EU AND JAPAN TALK TOUGH TO TIGERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001362

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-18-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CE NO JA EU LTTE
SUBJECT: EU AND JAPAN TALK TOUGH TO TIGERS

Refs: (A) Colombo 1323, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU troika and the Japanese
ambassador both delivered tough messages to LTTE
political chief Thamilchelvan on killings, child
soldiers and a rapid return to the peace table.
Thamilchelvan told all that the LTTE is committed to a
federal solution in accordance with the Oslo declaration
and that the LTTE-proposed ISGA is a stepping stone in
that direction. Both the EU and the Japanese noted that
Thamilchelvan has dropped his rhetoric about not being
able to return to the peace table until the Karuna issue
is under control. Moreover, the Norwegian Charge', to
his surprise, found Thamilchelvan willing to discuss
dates for peace talk resumption during his weekend trip
to Kilinochchi. The Norwegians here see the need for
several weeks of "quiet diplomacy" to give them "room to
maneuver" while the EU and Japan do not see the need for
a co-chair's statement now but defer to their capitals.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Dutch Ambassador Blankhart and EU Charge' Wilton
hosted an informal co-chairs meeting August 17 to brief
on the previous day's EU meeting in Kilinochchi with
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) political chief
Thamilchelvan. Japanese Ambassador Suda also reviewed
his August 15 meeting with Thamilchelvan and Norwegian
Charge' Laegreid brought the co-chairs up to date on his
recent circuit-riding between the LTTE and the GSL.

Japanese Perspective
--------------


3. (C) Invited to go first, Japanese Ambassador Suda
advised that he had focused on three points with
Thamilchelvan. First, Tokyo is seriously worried about
the current political impasse on peace talks and is
especially frustrated with the LTTE since, in Tokyo's
view, President Kumaratunga (CBK) has made concessions
which the LTTE has not reciprocated. Japan believes it
is time for the LTTE to "get serious." Second, Suda
said he laid down a strong marker about the recent
uptick in killings and told Thamilchelvan that it is
clear that for at least the last month the killings have
been in one direction: "headquarters LTTE" killing
Karuna LTTE and members of other Tamil groups like the
EPDP. Finally, the LTTE must reconfirm its commitment
to the tenets of the Oslo declaration, especially the
commitment to a federal solution. It is not
constructive for the LTTE to only talk about its Interim
Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal.


4. (C) In response, Suda said, Thamilchelvan "smiled and
nodded as usual" but did not deny responsibility for
killings (but did repeat his familiar language about how
it is the GSL's responsibility to uphold security in its
areas). Asked what the major LTTE "obstacles" were in
getting back to the peace table, Thamilchelvan said
"confusion in the South" with too many voices holding
forth on the peace process. On federalism,
Thamilchelvan said it was not possible under the current
constitution and the Tamil people "could not wait" for
constitutional reform. Thus, a "more immediate"
solution must be found. He stressed to Suda, however,
that the LTTE no longer desires a separate state and
that the ISGA is a stepping stone to a solution within
the context of a united Sri Lanka.


5. (C) Thamilchelvan also told Suda that LTTE remains
committed to the Oslo Declaration. Norwegian Charge'
Laegreid interjected that Thamilchelvan has reaffirmed
LTTE commitment to the Oslo Declaration in recent
conversations "without us having to solicit such
reaffirmation." The Norwegians have also been hearing
the "within a united Sri Lanka" formulation lately and
find this positive.
Tough Talk from the EU
--------------

6. (C) Turning to the EU meeting, Blankhart said that
the EU troika (Blankhart, Wilton and UK High
Commissioner Evans) had hit Thamilchelvan hard on LTTE
killings. They noted that the EU had issued a balanced
statement in early July calling on all sides to refrain
from violence. Now the situation was different, with
only Kilinochchi LTTE carrying out killings. As with
the Japanese, Thamilchelvan did not deny the killings.
Blankhart said the troika also hit Thamilchelvan hard on
child soldiers, noting that recruitments were continuing
and that the LTTE had lost all credibility on the issue.
Thamilchelvan admitted the LTTE was "not in compliance"
with the UNICEF program but then lapsed into the "usual"
line about how "the children come to us so what can we
do?" Blankhart said she cut off Thamilchelvan and told
him it was very clear what the LTTE should do: turn any
and all child soldiers over to UNICEF rapidly and
transparently.


