Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS2688
2004-08-20 19:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

MENDOZA TO TAKE FRAUD ARGUMENT BEFORE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM VE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002688 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR C. BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: MENDOZA TO TAKE FRAUD ARGUMENT BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL OPINION

Classified By: DCM Stephen G. McFarland for reason 1.4 (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002688

SIPDIS


NSC FOR C. BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: MENDOZA TO TAKE FRAUD ARGUMENT BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL OPINION

Classified By: DCM Stephen G. McFarland for reason 1.4 (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Miranda State Gov. Enrique Mendoza told the
Ambassador August 20 that the opposition had formed a
commission to compile the "evidence" supporting the
allegations that the GoV committed fraud in the August 15
referendum. Personally convinced that the GoV committed
fraud, he said the Coordinadora would not present the case to
the National Electoral Council or Venezuela's Supreme Court,
but rather would use it to delegitimize the Chavez
government. The Ambassador reminded Mendoza that the opinion
of the OAS and Carter Center technical experts will be key,
and urged him to take the evidence to them. Mendoza
recognized that the technical nature of the allegations
hindered understanding by the public. He concurred with the
Ambassador that what would be most convincing would be a
person revealing complicity. Mendoza also said he had
convoked the leaders of the major political parties to
discuss the recommendation of "democratic" governors and
mayors not to participate in the scheduled regional
elections. End Summary.


2. (C) Miranda State Gov. Enrique Mendoza is convinced that
President Chavez committed electronic fraud to win the August
15 presidential recall referendum. Meeting with the
Ambassador and PolCouns August 20, Mendoza recounted the
allegations that have been made public since August 16. The
Coordinadora Democratica leader said he had formed a
commission led by constitutional lawyer Tulio Alvarez, with
members such as former Supreme Electoral Council President
Carlos Delgado Chapellin, to compile the "evidence" they are
gathering. Mendoza said the evidence was not for use in
filing complaints with the National Electoral Council (CNE)
or bringing cases before the Supreme Court. Both these
institutions, Mendoza asserted, lack legitimacy. Instead,
the opposition will use the information to delegitimize the
Chavez government.


3. (C) Mendoza said the opposition had had two windows of
opportunity to press the fraud case in the first days after
the vote. Former President Jimmy Carter, he said, had closed

one of them with his statement August 16, whereas OAS SYG had
kept the other open as a result of the conversation Mendoza
was able to have with him. Urged by the Ambassador to take
the evidence nonetheless to the OAS and Carter Center
experts, particularly because of its technical nature,
Mendoza said they would, of course, do so.


4. (C) The Ambassador then asked Mendoza what impact a
declaration by the international observers that there was no
fraud, based on the August 19-20 audit of the results in
which the opposition had refused to participate. He reminded
the Governor that numerous governments had already blessed
the results, and following the audit, the USG might well
follow suit. Mendoza responded that the opposition would
continue putting its case together. It would be a mistake to
try to put information together to compete with the timing of
the audit, he said. He emphasized that the importance of
having the information fully in place even if it took days or
weeks.


5. (C) Mendoza recognized the difficulty of presenting
convincing arguments to the technically challenged and
acknowledged that in this type of situation, the best
arguments come from persons with hand on knowledge of what
supposedly occurred. He said for example, that a local radio
station owner in his state had told him that a National Guard
captain had lamented to a family member that he had
participated in changing paper receipts to keep his job.


5. (C) Mendoza noted that acting hastily had most recently
caused the death of an innocent woman at Plaza Francia, when
irresponsible leaders could think of nothing more to do than
to call people out on the street as a reaction to the loss.


Another mistake the opposition had made, according to Mendoza
was trusting Smartmatic. He said they had been convinced by
a member of the Coordinadora who is the father of one of the
Smartmatic executives that "the boys" would do a good job.

--------------
Future Elections
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador referred to the prospects for the
gubernatorial and mayoral elections in light of the real
possibility that the fraud allegations would still be alive
September 26. He asked Mendoza what would a Venezuela
without opposition governors in the major states look like?
Mendoza said the opposition was examining that question. He
noted that the Association of Governors and Mayors had
recommended that they not participate. The decision, of
course, was not up to the sitting officials, Mendoza said,
but up to the political parties, which could in any case
choose other candidates if the incumbents did not want to
run. He said he had convoked the leaders of the main parties
for a discussion August 22 to determine their course of
action.


7. (C) Mendoza noted that it would be folly to simply
abandon the political space to Chavez. He said there are
those in the opposition who advocate mass resignations, for
example, presuming that Chavez is working from the same
assumptions as they are. Mendoza recalled that during the
December 2002-January 2003 strike he had attempted to
negotiate end to the stoppage with then Minister of Interior
Diosdado Cabello and none of the arguments about jobs and
commerce worked. To participate in the elections, however,
Mendoza said there would have to be some adjustments to the
conditions, such as agreement to reconcile paper receipts
with the electronic tabulation, which the government is
unlikely to do.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Mendoza is prepared to make the fraud case the banner
for continuing opposition to Chavez. He is not alone, from
what we have seen among his fellow governors and mayors.
There are enough Venezuelans who believe they in fact have
been robbed to maintain a core constituency in the double
digits of percentages. Putting the matter in the hands of
the commission headed by Tulio Alvarez will help bring
clarity and order to the various types of fraud mechanisms
that are being alleged. The question is whether it will be
sufficiently credible.


9. (C) The question of participating in the regional
contests is crucial because participation would give the
opposition venues to maintain and cultivate grassroots
support and provide a channel for anti-Chavez sentiment.
Boycotting the elections would create a vacuum that Chavez's
associates, or opponents willing to take the opportunity for
a variety of reasons, would fill quickly. Participation in
the regional elections -- especially if the opposition did
fairly well -- would legitimate the referendum process.
Shapiro


NNNN
2004CARACA02688 - CONFIDENTIAL