in assassinations by the LTTE, coupled with the
lack of progress toward resumed negotiations, have raised
concerns that the ceasefire may be unraveling. While the
LTTE is clearly to blame for most of the increased violence,
President Kumaratunga's dependence on a contentious and
precarious coalition has distracted the GSL's focus and
undermined its ability to develop a unified policy on
recommencing talks with the Tigers. Recent ill-advised and
widely publicized threats of a military response to LTTE
violations issued by key GSL ministers have done little to
defuse the situation. Your visit will be interpreted locally
as a strong vote of confidence for the GSL and a
reaffirmation of our policy to retain the Tigers on the
Foreign Terrorist Organizations list until they renounce
violence both in words and actions. At the same time, you
should impress upon GSL interlocutors the need to move
quickly and cohesively to resume negotiations. In the
Republic of MALDIVES, the Government has justified the swift
suppression of pro-reform demonstrations on August 12-13 by
attempting to paint them as inspired by anti-American
"extremists" and "fundamentalists." Although we do not know
the affiliations of all 180 individuals detained in
connection with the demonstrations--and although one
Maldivian citizen is being held in Guantanamo for suspected
al-Qaeda activities--we remain generally skeptical of the
Government's attempts to link well-known pro-reform activists
to shadowy "extremist" elements. End summary.


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CEASEFIRE HOLDING,
BUT FRAYING AROUND THE EDGES
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2. (C) The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) has been broadly
supportive of U.S. efforts on the Global War on Terror. In
late 2002, for example, the GSL granted the U.S. blanket
overflight clearance for military aircraft. For most Sri
Lankans, however, "terror" generally means domestic terror,
as perpetrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE),who since 1983 have waged a violent ethnic insurgency
aimed at creating a separate state for ethnic Tamils in the
north and east of the island. Some Sri Lankan observers
credit the USG's Global War on Terror with pressuring the
LTTE to sign a Ceasefire Agreement with the GSL in February

2002. The 30-month-old ceasefire has shown some alarming
signs recently of coming apart at the seams, however. The
split with Karuna, the LTTE's Eastern Military Commander, in
March sparked a renewed wave of violence, as LTTE
"headquarters" targeted and killed his supporters in the east
in a brutal bid to reassert authority and intimidate the
population in the region. Moreover, the LTTE's (likely
well-founded) suspicion that the GSL aided and abetted
Karuna's defection has increased the Tigers' mistrust of the
GSL and upped the stridency of their anti-government rhetoric
in subsequent months.


3. (SBU) Since the beginning of July, suspected LTTE
militants have assassinated 32 political opponents, Karuna
supporters and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) informants, rivaling in a
mere seven weeks the Tigers' twelve-month total of 36
civilians slain in 2003. The Tigers characteristically
refuse to claim responsibility for the assassinations,
blaming those occurring in LTTE-controlled territory on
"rival factions," while faulting the GSL for failing to
prevent those occurring in government-controlled territory.
(Note: About one-third of the recent killings have taken
place in Colombo or its suburbs. End note.) Nor has the
violence been entirely one-sided. Eight LTTE cadres,
including two relatively senior members, have been killed
(most likely by Karuna supporters) over the same period.


4. (SBU) The successful targeting of purported SLA
informants in Colombo and its suburbs has raised GSL fears
that the Tigers have exploited the freedom of movement
afforded by the ceasefire to improve their intelligence and
to infiltrate the capital. Perhaps the most disturbing
development was the July 7 suicide bombing at a Colombo
police station (located diagonally across the street from the
U.S. Embassy),which killed four policemen. The bomber
detonated explosives attached to her body after suspicious
police escorted her from the office of her likely intended
target, an anti-LTTE politician who is a minister in
President Kumaratunga's Cabinet, to the station for
questioning. The abortive assassination attempt marked the
first time that the Tigers have reverted to their time-tested
tactic of suicide bombing since signing the Ceasefire
Agreement in early 2002. The LTTE's disavowal of involvement
in the incident has only confirmed suspicions, both within
the GSL and throughout the international community, that the
LTTE will continue to use terror and violence, despite the
ceasefire, to intimidate its opponents and put pressure on
the government.

