Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS295
2004-01-27 20:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

DAS DESHAZO'S MEETING WITH G-5 OPPOSTION LEADERS

Tags:  PREL PGOV VE OAS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000295 

SIPDIS


STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
NSC FOR CHRIS BARTON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE OAS
SUBJECT: DAS DESHAZO'S MEETING WITH G-5 OPPOSTION LEADERS


Classified By: Ambassador Charles S. Shapiro for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000295

SIPDIS


STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
NSC FOR CHRIS BARTON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE OAS
SUBJECT: DAS DESHAZO'S MEETING WITH G-5 OPPOSTION LEADERS


Classified By: Ambassador Charles S. Shapiro for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) On January 22, WHA DAS Peter DeShazo gave opposition
leaders (4 of 5 of the members of the so-called G-5) a
positive assessment of his meetings earlier in the day with
officials from the OAS, Carter Center, and UNDP, and of their
ability to monitor the signature verification process in the
CNE. GOV officials, he said, had expressed their commitment
to respect the decisions of the CNE. He stressed the
international attention focused on Venezuela, and his belief
that the CNE would act as a fair arbiter of the referendum
process. The leaders of the G-5 all stressed their lack of
confidence in the Government, and their fear that the CNE was
subject to pressures and might favor the government by either
openly disallowing the signatures, or delaying a recall until
after August, when the Vice President would serve out the
President's term. End Summary.


2. (U) The Ambassador hosted a dinner for DAS DeShazo with
Julio Borges (Primero Justicia),Juan Fernandez (Gente de
Petroleo),Henry Ramos Allup (Accion Democratica) and Enrique
Salas Romer (Proyecto Venezuela) represented the G-5. Enrique
Mendoza (COPEI) had accepted but did not attend. Also present
were the Political Counselor, the Public Affairs Officer, and
EmbOff (notetaker).

--------------
AD Concerned About National Assembly
--------------


3. (C) Henry Ramos Allup spoke first of the opposition's deep
concern about the functioning of the National Assembly and
the push for rules changes. He feared that the changes would
be used to approve a far-reaching package of legislation,
such as the reform of the Supreme Court, over the objections
of the opposition. The TSJ law, Ramos said, is the most
important threat to the opposition, since it would give the
government almost complete control over the interpretation of
the Constitution, and the governing body of the judiciary.
Ramos stressed changes in Accion Democratica, from opening up
its usually closed internal governing meetings to the press,

and instituting a far reaching policy of alliances. He
proposed that polls should be taken prior to the electoral
campaigns for governorships, and all parties agree to back
the candidate with the best chance to win. Enrique Salas
Romer pointed out that this eliminated the campaign's ability
to develop new candidates. Ramos stressed the need for the
opposition to remain united even after the referendum, to win
elections.


4. (C) Ramos and Salas played down various polls including
one showing up to 60 percent support for President Chavez in
a recall referendum. Salas attributed President Chavez'
tendency rise in the polls at Christmas to lavish spending,
and seasonal optimism. He predicted it would then fall
sharply afterwards. Both expressed confidence that Chavez
would lose the referendum.

---
CNE
---


5. (C) DeShazo told the leaders he was pleased to see the
technical competency of the OAS observation team working at
the CNE, and their own confidence in their ability to closely
monitor the verification of the signatures collected for the
referendum drives. He stressed the importance of the OAS in
the process, and his optimism that they would guarantee the
fairness of the process. He stressed the interest in
Washington, among both business and government leaders, in
the resolution of the political crisis in Venezuela, and that
the message he and the USG have conveyed to the GOV is that
the democratic process represented by a transparent and fair
referendum campaign must be respected. VP Jose Vicente
Rangel and FM Roy Chaderton had given him assurances that the
government would respect the decision of the CNE. He also

mentioned TSJ Chief Justice Ivan Rincon's optimism and
confidence in his institution's ability to fulfill its role
in the process.


