Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1385
2004-08-20 05:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: TWO VIEWS OF THE EAST - TRINCO

Tags:  PREL PTER CE LTTE 
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200501Z Aug 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001385 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-20-14
TAGS: PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TWO VIEWS OF THE EAST - TRINCO
MOSTLY CALM, AMPARA EDGY

Refs: (A) Colombo 371 (B)Colombo 1249

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Chargi d'Affaires.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001385

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-20-14
TAGS: PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TWO VIEWS OF THE EAST - TRINCO
MOSTLY CALM, AMPARA EDGY

Refs: (A) Colombo 371 (B)Colombo 1249

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Chargi d'Affaires.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The diversity of the humanitarian and
security situation in the east is shown by differences
between Trincomalee and Ampara. In Trinco, the
humanitarian situation is gradually improving and the
area is generally peaceful. Meanwhile, at the other end
of the east, Ampara is tense due to a GSL crackdown on
the LTTE, but LTTE-Muslim relations have calmed. The
difference in the security situation in Trinco and
Ampara may be that ongoing tit-for-tat violence farther
south of Trinco in Batticaloa and Ampara has tied the
Tigers' hands ?he LTTE cannot afford to wage anything
but a campaign for hearts and minds in Trinco. In both
areas, the LTTE is seeking to educate itself about
development, likely to prepare for administering its
proposed ISGA. END SUMMARY.

Humanitarian Situation Gradually Improving in Trincomalee
-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) Poloff traveled to the northeastern coastal
district of Trincomalee August 1-3. With the second-
best natural harbor in the world, Trincomalee has long
been seen as strategically important to both the
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),and the Sri Lanka Navy
headquarters its eastern fleet there. The population of
Trinco District is nearly evenly divided among
communities - 38% Muslim, 31% Tamil, 29% Sinhalese - but
it wasn't always. Tamils deeply resent past GSL efforts
to dilute the Tamil population in the area by promoting
Sinhala colonization schemes meant to drive a wedge
between Tamils in the north and east.


3. (SBU) Since the GSL and the LTTE signed a Cease-Fire
Agreement (CFA) in February 2002, Trincomalee District
has seen an increase in economic activity, primarily
from tourism. Humanitarian assistance in the area is
changing from relief to development-oriented activity.

S. Sutaram, Assistant Program Director for UNICEF told
poloff that the business environment is improving, and
many hotels are refurbishing to meet increased tourist

demand. However, the uptick in economic activity has
not yet trickled down to benefit the 20,000 internally
displaced people (IDPs) in the District, whose difficult
living conditions remain basically unchanged. 85% of
IDPs are Tamil, 10% Sinhala, and 5% Muslim.


4. (C) Many IDPs in Trinco have not returned to their
homes (most have been displaced from areas within the
district) for several reasons: their land is mined,
they have no land to which they can return, or they live
in what they perceive to be an unsafe area. Often, they
cannot return to their homes because of limited
infrastructure (e.g., water or schools) or because they
have no access to livelihoods. Nearly 90% of IDPs in
Trincomalee town live with family and friends, rather
than in IDP camps. UNHCR Representative Brita Helleland
noted that because some IDPs have gone home, the number
of people living in welfare centers in Trincomalee
District is declining: in 2003 there were 4000 IDPs in
camps, but this year there are only 2,500. She
explained that while social problems associated with
welfare centers - petty crime, illegal alcohol
production, drug use, and the showing of pornographic
films - do exist, they are not as severe as they are in
welfare centers in other parts of the country (e.g.
Jaffna). She noted that last year the LTTE opened an
office in one of the camps, which UNHCR successfully
asked the Tigers to close.


5. (C) Local government officials from village council
to provincial council report regular engagement with
local LTTE leaders, who profess an interest in learning
more about development activities. The LTTE are also
conducting a needs assessment survey. For the past
three weeks, 150 LTTE cadres from the Wanni went door to
door in both LTTE- and GSL-controlled areas asking
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims what they need to return
to normalcy. The cadres are also collecting biodata
from Tamil families and offering them the "opportunity"
to have three months of voluntary military training.
Government Agent (GA) Gamini Rodrigo noted that the
Tigers requested a meeting with staff in his office to
talk about development - so the Tigers (and not the
LTTE-affiliated Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO))
could offer up their own ideas about development in the
LTTE-controlled areas in Trincomalee District. On
August 6, the LTTE met with members of Rodrigo's staff
to submit development proposals to the GSL, which are
under consideration.


