ARIAS CARDENAS: OPPOSITION FACES UPHILL BATTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000545

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014
TAGS: PGOV VE
SUBJECT: ARIAS CARDENAS: OPPOSITION FACES UPHILL BATTLE
WITH CHAVEZ IN CHARGE


Classified By: Ambassador Charles S Shapiro, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
)

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Summary
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1. (C) Francisco Arias Cardenas, former presidential
candidate and ex-Governor of Zulia, told the Ambassador
February 11 that President Hugo Chavez's increased control of
the military and the state oil company (PDVSA) following the
events of April 11, 2002, make it unlikely that he could be
forced from power in the short term. Arias lamented that if
the National Electoral Council (CNE) chooses to deny a recall
referendum on Chavez, opposition protests and panic would
ensue. If, instead, a recall was approved and Chavez lost,
any new administration would have to contend with a large
minority of Chavez sympathizers, including armed fanatics.
Multiple opposition parties will be hard pressed to maintain
unity campaigning against the blackmail and bribes of
Chavista politicians for August regional elections. End
Summary.

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Chavez in Control of Military: Forced Departure Unlikely
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2. (C) Former presidential candidate and ex-Governor of Zulia
Francisco Arias Cardenas told the Ambassador February 11 that
President Hugo Chavez's solid control of the military and the
state oil company (PDVSA) makes Chavez's involuntary
departure from power unlikely in the short term. Arias, now
head of the Union party, claimed President Chavez purged
military leadership very effectively since the events of
April 11, 2002, placing loyalists in key positions. Although
he conceded there are still "one or two" higher-ranking
officers and many mid-level officers that might support the
opposition if Chavez flagrantly violated the constitution or
rigged National Electoral Council (CNE) decisions, he
discounted their overall significance. He said Chavez
informants have thoroughly infiltrated the military, that
there is no mutual understanding between officers about what
events would trigger open dissent, and that there is an
inclination that "this is not the right time" for such
dissent. Chavez's public relations barrage, legitimizing his
rule as just and democratic, and his constant, but
"selective," use of the Constitution make it difficult to
justify any military break with his regime. "He is a
dictator with the appearance of a democrat... There is no way
for the military to organize against him." Arias claimed
Venezuelans have been approaching him on the street to tell
him "we're depending on you," implying Arias should use his
military background to oppose the GOV if the recall effort
fails. But Arias said he did not have the influence in the
military to provide such help.

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PDVSA: Onetime Opposition Base, Now Chavez Lifeblood
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3. (C) Arias claimed that Chavez was using the same methods
he used to secure control of the military with the state oil
company (PDVSA),a process that accelerated after the
two-month national strike that started December 2, 2002.
Arias found it ironic that PDVSA once led the fight against
Chavez, but was now keeping him afloat by financing his
"revolution." He lamented that Chavez's increasing control
of the armed forces, PDVSA, and the business sector would
make any future challenge significantly more difficult for
the opposition than previous attempts. "The most serious
problem," said Arias, "is that we do not have power anymore."

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Failed Recall Will Lead to Protests and Panic
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4. (C) Arias said that if the presidential recall is not
approved by the CNE, there will be significant opposition
protests and panic. However, many public employees and


recipients of government aid will forgo participating in any
uprising for fear of losing their jobs or assistance, just as
many of them decided not to participate in the signature
drive calling for a presidential recall. Their fear of
reprisal will be vindicated if the recall is denied, proving
the GOV's power and will to impose its political will on
Venezuelan institutions.

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Post-Chavez Administration Should Incorporate Chavistas
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5. (C) If the recall is approved by the CNE, Arias predicted
a thorough defeat for Chavez. "We will show them that they
are the minority." He added, however, that Chavez has
significant support in poor neighborhoods and has armed his
most rabid supporters. Even if Chavez leaves peacefully, the
next administration will have to deal with these potentially
violent extremists, as well as Chavez sympathizers in the
armed forces. Arias argued that the "war would not be won"
with a referendum that leads to Chavez leaving power, but
rather when the opposition demystifies the Chavez revolution
and incorporates the 35 to 40 percent of Venezuelans with
pro-Chavez sympathies.

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National and Zulian Political Diagnosis
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6. (C) Arias conceded that opposition parties would have
difficulty maintaining unity during regional elections slated
for August as "they are all trying to protect their own
space." The Ambassador agreed, adding that the opposition
would have to propose an agenda beyond opposing Chavez.
Arias said this was "slowly" happening, and that
gubernatorial and mayoral candidates fundamentally understand
that they need to campaign to improve people's day-to-day
lives, rather than on the coattails of national politics.
Arias was concerned that pro-Chavez politicians have been
successful blackmailing and corrupting both government
officials and business leaders, particularly Interior and
Justice Minister Lucas Rincon, and that this will prove
useful to them during elections as they offer incentives and
threaten to punish those tainted by deals with Chavismo.
Although there are far more opportunists than true believers
in Chavista ranks, Arias cautioned that appealing to
opportunism "has worked well" for the GOV.



7. (C) Arias stressed the importance of Zulia's oil
resources, political significance, and the border with
Colombia. Neither of the Fifth Republic Movement's (MVR)
front runners for governor, Calixto Ortega or Rodrigo Cabezas
(both National Assembly),have a chance of beating Zulia
Governor Manuel Rosales, according to Arias. (Note: Ortega
told poloff February 12 that he is confident he will win both
the nomination and election. He claimed Governor Rosales is
not as popular as his reputation and that the Democratic
Action party will nominate another candidate, splitting the
opposition vote. End Note.) GOV forces are working hard in
Zulia to shore up support for the eventual nominee, Arias
noted, particularly in south Maracaibo, where they are
"spending a great deal of money" through government programs
and outright bribery. Arias discounted the eventual success
of this strategy. He proposed regional and local governments
of states on both sides of the Venezuelan-Colombia border
take the initiative to combat border problems, as the federal
government is not addressing border problems satisfactorily.

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Chavez the Great Communicator
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8. (C) Arias claimed Chavez skips conventional political
discourse by speaking directly to the people. He said Chavez
uses baseball and religious analogies deftly to make
political points, using Venezuela's two most popular
institutions to strip out political complexities and opposing
viewpoints. This is dangerous, considering many Venezuelans


rely exclusively on his comments for social and political
information, and is one reason his supporters remain loyal.
Arias lamented that it is "almost impossible" to convince
Chavez's core supporters that their "savior" might be wrong
about anything, but that it would be impossible for Venezuela
to "go on without the Chavistas."

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Comment
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9. (C) Unlike many opposition leaders, Arias has full
appreciation for Chavez's intellect and abilities, and his
assessment of the military's incapacity to stand up to Chavez
is sobering. His analysis of the importance of incorporating
Chavistas in a post-Chavez Venezuela is sound. Former
Chavistas like Arias will be key to convincing Chavez's
supporters that there is life after Chavez.
SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA00545 - CONFIDENTIAL