7. (C) Blankhart said the troika was also blunt about
the need to get back to the table, echoing the Japanese
formulation that CBK has made concessions but the LTTE
has not. Thamilchelvan demurred, stating that the LTTE
no longer insisting on a separate state is a "concession
for peace." He then started his argument about how the
proliferation of "voices" in the south is an obstacle to
peace. Blankhart said she told Thamilchelvan that in
democracies there are always "many voices" speaking out
on all issues and that this is a good thing. She told
Thamilchelvan that the only voice in the South he needed
to listen to was the President's. Asked about adherence
to Oslo and the role of the ISGA, Thamilchelvan told the
EU ("he made it very clear") that the ISGA is something
to be negotiated with the GSL, not something that the
LTTE will insist the GSL accept or reject. Moreover,
Thamilchelvan stated, "the ISGA should lead to the
federal solution that was discussed in Oslo."

Karuna Obsession Over?
--------------


8. (C) Both the Japanese and the EU troika noted that
Thamilchelvan did not raise his long-familiar talking
point that there can be no progress on a return to the
peace table until the Karuna issue is resolved. Indeed,
they had to raise Karuna and the situation in the East
with Thamilchelvan. Both parties said that their clear
impression is that the LTTE leadership believes it has
gotten control of the Karuna issue and made progress on
reasserting control over the East. Norwegian Charge'
Laegreid concurred, noting that the LTTE has indeed
dropped its "Karuna obstacle" language and now is "back
to arguing about wording and linguistics."

Norwegians See Some Hope (Maybe)
--------------


9. (C) In that vein, Laegreid noted that when he met
with Thamilchelvan last weekend, the LTTE political
chief had told him that the LTTE would not accept any
GSL language on an interim authority as the basis for a
return to peace talks. Rather, only the ISGA could be
the basis for discussion. Laegreid had earlier on
August 17 conveyed this message to GSL Peace Secretariat
Jayantha Dhanapala who had instructed Laegreid to tell
the LTTE that the GSL would never agree. ("I don't even
have to go to the President with this.") Laegreid said
he had passed the GSL view back to the LTTE by phone and
expected to have a reply from them by the end of the
week. Meanwhile, Laegreid said, the GSL continues to
work on its own interim authority proposal which it
probably will not make public before the next round of
talks to "avoid having it picked apart in the press."


10. (C) Laegreid also reported that in his weekend
meeting with the LTTE, the Tigers had launched into
their usual riff about the longsuffering Tamil people
who were not getting their share of development
assistance, etc. Laegreid said he had cut them off and
told them that development assistance would not flow
until progress was under way towards a "final solution."
If the LTTE really cares about the Tamil people, why are
they dragging their feet on peace? This engendered an
intense LTTE sidebar conversation in Tamil. After a few
minutes of this, Laegreid interrupted to say, "what
about returning to talks in mid-September?"
Thamilchelvan said they could not, since there will be a
large Tamil meeting in Geneva then. But, to Laegreid's
surprise, the LTTE leader said "What about early
October?" Laegreid said he had raised that time period
with Dhanapala earlier on August 17 and the Peace
Secretariat chief had said that would be fine with the

SIPDIS
GSL. Laegreid had conveyed that back to Kilinochchi,
along with a message from Dhanapala that the GSL cannot
be expected to "sit idly by" while the LTTE kills Sri
Lankan citizens.


11. (C) Laegreid emphasized that it was not clear if
Thamilchelvan had the authority to seriously discuss
dates or not. Nonetheless, the Norwegians had found it
encouraging and see it as a possible sign that the LTTE
realizes they have to move on peace talks. Laegreid
said that there is "no timetable" for Solheim or
Helgesen to come back in the near future (local press
reports notwithstanding) but that could "change rapidly"
depending on events on the ground.

Next Steps
--------------


12. (C) Blankhart and Suda both felt that the LTTE,
having been hit hard by the EU and Japan, would need
some time to take this on board and consider next steps.
Laegreid observed that Thamilchelvan needs time to
"ponder" and the Norwegians need "time to maneuver" and
continue "quiet diplomacy" in light of the discussion of
dates and the apparent LTTE dropping of the "Karuna
obstacle." Thus, a co-chair's statement now probably
was not needed although this was a matter for capitals
to decide. Laegreid said Helgesen would be talking
shortly with Deputy Secretary Armitage and with Japanese
envoy Akashi (we understand the conversation with the
Deputy Secretary occurred overnight).

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The tough EU and Japanese messages seem to have
been heard loud and clear although it is impossible to
know whether Thamilchelvan reports back accurately to
his masters and to what extent they care what the EU and
Japan think. Both Thamilchelvam's mention of dates for
peace talks and his apparently newfound lack of concern
on the Karuna "obstacle" are noteworthy, although many
semantic differences remain to be ironed out before the
LTTE and the GSL agree on what would be discussed at the
next round. Meanwhile, the Norwegians continue to
deliver quite a bit of mail in both directions. END
COMMENT.

ENTWISTLE