6. (C) In a meeting with poloff on August 3, North East
Provincial Council Chief Secretary S. Rangarajah spoke
briefly about the development activities he oversaw, but
really wanted to talk about issues relevant to the LTTE.
The Tigers have a warm relationship with the North East
Provincial Council, where tens of millions of dollars
from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for
rehabilitation of the north and east are funneled.
[Note: The Provincial Council functions only as an
administrative body, as the LTTE has not allowed
provincial council elections in the north and east in
over a decade. UNICEF's Sutaram commented that because
there are no elected members, the structure is actually
working very well-ostensibly because political
interference is minimal and Provincial Council
administrative representatives are "professional,"
rather than political. End note.] Rangarajah strongly
advocated the implementation of the LTTE's Interim Self
Governing Authority (ISGA) as a solution to the
rehabilitation and resettlement needs of people of the
north and east. He claimed that the central government
and national legal system are impediments to these
processes and suggested that the LTTE could take over
the administrative machinery needed to accomplish these
goals instead. He said that the LTTE is interested in
learning about development. [Note: Rangarajah's public
appointment board showed LTTE meetings scheduled for
later the same day. End note.] Rangarajah also
confided (please protect) that the LTTE "wanted him to
work for the ISGA," (for the LTTE)a proposal he said he
was seriously considering. Finally, he urged the
international community and the USG to encourage the
opposition United National Party (UNP) to support the
GSL negotiations with the LTTE and declared that there
will be a decline in the peace process if the "no war/no
win" situation continues.

Trincomalee Security Situation Mostly Calm
--------------


7. (C) Trincomalee appeared calmer than other areas of
the east, where killings continue almost daily. GA
Rodrigo noted that the area was generally peaceful.
Only one of the dozens of killings by the LTTE in the
last month has taken place in Trincomalee (reported
septel). Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
interlocutors report that there are few repercussions
from the LTTE's internal break in March, when eastern
LTTE military leader Karuna broke away from LTTE supremo
Prabhakaran. SLMM contacts noted that most Cease-Fire
Agreement (CFA) violations in Trinco stem from the
ambiguous border between LTTE- and GSL-controlled
territories. Child abductions and child recruitment are
also the source of a number of violations, although
cases reported to the SLMM are declining. UNICEF's
Sutaram reported that child recruitment in Trinco is
slowing, but cautioned that town residents were much
more likely to report recruitment than rural residents.
ICRC's Trinco Representative Patrick Walder noted that
people are coming to ICRC with recruitment complaints,
but it is ICRC's policy not to share this information
with the more "political" UN agencies, including UNICEF.


8. (C) Days after poloff's visit, however, an (anti-
LTTE) Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) member was
killed in Trinco on August 10. In subsequent
demonstrations, the EPDP accused the LTTE of the murder.
In an earlier conversation with poloff, Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission Trincomalee Head Dagfinn Aadnanes
described the EPDP as in "hiding," and not very active.
He reported that police guard the office and that most
EPDP members had resigned their membership and now
support the organization privately instead of publicly.
Tension between the LTTE and Muslims continues,
occasionally manifested by hartals (general strikes)
called by either the LTTE or Muslim community leaders.
The SLMM reported that while there are allegations of
radical Muslim groups organizing in Muttur (south of
Trincomalee),there is no evidence of a serious problem.

A JVP MP from Trinco?
--------------


9. (SBU) Jayantha Wijesekera, first-time Marxist
Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) MP from Trincomalee, is
an enthusiastic advocate for his adopted constituency -
self-reported as local farmers and fishermen from Tamil,
Muslim and Sinhala communities. A JVP member since
1986, Wijesekera was originally a paddy farmer, but left
his own fields to become a community organizer. He is
Sinhalese, but switches from Sinhala to Tamil with ease,
and claims a diverse voter base: 15% Tamil, 25% Muslim,
and 60% Sinhala. In a conversation with poloff,
Wijesekera was more concerned about obtaining
development resources for his local constituencies, like
paddy seed and improved irrigation, than with national
politics. Trinco GA Rodrigo noted that Mr. Wijesekera
was the only Trinco MP who has submitted his proposals
for the approximately US $50,000 funding for development
proposals each MP is allocated.


10. (C) Wijesekera's ideas about the peace process are
in line with the usual JVP rhetoric. He professes to
believe in the integration of communities and that, by
working together for the good of the country, these
groups will forget their differences. Wijesekera said
he envisions achieving peace in Sri Lanka through
greater state employment which, he explained
disingenuously, the GSL could achieve simply by building
more factories. He asserted that people with jobs and
full stomachs will forget their differences - and if the
10,000 GSL job vacancies in the north and east are
filled, there would be no need for the LTTE's Interim
Self Governing Authority (ISGA). He also reported that
people in Trinco are concerned about the separation of
the east from the rest of the island, and are worried
that if peace talks begin there will be a division of
the country. Wijesekera asserted that he has proven to
the LTTE that he is working for all communities. He
noted that the LTTE comes to talk to him, although he
attributed their interest to a turf-conscious concern
that he is helping Tamils.

