Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS3542
2004-11-17 13:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

SHATTERED OPPOSITION SHORT ON STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV KDEM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003542 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
HQSOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: SHATTERED OPPOSITION SHORT ON STRATEGY

REF: CARACAS 03291

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003542

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
HQSOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: SHATTERED OPPOSITION SHORT ON STRATEGY

REF: CARACAS 03291

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Venezuela's Coordinadora Democratica, the
amalgamation of opponents to President Hugo Chavez that had
begun to disintegrate before the regional elections on
October 31, has been deemed dead by opposition parties and
Chavez supporters alike. Many opposition members, who tend
to blame the government for cheating and fault Washington for
abandoning them, have been too preoccupied with their bad
fortune to plan a rebound from the drubbing they had expected
in the regionals. Some Chavez opponents predict an
undemocratic end to his rule; others believe internal
fissures already have his government on the brink of
collapse. While opposition party members muse about new
interparty alliances, policies, and strategies, the
opposition is not making a serious effort to cooperate and
may encounter more setbacks before being able to mount a
serious challenge. In the meantime, the administration will
have to answer for more now that it controls most of the
government authorities. End summary.

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Disunity and Disarray
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2. (C) The union of Venezuelan political parties and
interest groups opposing President Hugo Chavez, which had
begun to unhinge before the regional elections on October 31,
has disintegrated. On November 2, Accion Democratica (AD)
president Henry Ramos Allup publicly declared the
opposition's Coordinadora Democratica (CD) "finished."
Social Christian Party (COPEI) deputy secretary general Cesar
Perez Vivas confirmed to poloff the following day that the CD
had outlived its usefulness. Primero Justicia (PJ) had
broken with the CD in late September because, according to a
PJ official in Tachira State, the PJ's involvement merely had
bolstered rival opposition parties on the verge of folding.
Smaller parties such as Causa R and Alianza Bravo Pueblo
(ABP) also had walked in late September over their refusal to
participate in elections viewed as rigged, according to
press.


3. (C) Chavez opponents expected the President's candidates
would dominate on October 31, but few were considering any
strategy to rebound from the losses. Indeed, parties were

still divided over short-term tactics. For example, no
consensus existed within parties over whether their
candidates should remain in regional elections, although most
of the opposition ended up supporting participation. In some
cases, such disagreements led to internal party fractures;
Proyecto Venezuela leader Henrique Salas Roemer dismissed
Luis Carlos Rubio for dropping out of the Anzoategui
gubernatorial race, according to a member of the CD's
political committee.

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Pouters
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4. (C) The most common trait among opposition supporters is
an inability to look past recent setbacks. Chavez's
opponents focused on rehashing examples of alleged
governmental election fraud, the trumped-up criminal charges
brought against fellow Chavez opponents, and other abuses to
discussing ways to exploit Chavez's political
miscalculations. Alfredo Coronil, AD's national secretary of
international affairs, told poloff nearly 90 percent of the
country opposed communism, but when asked why the opposition
did not try to turn public opinion against oil loans to Cuba,
Coronil merely resumed bashing Chavez's foreign policy.
Coronil said Venezuela's former enthusiasm for democracy had
dissipated into unprecedented apathy.


5. (C) Some dispirited Chavez opponents expect the
United States to rescue Venezuela. Most Chavez opponents
resent the Carter Center's endorsement of the referendum
process, and many convey distrust of the Embassy's appeals
for better bilateral relations. National Assembly deputy

Alfonso Marquina (AD) questioned poloff October 18 whether
the United States really cared about civil rights in
Venezuela. On October 5, the alarmist political analyst
Isabel Bacalao, who heads the think tank "Servicios de
Informacion Estrategica," lamented to poloff that the US had
lost its ability and willingness to influence Venezuela.

--------------
Chicken Littles
--------------


6. (C) Another view among opposition members is that
Chavez is here to stay until he is overthrown. Of these
skeptics, many privately justify rebellion by citing article
350 of the constitution, which provides for the public
disavowal of antidemocratic or abusive leaders. Some expect
imminent violence, such as retired Vice Admiral Rafael Huizi,
who told poloff in early October that unidentified military
officers would stage a coup if the administration ignored the
release of the CD's election fraud report (REFTEL) on October

12.