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FRAGILE COALITION MEANS INCONSISTENCY,
INATTENTION ON GSL SIDE
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5. (C) While the Tigers' sporadic violence is a depressing
trend, the response thus far from President Kumaratunga's
four-month-old government offers little reassurance that it
is formulating a cohesive, well-coordinated policy to bring
the LTTE back to the negotiating table. The President's
dependence on a fractious, precarious coalition to retain her
office has complicated efforts to resume negotiations with
the Tigers, who walked out of talks with the previous
government in April 2003. In particular, the pro-nationalist
Jathika Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front or JVP),
former Marxist revolutionaries turned Parliamentarians who
control nearly one-third of the seats in her coalition,
vehemently oppose discussion of the Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA) proposed by the LTTE as the first agenda
item for resumed negotiations. Unable to count on support
from her own government--let alone an entrenched Opposition
only too eager to see her fail--the President has shied away
from tackling controversial subjects like Tamil autonomy and
the ISGA, focusing instead on preserving her fragile
coalition and her endangered political career. The disparate
and competing viewpoints within the GSL, as well as the
President's own disinclination to share information and
delegate authority, have contributed to a lack of consistency
in GSL statements on possible negotiations. The dissonance
has grown most acute over the past few weeks, when the
President's absence from the country (she is in the UK on a
personal holiday) has coincided with the spike in LTTE
violence. The Army Chief, the Government spokesman and the
Acting Defense Minister have all been widely quoted in the
press recently, spouting thinly-veiled ultimatums to the
LTTE, with the Acting Defense Minister lacing his comments
with accusations that the Scandinavian-sponsored Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, which documents reported ceasefire
violations, is "one-sided." (Note: When President
Kumaratunga's party was in the Opposition, its members
frequently lambasted the Norwegian facilitators as pro-LTTE.
End note.) While such saber-rattling may play well before
the Sinhalese majority in the south of the country, the GSL
cannot afford either the political or financial costs of a
return to hostilities. These statements have increased
tensions on both sides and prompted popular speculation of an
imminent break in the ceasefire.


6. (C) Behind the scenes, knowledgeable GSL officials
describe the latest noises as largely a media frenzy, with
politicians using the media to sound tough. The same
officials tell us that, objectively, the chances of a return
to fighting are no higher now than a few months ago. In a
welcome development, the Army and the LTTE have agreed to
hold talks in the precarious East at the end of the week, an
event orchestrated by the indefatigable Scandinavian
ceasefire monitors.


7. (C) In view of the on again/off again nature of the
peace process, the LTTE's intentions remain unclear. Many of
our interlocutors belive that the status quo--a protracted
ceasefire wiht no imminent return to talks--favors the LTTE,
affording them freedom of movement to redistribute their
cadres, including in Colombo, improve their
intelligence-gathering capabilities, icrease their
recruitment (including of children) and re-pad their
finances. Clearly, the President's precarious political
position benefits the Tigers, allowing them to criticize her
for "stalling" and to question her sincerity in pursuing
talks. Meanwhile, besides demonstrating they retain the
ability to carry out the political assassinations noted
above, the LTTE continues to maintain its terrorist capacity,
including the most sophisticated suicide technology in the
world, and may be expanding its links to other groups
regionally and internationally. The LTTE receives
significant amounts of military supplies by sea; indeed its
own merchant fleet provides weapons and munitions directly to
its cadres and traffics throughout South and Southeast Asia
weaponry procured through its global network. Human and
narcotics smuggling, black-market sales of gemstones and
other high-value items, possibly including terror weapons,
help fund the LTTE.


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ECONOMIC FRONT
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8. (SBU) The Sri Lankan economy has been on an upward trend
the past three years, though the recent change in Government
has left investors and local business representatives
uncertain about the direction it is headed in the future.
While the immediate past-Government was pro-reform and moving
forward with a fairly aggressive liberalization program, the
current government has taken a more "go slow" approach. The
current Government's political make-up (particularly the
inclusion of the Marxist JVP) has made coming to an economic
consensus on important issues difficult.


9. (C) On the counterterrorism front, Sri Lanka is engaged
in two port-related initiatives of particular value - CSI and
Megaports. Sri Lanka and US Customs entered into an
agreement to establish Colombo as a CSI Port last year, but
the implementation process was interrupted by this year's
political upheaval. The current Government has decided to
move forward, however, and should be purchasing the necessary
scanning equipment and building needed infrastructure over
the next three months. Once established, US Customs will set
up a permanent presence in Colombo, and container traffic to
the US from this major transshipment point will be far more
secure. Megaports is a relatively recent phenomenon. The
MOU was signed by the Minister of Ports and Aviation during a
visit to Washington in June. The technical survey team has
just completed its work. The current plan is to have
Megaports equipment up and running at the port by March 2005.