Ampara Humanitarian Situation
--------------


11. (C) The population of Ampara, on the southeastern
coast of the island, has suffered its share of
displacements due to conflict, but has been able to
recover more easily than other areas. A decade ago
about 10,000 people were displaced - mostly Tamils from
coastal areas, although some Muslims were also
displaced. IDPs stay with friends and family; there are
no welfare centers in Ampara. The population of Ampara
District is 41% Muslim, 40% Sinhala and 18% Tamil.
Barriers to IDP return are fewer, especially because
very few areas in Ampara District are landmine-affected.
However, access to livelihoods continues to be a problem
for many people, including the area's farmers and
fishermen. While Ampara District is considered GSL
controlled, there are pockets of LTTE-controlled areas.
Development activities in Ampara, which are supposed to
be overseen by the GA, appear to lag considerably behind
initiatives in Trincomalee.

Security Situation: STF Crackdown on LTTE
--------------


12. (C) The Israeli, British, and U.S. trained
paramilitary Police Special Task Force (STF) is in
charge of security for Ampara District, rather than the
Army. Some interlocutors report that the LTTE respects
the STF for its discipline and its fighting ability. In
the past decade, many members of this highly trained
unit have moved to higher positions in Colombo, and some
high-ranking police interlocutors admit that the STF has
consequently lost some of its strength. Following
Karuna's defection in March, (Reftel A),the situation
in Ampara became extremely tense, according to SLMM
interlocutors. An EPDP politician and town council
leader of a local village was killed by the LTTE on July
21 (Reftel B),and the GSL ordered a crackdown on the
Ampara-area LTTE. The STF increased its checkpoints and
policing activities - providing a visible reminder of
GSL control in Ampara. The LTTE reacted negatively,
complaining to the SLMM that the STF was trying to
provoke the LTTE to break the Cease-Fire Agreement and
demanded that the STF change its checkpoint procedures.
After poloff's visit, the SLMM facilitated a meeting
between the STF and LTTE and worked out one point of
contention. Now new checkpoint procedures dictate that
female STF personnel search female LTTE cadres at
checkpoints.


13. (C) Human rights interlocutors note that post-
Karuna, security in Ampara is tenuous, with continued
LTTE abductions of children. They also report that
human rights violations are committed by both the LTTE
and the GSL, although the GSL's "violations" primarily
dealt with its inability to provide government services
- like distributing food to IDPs - as opposed to the
LTTE's, which are typically violent.

The Muslim Perspective in Ampara District
--------------

14. (C) After the CFA, incidents of kidnapping, vehicle
theft, ransom and taxation of Muslims in the adjacent
Ampara District abated. Muslim interlocutors described
the sporadic killings of LTTE opponents as an attempt by
the Tigers to control the area, to gain "a dictatorship."

M. A. Zubaideen, General Secretary of the Joint Security
Peace Foundation, a local Muslim group, admitted that the
larger Muslim population had experienced fewer incidents
of LTTE intimidation since the CFA. However, he was very
concerned about what would happen under the LTTE's
proposed ISGA. He said that the "LTTE will never change,"
and that he feared Muslims would suffer under an LTTE
administration. He also noted that LTTE taxation and
extortion of Tamils continues. When queried about the
views of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) MPs, Mr.
Zubaideen charged that the MPs are concerned only about
themselves and not about their communities, least of all the
land issues that Muslims in the east are concerned about.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) The Tigers seem to be invested in improving
both their reputation and their efficacy in Trincomalee
District. Never a support base for Karuna, LTTE
resistance in Trinco comes from Muslims, Sinhalese, and
EPDP-supporting Tamils. (In contrast, Karuna enjoys an
estimated 90% public support in Batticaloa.) Ongoing
tit-for-tat violence farther south in Batticaloa and
Ampara has tied the Tigers' hands - they cannot afford
to wage anything but a campaign for hearts and minds in
Trinco. More frequent Muslim community-orchestrated
hartals (general strikes) over the past few months
probably indicate increased Muslim insecurity about the
LTTE's proposed ISGA, under which Muslims would have
limited redress from a group that has historically
mistreated them. The LTTE is keeping a careful watch on
anyone helping Tamils - whether it be the JVP or the GSL
- lest anyone usurp the Tigers' self-proclaimed role as
savior for the Tamil people. Meanwhile, inadequate GSL
development efforts in Ampara leave the area more
vulnerable to JVP influence in the interior, and LTTE
influence along the coast. Throughout the east, the
LTTE is seeking to educate itself about development,
likely to prepare for administering its proposed ISGA.

ENTWISTLE