Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS2725
2004-08-27 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

MVR DEPUTIES ESPOUSE RECONCILIATION

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PHUM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002725 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE
SUBJECT: MVR DEPUTIES ESPOUSE RECONCILIATION


Classified By: ACTING DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASON 1.5 D

--------
Summary
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002725

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE
SUBJECT: MVR DEPUTIES ESPOUSE RECONCILIATION


Classified By: ACTING DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASON 1.5 D

--------------
Summary
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1. (C) Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) Deputies William Lara
(Miranda) and Jose Khan (Caracas),told poloffs August 23
that they hoped to devise a plan for reconciliation in the
National Assembly. Lara and Khan had avoided EMbassy contact
for almost a year. They also expressed objections to
postponing the regional elections, and optimism about
prospects for improving US-Venezuela relations. The deputies
were distrustful of the opposition and of the USG, which
indicates the likely strict limits to any dialogue. End
summary.

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Reconciliation is possible. . . to an extent
--------------


2. (C) Poloffs met with Fifth Republic Movement (MVR)
Deputies William Lara (Miranda) and Jose Khan (Caracas)
August 23 to discuss the government's ideas about
reconciliation with the opposition and the US Government, and
to gain insight into the government's strategy for the
regional elections. Lara and Khan said that government
legislators were hoping to devise a common legislative agenda
with opposition deputies that could be used as the starting
point for reconciliation. The two examples they gave were
the law that would regulate disbursement of federal funds to
state and municipal governments, and the formation of the
federal government council that would direct federally funded
development projects nationwide. To be able to reach this
common ground, however, Khan said there would have to be an
agreement on protocol rules for the National Assembly in
which opposition deputies would agree not to filibuster or
hinder the passage of bills within the Assembly. In apparent
contradiction to the possibility of reconciliation, Lara said
there were other initiatives that the MVR knew it would have
to push on its own, such as the appointment of judges to the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ),the media content law, and
the national police law. He also made clear the GOV would
not/not negotiate with any opposition leaders who would not
accept the results of the presidential referendum.

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Plans for the future
--------------


3. (C) When asked about the plan for deepening the
revolution that President Hugo Chavez announced in his Alo
Presidente program August 22 (septel),Khan explained that
the government would begin investigating corruption charges
lodged against government officials, including Chavez's
cabinet members. He said the party realized that one of the
problems in implementing the 1999 Constitution was the
rampant corruption that existed among those who had lost
sight of the revolution. The investigations would include a
review of the social missions and their efficiency as well.
(Comment: On August 25, Social Development Fund (FIDES) head
Elias Jaua told the press he had asked the Fiscalia to
investigate 10 of his staff for corruption.)

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No Delay in Regional Elections
--------------


4. (C) Turning to the regional elections, Lara was adamant
that the regional elections be held 26 September as
scheduled, unless a postponement was needed for technical
reasons. Lara argued the date should stand because the CNE
does not have the legal authority to extend the terms of the
governors and mayors in office. In addition, Lara admitted,
politically it would be more expedient for his party to hold
elections to take advantage of the "coattail effect" produced
in the wake of Chavez's victory. Lara asserted with
certainty that Coordinadora leader Governor Enrique Mendoza
was finished politically and would be defeated by Diosdado
Cabello in Miranda. He said gubernatorial candidates Gen.

(Ret.) Alberto Gutierrez (Zulia) and Gen. (Ret.) Luis Felipe
Acosta Carles (Carabobo) would have tough races, given that
the opposition incumbents can count on Chavista cross-over
votes in their favor.

--------------
Bilateral Relations
--------------


5. (C) Lara and Khan expressed optimism that US-Venezuela
relations would improve in the wake of the referendum, but
alleged U.S. reluctance to recognize the results. Both
raised allegations that the CIA is conspiring to destabilize
Venezuela. Lara claimed former President Bush (sic) called
President Chavez to congratulate him on his victory in the
referendum, taking it as a positive sign that relations would
improve. Lara offered two areas for cooperation -- illegal
drugs and terrorism -- and added that elements of the USG
seem intent on impugning or at least not recognizing
Venezuela's contributions. Lara also recommended that the
USG convince the opposition to drop its fraud allegations and
accept the government's offer to dialogue.

--------------
Comment
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6. (C) Lara had avoided contact with the U.S. Embassy for
eight months, so we interpret his newfound interest in
meeting poloffs as part of the GOV's post-referendum
reassessment of bilateral relations. The deputies' attitude
toward the opposition raises doubts about the Chavistas'
interest in a sincere give-and-take with the opposition.
Their persistent suspicions about USG plotting in Venezuela
indicates that while the GOV has turned down the volume on
its criticism of the USG, it maintains its perspective.
McFarland


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2004CARACA02725 - CONFIDENTIAL