Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1142
2004-07-08 12:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

GSL DOWNPLAYS JULY 7 SUICIDE BOMBING IMPACT ON

Tags:  PTER ASEC PGOV PREL CE NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001142 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E.MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: GSL DOWNPLAYS JULY 7 SUICIDE BOMBING IMPACT ON
PEACE PROCESS AS LTTE DENIES RESPONSIBILITY

REF: A. (A) COLOMBO-SA/INS 07-08-04 UNCLASS EMAIL

B. (B) COLOMBO 1132 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001142

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR E.MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: GSL DOWNPLAYS JULY 7 SUICIDE BOMBING IMPACT ON
PEACE PROCESS AS LTTE DENIES RESPONSIBILITY

REF: A. (A) COLOMBO-SA/INS 07-08-04 UNCLASS EMAIL

B. (B) COLOMBO 1132 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Government officials downplay the July 7
suicide bombing in Colombo to keep the incident from
jeopardizing the peace process. The intended target, Tamil
Minister Devananda, is unfazed by the assassination attempt
and dismisses the likelihood that his connection with Karuna
may have provoked the Tigers. The Norwegians are concerned
about the incident, but are working with the SLMM to keep the
situation under control and both sides engaged in the peace
process. The LTTE denies responsibility in the suicide
bombing and blames other "elements," but expresses its
commitment to the peace process and ceasefire. For the
moment, it appears that the July 7 suicide bombing was an
isolated incident, a "warning" to the government. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) GSL OFFICIALS TAKE LOW-KEY TACK: In the wake of the
July 7 suicide bombing in Colombo, the Sri Lankan Government
has downplayed the event's impact on the peace process with
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Although it is
widely assumed the LTTE are responsible for the bombing, the
GSL has taken care to avoid accusing the Tigers and has
instead focused on condemning the "attempted assassination
through a targeted suicide attack" and expressing its
sympathies and condolences for the victims and their
families. Director General of the GSL Peace Secretariat,
Jayantha Dhanapala, told the Ambassador on July 8 that the
government was trying to keep the situation under control,
being vague about suggesting responsibility for the bombing
until the investigation was completed. Dhanapala also felt
the July 7 suicide bombing was a directed one and not
"general." Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in a
separate July 8 conversation with the Ambassador, said the
bombing was "not necessarily a breakdown in the ceasefire."



3. (C) The GSL seems determined not to let the July 7
bombing affect the peace talks, but Dhanapala highlighted
that "a nervous group was not the best peace partner." He
felt that the LTTE was upping the ante on the talks: first
they would only discuss an interim administration, now they
would not go back to the negotiating table until the
situation in the East was resolved. In Kadirgamar's opinion,
the Tigers were in no position to start serious fighting,
particularly because of the situation in the east and the
dissension in their own ranks.


4. (C) ARMY COMMANDER SEES LTTE HAND IN BOMBING: Speaking
with the Ambassador on July 8, newly appointed Commander of
the Army, Lt Gen Shantha Kottegoda, was certain the LTTE was
responsible for the suicide bombing. Kottegoda said it was
clear ceasefire violation and the government had to make an
official complaint to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM). He was also convinced that the Tigers were pursuing
an "individual target, and had been for a long time." He
felt that the situation with Karuna also contributed to the
LTTE's actions. While not conceding that the bombing was in
reaction to the shooting of LTTE cadre and other activities
in the east -- on July 5, three cadres were wounded,
including a senior Tiger political leader, and one more
killed -- Kottegoda said that when he visited the east last
week, he told the LTTE that there would be no Army
involvement with Karuna now that he was in charge. (Comment:
implying that there was some involvement previously.) As for
Karuna, Kottegoda stated, "I don't know where he is."


5. (C) INTENDED TARGET UNFAZED: Since the bombing, the
intended target, Hindu Affairs Minister Douglas Devananda,
has been vocal about his insistence to continue his
ministerial work unabated. The target of several
assassination attempts by the LTTE, Devananda was quoted July
7 as saying it would "not be easy to silence me." In a July
8 conversation with the Ambassador, Devananda described how
July 7 was a "public day" for constituents to come to his
office. When the female bomber refused an investigation by
ministerial security personnel, she was then taken to the
police station, where she detonated.