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Pollyannas
--------------


7. (C) A final opposition school of thought is that
Chavismo is soon to collapse on its own. Bacalao sees hints
of desperation in pro-government media broadcasts and Chavez
speeches that point to the administration's lack of control
over the military. Those opposition figures who dismiss
Chavez's influence also tend to be confident of his
opponents' cohesion. Chain emails announcing imminent,
overwhelming street demonstrations circulate with such
frequency that the radical pro-Chavez website www.aporrea.com
prints them in derision.

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Tacticians
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8. (U) A few politicians have considered the future of
the opposition. AD international affairs secretary Coronil
said he envisioned a coalition of social democratic parties,
to include AD, COPEI, Movement toward Socialism (MAS),and
ABP. His homologue in COPEI, Sadio Garavini, told poloff
November 5 the same, although he consigned AD to another
imaginary alliance because it was too left-leaning. Causa R
leader Andres Velazquez told poloff before the regionals he
was considering a new leftist opposition bloc, and press
reports on November 2 said ABP leader Antonio Ledezma had
proposed a new opposition front, as well. PJ and Causa R
announced November 15 they would unite in a 8-member National
Assembly bloc that they hoped would grow into a political
alliance, according to press.


9. (C) Even fewer opposition figures have articulated
a shift in platform. Marquina, who is AD's floor leader in
the National Assembly, told poloff before the regionals that
most voters were interested in employment, not civil rights
issues. Reflecting on the "it's the economy, stupid" slogan,
Marquina said the most important issues in Venezuela involved
the people's empty stomachs. PJ representatives in
Anzoategui on October 26 also told poloff that the people
were most interested in poverty alleviation. An assistant to
MVR National Assembly deputy Luis Tascon in early October
privately credited PJ for engaging with lower-class
neighborhoods.


10. (C) Primero Justicia, whose officials in Tachira
and Anzoategui told poloffs they were more concerned about
the 2005 National Assembly elections, is perhaps the only
party to have formulated a post-regional election strategy.
PJ backers said they wanted to show effective management and
service provision in a few key mayoralties, from which they
would radiate outward. Anzoategui PJ backers won a local
race with the campaign slogan "just like in Baruta and
Chacao," which refers to two relatively clean, safe,
upper-class Caracas municipalities run by PJ mayors. A
Tachira PJ representative said PJ would concentrate on
educating party members before the National Assembly
elections next summer.

--------------

Comment
--------------


11. (C) No serious interparty dialog about opposition unity
is occurring yet. Most opposition members are too focused on
feeling sorry for themselves to plan for the future. Because
government coffers almost exclusively finance political
campaigns in Venezuela, we may even see more splits as some
opposition members approach the government seeking to cut
deals to recoup financial losses. PJ may be the only party
making a promising effort to distance itself--both by
choosing its allies and by managing its image--from the
pre-Chavez past, but the young professionals failed to
generate much support from Venezuelans at the national level.
Despite the Pollyannas' hopes, Chavez's government is highly
unlikely to implode anytime soon. Nonetheless, the
electorate now will have mostly Chavistas to blame for
underemployment, public insecurity, and scarce government
services. Chavismo may begin to face a bigger threat from
within as pro-government officials compete for spoils in the
regions.


12. (C) The splintering of the opposition reflects the fact
that the opposition was a coalition of disparate groups
united only by the prospect of defeating Chavez. As a
coalition, the opposition groups excelled in organizing the
signature collection drive (thanks to Sumate) but were less
adroit in responding to Chavez and in offering a credible
alternative to Chavez.


13. (C) The challenge to opposition groups remains that of
presenting a credible alternative to Chavez and the MVR in
the 2005 National Assembly elections and the 2006
presidential elections. New leaders need to emerge, and
parties need to get in touch with their supporters, before
there can be progress towards opposition unity.
Brownfield


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2004CARACA03542 - CONFIDENTIAL