10. (C) On the terrorist financing front, neither Sri Lanka
nor MALDIVES is an important regional financial center. The
LTTE, however, runs a sophisticated terrorist financing
network, including NGO fronts and well-heeled members of the
Tamil diaspora. Sri Lanka's Central Bank has circulated the
list of individuals and entities included on the UN 1267
Sanctions Committee's consolidated list, but to date no
assets have been identified. Sri Lanka is party to the UN
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and to the 1988 Drug Convention. The GSL is
currently drafting legislation to enhance its ability to
combat money laundering and set up a financial intelligence
unit. MALDIVES is also interested in pursuing anti-money
laundering legislation, but is presently focused on internal
political problems. US Treasury is providing technical
assistance to both nations on anti-money laundering efforts.

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THREAT LEVEL
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11. (C) Colombo is rated HIGH on the SETL for Crime,
Indigenous Terrorism, Transnational Terrorism, and Political
Violence. Americans are rarely targeted for violent crime,
and there is no recent history of Americans being
specifically targeted for terrorism in Sri Lanka. During the
past year the Ambassador received a death threat via email,
and a USAID contractor received a written death threat,
neither of which were believed to be credible. In August the
Embassy closed for three days due to an anthrax hoax that
included a letter, written by a person claiming membership in
the "Sri Lanka al-Qaeda," threatening President Bush and the
White House. Even though it has not targeted American
interests, the LTTE remains a deadly terrorist organization.
We monitor the growing frustration expressed by the Muslim
community at the LTTE attacks directed against them. In
general, however, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka is
comparatively moderate. Politically, the Muslim community
suffers from the same divisiveness and factionalism that
bedevil the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. Threat
information will best be addressed during your meeting with
Keerthi Gajanayake, Director General of the Directorate of
Internal Intelligence (DII).

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SECURITY FORCES' CAPABILITIES
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12. (C) The ability of the police to respond effectively to
the criminal and terrorist threat is severly limited. Local
police have proven themselves effective in containing
political disturbances and demonstrations. A strong
relationship with senior police, due in part to ATA training
opportunities, enables the Embassy to receive excellent VIP
protection, perimeter protection and bomb disposal services
upon request. The average officer on the street, however, is
poorly trained, underpaid, and under-motivated to perform
routine law enforcement duties. During the past twenty years
of civil war, the police were used primarily for
counter-insurgency and thus many never developed basic police
skills in crime investigation, community policing, or traffic
enforcement. Police are in desperate need of training in
these areas. At the most senior level, police are
significantly hampered by a culture of patronage that
discourages professionalism and encourages political
favoritism. In the past year the President has replaced the
Minister of Interior, the Secretary of Interior, the
Inspector General of Police and the Director of Internal
Intelligence. The President recently "restructured" the
Ministry of Interior into the Ministry of Public Security,
Law and Order. In a recent conversation, Inspector General
of Police Indra De Silva indicated that he may step down in
the near future. The Special Task Force (STF),a highly
trained elite police unit tasked with providing security in
the Eastern Province, has effectively integrated ATA training
into their operations.


13. (C) Sri Lanka's roughly 150,000-man military is
attempting to develop enough combat power to defeat the LTTE
if the ceasefire fails--a capability the military now lacks.
In March 2002 all three services of the Sri Lankan military
approached the Embassy with significant requests for military
sales. In September and October of 2002, three U.S.
Department of Defense Assessment teams evaluated the Sri
Lankan military's capabilities and needs. Their findings
point to systemic and operational weaknesses, especially
shortcomings in doctrine, mid-level leadership and training.
In addition, severe equipment shortfalls were highlighted in
four areas: maritime surveillance and interdiction,
battlefield intelligence and surveillance, military
communications and mobility and basic soldier items were
deemed most critical to the future success of the Sri Lankan
military. In spite of these problems, the Sri Lankan
military remains a worthy engagement partner and has offered
unlimited access to the experiences (both positive and
negative) and lessons learned by all three services during
nearly twenty years of fighting the world's most prolific
users of suicide technology and IEDs. Recent exchanges and
exercises held in Sri Lanka have resulted in information that
will directly improve the survivability of U.S. forces
serving in harm's way.
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USG ASSISTANCE
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14. (C) ATA has a successful history of training in Sri
Lanka, investing approximately $1 million to train an
estimated 138 police since 1999. Past ATA courses include
Post-Blast Investigation, VIP Protection,
Countersurveillance, and Hostage Negotiation. Practically
all senior police officials to be encountered during your
visit have attended at least one ATA course, a fact that
offers substantial returns to the USG in the form of police
support. Regrettably, all ATA training for 2004 was
cancelled due to other priorities in the region, and no
training is anticipated for 2005. On the positive side, INL
funds totaling approximately $500,000 have been identified
this year to establish an International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) contractor
position in Sri Lanka and to coordinate projects with the
police in narcotics interdiction and community policing. We
believe development of community policing initiatives in Sri
Lanka is essential to a successful peace process, and
therefore advocate training in that area. In March the
TIP/PISCES program was introduced to Sri Lankan authorities.
However, due in large part to the massive shift of law
enforcement personnel previously mentioned, the proposal lost
momentum, and a MOI has yet to be signed. We have recently
heard, however, that the proposal will be accepted, pending
approval by the Cabinet. TIP/PISCES will be an important
topic for discussion Tilak Ranaviraja, the Secretary of
Public Security. We may sign an agreement during your visit.
Extraditions are another possible topic. By the time of
your arrival, the successful extradition from the U.S. of a
Sri Lankan citizen wanted here on child molestation charges
should have taken place. We may also have learned if the Sri
Lankan Magistrate decides to extradite a Catholic priest to
California to face child molestation charges. If successful,
this will be the first test of the extradition treaty,
ratified in April 2001, between our countries.