6. (C) Devananda and his political group, the Eelam People's
Democratic Party (EPDP),have long been rivals with the LTTE,
who view his ministerial appointment as an affront. Many
believe, however, that Devananda's recent public connection
with breakaway LTTE rebel Karuna provoked yesterday's
assassination attempt. Devananda reiterated to the
Ambassador that he was in continuous touch with Karuna, but
dismissed the idea that his connection with the rebel Tiger
was the reason behind the bombing. Karuna was proceeding
with plans to form a political party, the "LTTE - Karuna
wing," Devananda said.


7. (C) MORE WORK FOR THE NORWEGIANS: Speaking with the
Ambassador on July 8, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar
said that the Tigers told him they have no connection to the
July 7 bombing. Commenting on the SLMM, Brattskar said the
monitors were drafting a letter to both sides "deploring the
July 7 violence and the general attitude and events in the
east" in recent days. While the Tigers were likely
responsible for the suicide bombing, Brattskar felt that both
sides had much to answer for, given recent actions. In
conjunction with the SLMM, Brattskar said that he and SLMM
head Trond Furuhovde were considering meeting separately with
both the GSL and LTTE to discuss the ceasefire agreement
(CFA). Brattskar said that the GSL hoped the Tigers would
issue a statement in support of the peace process and
ceasefire, but expressed his doubt that the Tigers would do
so.


8. (C) DENIAL AND CONDEMNATION BY TIGERS: Not unexpectedly,
the LTTE denied involvement in the bombing. LTTE political
leader S.P. Thamilchelvan is quoted on the pro-LTTE website
"TamilNet" as saying the group had "absolutely no connection
in the suicide bombing." Separately, the LTTE also released
a statement (Ref A) on its official website, blaming "some
elements who are working to disrupt the peace efforts between
the Sri Lanka Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam." The statement goes on to criticize the government
and military for helping these elements and calls on them to
"halt all assistance given to these armed groups." The LTTE
concludes the statement reiterating its commitment to the
peace process and to the ceasefire.


9. (C) OPPOSITION REACTION: The Opposition United National
Party (UNP) spokesman Ravindra Randeniya called on the
government to pursue those responsible for the suicide
bombing and for the government to be accountable for its
recent action and cease blaming other parties for the
problems in the east. Milinda Moragoda, an MP with the UNP
told the Ambassador on July 8 that the LTTE and EPDP have had
many clashes in the past three years. Moragoda claimed that
LTTE senior theoretician Anton Balasingham always maintained
that EPDP was not part of the peace process. Moragoda, too,
felt that the July 7 bombing was likely connected to the
violence in the East and said the real risk was having the
whole situation "slide into chaos." Moragoda said he heard
that there were 15 suicide bombers for different targets
around Colombo, but, "Why activate one now unless it was
connected to the Karuna issue."


10. (C) It is interesting to note, however, that police
found a suicide vest and landmine in a Colombo suburb on June
17, and explosives under a key Colombo-area bridge some weeks
prior. Given the events of July 7, it is possible the
"discovered" suicide vest was an intentional warning by the
LTTE to the government to cease its alleged activities and
support of pro-Karuna elements in the east. When the
activities continued, the Tigers may have moved to the next
step.


11. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY SEES GSL ALSO AS TARGET: In a July 8
conversation with poloff, Jehan Perera, Director of the
National Peace Council noted he thought the July 7 suicide
bombing in Colombo, which he attributed to the LTTE, was
meant as a message to the GSL not to "two-time" the Tigers.
He described the attack as retaliation for "government
connivance" in July 5 attacks against LTTE cadre in the east.
He thought the LTTE felt that unless they hurt the GSL, the
government would not bother itself with Tiger concerns.
Although Devananda is a long-term target of the Tigers,
Perera posited that the LTTE could attempt to assassinate him
at any time, and that the timing of this attack indicated
that it was against the government, and not Devananda
specifically. In his view, the Tigers' choice of target was
not one that would lead to war, as an attack on a Sri Lankan
Army installation might have. Perera saw the bombing as an
isolated incident which would not necessarily escalate into a
pattern of attacks in the capital, although he though it was
a dangerous sign that the LTTE might use suicide bombing
attacks as a tool to "get their way" in the future.


12. (C) COMMENT: The general feeling in Colombo is to treat
the July 7 suicide bombing as an isolated incident, not as a
prelude to all-out war. The government has certainly been
treating it that way, downplaying the incident and not
accusing the LTTE. While Devananda may have been the
specific target, this was almost certainly a warning to the
government as well that the Tigers can strike back if they
are struck in the East. Interestingly enough, most people in
Colombo seem not to have reacted strongly to the bombing,
despite it being the first in over two years and the only one
since the CFA went into effect. END COMMENT.
LUNSTEAD