"HEGEMONY IS A CHALLENGE:" CHAVISTA LEADER VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003584

SIPDIS


SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2034
TAGS: PREL EPET PGOV PHUM ENRG VE
SUBJECT: "HEGEMONY IS A CHALLENGE:" CHAVISTA LEADER VIEWS
GOV


Classified By: DCM - Steve McFarland for reason 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: Chavez supporter and Patria Para Todos
(PPT) secgen Jose Albornoz talked with DCM November 18 about
impending cabinet changes, policy challenges for Chavez and
the MVR party, and potential to improve bilateral relations.
PPT accepts that party stalwart Ali Rodriguez will leave
PDVSA to be Foreign Minister, but is resisting a proposal to
replace Ambassador to the US Bernanrdo Alvarez_ with William
Izarra. New PDVSA president may be Energy Minister Ramirez_.
Internally, Chavez' challenge is to not let political
hegemony be undone by corruption. Albornoz said the GOV paid
attention to international and to US views on human rights
cases, pointing to the release of Henrique Capriles; he said
the Sumate case essentially would remain in suspended
animation, so that the case could be revived in 2006 if
needed. Albornoz made a strong pitch for improved bilateral
relations, including a presidential summit in 2005; DCM said
the summit was improbable, and stressed that improved
relations would depend on the resolution of each sides'
concerns, including Sumate, the penal code, and press
freedom. End Summary.


Cabinet Changes in the Works
--------------


2. (C) Chavez ally and PPT SecGen Jose Albornoz stated that
PDVSA president Ali Rodriguez, a key PPT leader, would move
to the Foreign Ministry as early as November 19. Energy and
Mines (MEM) Minister Rafael Ramirez_ was the leading candidate
to replace Rodriguez; Albornoz warned that Ramirez_ was close
to Cuba (comment: Rodriguez was rumored to be very close to
Castro as well). Albornoz said that there was another idea
floating around: to move Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo
Alvarez_ back to replace Ramirez_, and to send to Washington
William Izarra, the theoretician of the revolution, former
coup plotter, and father of Communications Minister Andres
Izarra. The PPT was trying hard to resist this, Albornoz
said, and warned that Izarra was harder-line than Alvarez_,
and also that it was Marta Harnecker--who has an office in
Chavez' palace--that was pushing Izarra's candidacy.
(comment: Izarra is a low-key and approachable ideologue
whom Chavez had distanced himself from. Izarra did valuable
work in the referendum, and in now back in Chavez' favor.)
DCM did not say, "oh what a shame if Alvarez_ were to be
replaced." The other cabinet change in the works is to
replace Health Minister Capella with the sister of Army
commander Gen. Baduel. Albornoz said that Capella had been
forced out because his arrogance had caused considerable
problems in a ministry which had to satisfy numerous unions
and groups of customers.

"Hegemony is a Challenge:"
--------------


3. (C) Albornoz said that during the November 13 meeting at
Fuerte Tiuna with the Chavista governors and mayors, Chavez
underscored the need to fight corruption and inefficiency.
There were, however, initial signs of discord in Chavez' MVR
party. Chavez' recent order to the MVR to respond positively
to the desire for cooperation from the Union party of
Francisco Arias Cardenas (ex-Chavez coupplotter, and former
Chavez rival) had really annoyed MVR deputies like Nicolas
Maduro, Iris Varela, and William Lara. These deputies feared
that Arias Cardenas could somehow displace them, Albornoz
asserted. For the PPT, however, now was a time of
opportunity: the party now had 30 regional assembly
delegates, and 27 mayors. The PPT was pushing its deputies
to get on accountability commissions in their respective
assemblies in order to support anti-corruption efforts
(comment: in many cases, probably to ensure corruption flows
their own way). Meanwhile, the Chavistas are focused on the
2005 national assembly elections. The Chavistas supported
the Electoral Council (CNE) decision to suspend the December
recall elections (of opposition deputies) because any
opposition victory would be a real boost for the opposition,
whereas an MVR victory would have little additional impact on
the heels of their August 15 and October 31 successes. It
was, however, a fiercely fought debate within the Chavista
parties, Albornoz said.

Better Relations with the U.S.?
--------------


4. (C) Albornoz stressed that Ali Rodriguez would, as
Foreign Minister, aim for improved bilateral relations --
ideally to the point that there could be a Chavez-Bush summit
in 2005. DCM said that while nothing was impossible, this
sounded very improbable. The USG view is that presidential


meetings reflect a positive bilateral relationship. There
would have to be considerable improvement on the issues each
country is concerned about. In the case of the U.S., these
included Sumate, the penal code, and the media law. Albornoz
asked if we had not noticed that the Sumate case had moved in
the favor of the defendants; he also claimed to have lobbied
Chavez, at our request, to free the then jailed Henrigue
Capriles. DCM said we had. Albornoz (who bears a grudge
against Sumate from when Sumate trounced his own Comando
Ayacucho in 2003-4) said that the judicial action against
Sumate would be frozen, but not dropped altogether, so that
the GOV could take it up again during the 2006 presidential
campaign if needed. On the penal code, Albornoz offered only
that Venezuela was not as advanced a society as the US; on
the media law, he agreed that it was "crap" ("una cagada") as
drafted. He nodded assent when the DCM observed that its
purpose was to reduce TV network income by imposing local
content rules. Back to Rodriguez, Albornoz said that the new
Foreign Minister would be interested in meeting privately
early on with the Ambassador; DCM urged him to press
Rodriguez to do so.

Comment:
--------------


5. (C) Albornoz usually offers a tantalizing mix of
insights, news, and self-promotion. Our take:

--While the decision to replace the ineffective FonMin Perez
is logical, the choice of Ali Rodriguez is curious. It would
seem to foreshadow an increase in Chavez' oil diplomacy, but
it also raises questions about where PDVSA is headed. The
change would make some sense from Chavez's perspective: it
reduces the PPT's disproportionate power in PDVSA (Ramirez_,
although a protege of Rodriguez, lacks the latter's political
heft). It would be a graceful exit for Rodriguez, and
Rodriguez would offer Chavez far more ability to execute
policies than FonMin Perez.

--There is some churning about within the MVR and pro-Chavez
groups. Thus far we have seen nothing that Chavez can't

easily control -- but there are differences out there over
direction and resources and personalities, and we believe the
Chavista hegemony will magnify those differences over time.

--The international message on Sumate has had at least some
positive effect. Indeed, had prosecutor Anderson not been
assassinated November 18, it is possible that the Sumate case
might have evolved more positively in a short period of time
-- although Albornoz's desire for what he called a "sword of
Damocles" was and remains a plausible option.
Brownfield


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2004CARACA03584 - CONFIDENTIAL