15. (C) The 2002 Department of Defense teams'
recommendations have helped focus our military engagement and
assistance, and continue to serve as guideposts for
engagement despite the additional burdens faced by the
military, poor recruitment and retention, lack of training
and operational resources and a continuously decreasing
budget. Sri Lanka began receiving FMF in FY 2004 and
receives, in an expanding program, funding for International
Military Education and Training (IMET). Sri Lanka is
eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under
Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and recently took
ownership of the ex-US Coast Guard Cutter "Courageous,"
scheduled to arrive in Sri Lanka in December of 2004.

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POINTS TO MAKE
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16. (C) Your visit follows closely upon the August 19
statement issued by the Department condemning the recent
violence and urging both parties to return to the table, as
well as an August 16 press statement from the EU sounding the
same themes. As noted above, many Sri Lankans, including
those with links to the Tigers, credit the USG's strong
anti-terror posture with providing the pressure needed to
prompt the LTTE to agree to a ceasefire. Your visit will be
interpreted--correctly--as a show of support for the GSL and
an unambiguous reminder to the LTTE that it will remain
listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until it renounces
violence in word and deed. It is thus important that you
underscore to GSL and other interlocutors the need to refocus
their divided attention upon the peace process and work
together toward resuming negotiations. Points you may wish
to emphasize follow below:

--Convey thanks for GSL support on Global War on Terror;

--Express strong support for the peace process and underscore
need for restraint in public statements;
--Stress the need for progress toward resuming talks;

--Reiterate our support for the Norwegian facilitating role;
--Encourage continued movement on new anti-money laundering
legislation;

--Press for continued progress toward CSI implementation at
Port (particularly new building and equipment procurement).

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OVERVIEW OF MALDIVES
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17. (C) Although you will not have the opportunity to
travel to MALDIVES during this visit, we include the
following background information in the event that the topic
arises during your discussions in Colombo:

--One Maldivian citizen is being held on suspicion of links
to al-Qaeda at Guantanamo Bay. The GORM has asked for his
release.

--Following demonstrations on August 12-13, the Government of
the Republic of MALDIVES (GORM) detained 180 people and
declared a State of Emergency, which allows the detainees to
be held for extended periods without charge and without
access to legal counsel. Included among the detainees are a
number of prominent pro-reform activists, including about 10
MPs, a former Attorney General, a member of the National
Human Rights Commission, and a former SAARC Secretary
General. Although a number were subsequently released, none
of the remaining 76 detainees has been charged thus far.

--The GORM has justified the declaration of the State of
Emergency (and hence their prolonged detention) by attempting
to link the pro-democracy leaders with Muslim "extremists"
who may also have participated in (and perhaps even
precipitated) the demonstrations for different reasons. So
far, however, the GORM has offered no firm evidence of a
connection between the pro-reform activists and the
"extremists," or between the "extremists" and any terrorist
organization.

--An EU delegation to the Maldivian capital met some of the
detainees on August 23-24, while our DATT met another group
of detainees in a separate prison on August 30. The DATT
reported no visible signs of torture or maltreatment on the
prisoners he interviewed. One of the detainees interviewed
by the EU delegation alleged maltreatment, and another showed
distinct signs of psychological trauma. In an August 16
public statement, the Department has urged the GORM to
continue the process of political and constitutional reform
begun a year ago and to respect the human rights of
detainees. Separately, we have pressed the GORM to sign a
formal agreement with the ICRC allowing it access to all
detainees.

--The Maldivian UN PermRep will meet with the Deputy
Secretary in Washington on September 1.

SIPDIS
ENTWISTLE