6. (C) The four opposition leaders stressed their lack of
confidence in the GOV, and their fear that it was pressuring
the CNE. The delays in the verification of the signatures
were cited as evidence that the CNE is not acting in good
faith. Borges pointed out that not one signature had yet been
verified, and that the stated goal of finishing in 22 days
was impossible. All the leaders acknowledged 70 percent
public trust in CNE, but they did not share it. When asked by
the Ambassador what they wanted to achieve from President
Carter's visit, they all stressed "fair play."


7. (C) Ramos related VP Rangel's assertion that the
opposition had not gathered more than 1 million signatures
with the exhortation immediately afterwards that everyone had
to accept the CNE's decision. He found this a clear sign of
government pressure on the CNE, or even a sign of a deal.
Ramos charged that the collection of signatures had not been
fair, being stacked against the opposition with rule changes
and military pressure. Ramos talked of his fear that the CNE
would try to prove its independence by disallowing some of
the pro-government parties signatures against opposition
deputies, and then disallow the recall referendum on the
President. He pushed hard several times for a plan under
which the opposition would accept all the signatures against
their deputies, including 9 from Ramos' AD, and go right to
the recall elections. This would put pressure on the
government to do the same, and eliminate the opportunity for
the CNE to use the recall referendums against deputies as
legitimating for its throwing out the presidential
referendum.


8. (C) Salas responded strongly to DAS DeShazo's comment that
the opposition parties' negative sniping at the CNE was
perceived as counterproductive and that they were seen as
lacking a unified, positive message. Salas declared that the
opposition was responsible for making the CNE an acceptable
arbiter, despite it having a pro-government majority, and
they had every right to want to them to be closely watched,
and reminded of their responsibilities. He said the CNE had
not earned its credibility, but been given it.


9. (C) Borges also stressed the delays of the CNE in
verifying the signatures, and asked DAS DeShazo if it would
be acceptable to the international community if the delays of
the CNE led to the recall referendum taking place after
August, when the VP would substitute a defeated Chavez,
rather than a popularly elected leader. He suggested this
might be the CNE's intention in drawing out the verification
process. DAS DeShazo responded that there was a limit, though
not quantified, as to how much delay was acceptable, and that
the circumstances and reasons for any delay would be a factor
in determining the response of the international community.
He stressed that both the GOV and CNE have pledged that the
process will be transparent and fair and that the USG regards
these as markers upon which to judge results. Borges
stressed that the constant addition of new rules to a
signature verification process added uncertainty to the
process.


10. (C) Juan Fernandez stressed the tremendous distrust
between the two sides, and the need to complete actions
according to a pre-established timetable to build trust. He
also suggested an agreement between the sides not to run to
the courts to contest any outcome, as this would generate
further tension. The Ambassador pointed out that a
constitutional right was involved, but Fernandez suggested
that the situation required some sort of corporative
agreement between the sides to protect the peace. He also
suggested Carter to help set up a direct line of
communication between the two sides to help bring down
tension.


11. (C) In a sustained aside conversation with AD leader
Henry Ramos, DeShazo opined that for the opposition to be
effective, it needed to reach out to public opinion with a
coordinated, coherent, and positive public message, put

forward a program or plan of action, and reach out not only
to oppositionists but also to independents and chavistas. He
noted that he was hearing in many circles that opposition
carping at the CNE at this early stage in the verification
process was counterproductive. Ramos agreed, offering strong
criticism of the disunity of the opposition and its public
affairs and seconding the need to reach agreement soonest on
coordinating action and designing a platform.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) The leaders welcomed this opportunity to meet with
DAS DeShazo. The concern about CNE foot-dragging is the
preponderant theme for the opposition. They discount that
pressuring the CNE could backfire and will no doubt continue
to make their views known. The marches January 23 are part of
the strategy. DeShazo's message was unmistakable throughout
his visit: support for the CNE -- and the important OAS and
Carter Center observation -- as the way to achieve the OAS
resolution's call for a democratic, peaceful, constitutional,
and electoral solution. The G-5 bristled at the implied
criticism of their carping, but took the message on board.


13. (U) DAS DeShazo reviewed this message.
SHAPIRO


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