Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO103
2004-01-20 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Ambassador Lunstead and Japanese Special Envoy

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINS EAID CE JA NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000103 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/J; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

C O R R E C T E D COPY(COLOMBO MRN #0102 TEXT CHOPPED AT MARGIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01-20-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EAID CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Ambassador Lunstead and Japanese Special Envoy
Akashi discuss Sri Lankan situation and next steps

Refs: (A) State 11999

- (B) Colombo 88, and previous (All Notal)

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000103

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/J; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

C O R R E C T E D COPY(COLOMBO MRN #0102 TEXT CHOPPED AT MARGIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01-20-14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EAID CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT: Ambassador Lunstead and Japanese Special Envoy
Akashi discuss Sri Lankan situation and next steps

Refs: (A) State 11999

- (B) Colombo 88, and previous (All Notal)

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Lunstead met January 20
with Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi. The two
discussed Sri Lanka's ongoing cohabitation impasse and
its impact on the peace process. Both agreed it was
important for the U.S. and GoJ to continue to consult in
the leadup to the meeting of the Tokyo process co-chairs
slated to take place in Washington on February 17.
Akashi was basically in a listening mode during the
meeting, but was clearly very concerned about the
cohabitation deadlock. Per Ambassador's comments to
Akashi, the U.S. side plans to underscore the need for
the international community to support the underlying
peace process during the January 23 Tokyo follow-up
meeting in Colombo. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Akashi Reviews Visit
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Lunstead met with Japanese Special
Envoy Yasushi Akashi on January 20. Akashi was
accompanied by Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda and several
other GoJ officials. DCM, AID Director, and Polchief
also sat in on the meeting. Akashi arrived in Colombo
on January 19 to kick off a week-long visit, which will
culminate in a meeting of donor and international
organization representatives scheduled to be held in
Colombo on January 23. Akashi noted that he wanted to
use his visit to obtain first-hand impressions of the
ongoing political deadlock between Sri Lanka's President
Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, and its
impact on the peace process. To accomplish this, he had
a full plate of meetings in Colombo and would travel to
the northern town of Kilinochchi on January 22 to get

the viewpoint of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) on the situation.


3. (C) Regarding Japanese government positioning on the
Sri Lankan situation, Akashi said the GoJ agreed that
there should be a linkage between aid and progress in
the peace process, but that it should be a positive,
rather than a negative linkage. To this end, assistance
should be "used as a stimulant" to encourage further
progress in the peace process and to pressure the two
sides to return to negotiations. Stressing the need to
concentrate on upholding the ceasefire agreement, he
said the Tigers could cause an "untoward event," and
noted that "no-one should be complacent" regarding the
ceasefire. Given the heightened risk of an LTTE-GSL
confrontation caused by a misunderstanding, it was vital
that the President and the PM find a way to end their
cohabitation infighting soon and refocus on ways to re-
energize the peace track.

--------------
Analysis of Current Situation
--------------


4. (C) Akashi then asked Ambassador Lunstead for his
assessment of the situation in Colombo, and of the
likelihood of a rapprochement between the President and
Prime Minister. Ambassador responded by noting that the
impasse between the two was very serious. This was
ironic in that the President and PM had agreed on
roughly 80 percent of the issues necessary for a
compromise, but the two were hung up on the last 20
percent. Ambassador Lunstead noted that the question
was now one of which Defense Ministry powers would be
given back to the PM, and which kept in the President's
hands (see Ref B). Ambassador further noted that, in
his view, the underlying motive for the President's
action was her demand that she not be treated by the PM
for the next two (or three) years of her term in the
same way she felt she had been treated in the past two
years -- excluded from decision-making. That said, the
Ambassador continued, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP)/Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) alliance
decreased the prospects of the President reaching a
compromise with the Prime Minister, and the prospect
that the President might call for general elections
seemed more likely now. Elections would probably solve
little and could well make things worse.


5. (C) Turning to the linkage between politics and
assistance, Ambassador made the point that there was a
need to distinguish between progress in peace
negotiations, which had been stalled since April 2003,
and progress in the peace process. Progress in the
peace process continued and the international community
could use its assistance to reinforce that progress.
Akashi agreed with this distinction. At the same time,
given the absence of progress in peace negotiations, the
full amount of aid pledged at the June 2003 Tokyo donors
conference would not be possible to deliver at this
point. That said, both the Ambassador and Akashi agreed
that the international community could move forward on
humanitarian assistance and other short-term forms of
relief activities in the north and east, and on some
assistance to the south -- all activities in support of
the peace process.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


6. (C) Turning to next steps, Akashi and the Ambassador
discussed the modalities of the Tokyo follow-up meeting
of donor and international organization representatives
scheduled to take place in Colombo on January 23.
Akashi said the meeting would be two-part: the first
part would involve only bilateral and multilateral donor
representatives; the second part, would include these
representatives plus GSL and LTTE representatives if the
Tigers decided to accept their invitation and
participate. Ambassador Suda noted that the Tigers had
not yet stated if they would attend, and he thought
there was a less than 50 percent chance that the group
would show up. The GoJ side was committed to working on
ways to minimize the possibility of interaction between
the U.S. and the LTTE sides at the January 23 meeting if
the Tigers did attend. Wrapping up, Ambassador Lunstead
said he felt the January 23 meeting would be very
constructive, and should prove a valuable stepping stone
for the February 17 co-chairs meeting in Washington. He
urged that the two sides continue to consult in the
leadup to the February meeting. Akashi said he welcomed
the February co-chair meeting in Washington and agreed
that continued consultation was important for the GoJ.
Both agreed that it was important for members of the
international community to be on the same page regarding
Sri Lanka; the February meeting would help ensure that
that continued to be the case.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Akashi was basically in a listening mode
throughout the meeting and used the discussion to gain
insight into the complicated, shifting situation in Sri
Lanka. He was obviously extremely worried about the
serious cohabitation impasse which has cropped up in
Colombo since his last visit in September 2003 and its
negative impact on efforts to bring the GSL and the LTTE
back to the negotiating table. At the same time, he was
receptive to Ambassador's distinction between the peace
process, which continues every day, and the peace
negotiations, which are currently stalled, and he agreed
that the international community can use its assistance
to reinforce the underlying peace process in targeted
ways (the U.S. side plans to underline this key point
during the January 23 Tokyo follow-up meeting in
Colombo). Akashi also agreed that the February 17
meeting in Washington presents a signal opportunity to
engage with the other co-chairs and set a common course
on Sri Lankan assistance issues in light of the negative
developments in Colombo. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD