VENEZUELA: WHY CHAVEZ "WON"

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002671

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS TO DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2014
TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: WHY CHAVEZ "WON"

REF: A. CARACAS 2081


B. CARACAS 2153

C. CARACAS 1950

D. CARACAS 2432

E. CARACAS 2309

F. CARACAS 2088

Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The Organization of American States (OAS) and Carter
Center are auditing ballots now, but assuming that charges of
electoral fraud are not substantiated, one must ask what
happened and how Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won the
August 15 recall referendum by such a large margin. Chavez
ran an effective, overwhelming electoral campaign using
practically unlimited state resources against a divided and
disorganized opposition. High oil prices cushioned his
success. Chavez also utilized other mechanisms to ensure
himself victory, including his control over the National
Electoral Council (CNE) and, by extension, the international
observer missions. Chavez created a climate of uncertainty
for opposition supporters and leaders, who expended enormous
energy and political capital just to get to the referendum.
Additionally, the opposition's "Si" campaign never really got
off the ground, weakened by lack of money and off-target
messages. End summary.

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Chavez the Great Campaigner
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2. (C) Chavez ran an effective, overwhelming electoral
campaign beginning in July 2003, when his popularity dropped
to a low 36% in the polls. Starting with the "Mision
Robinson" literacy campaign, Chavez began using state
resources to reach potential voters directly, offering cash
stipends as well as access to elementary and high school
degree completion programs. Defeated most recently during
the appeals process for presidential recall signatures, he
then personally took control of the campaign and enlisted his
ministers and other government officials to marshal the
resources at their command.


3. (C) Instead of letting the referendum be a Chavez vs.
Chavez decision, he recast the referendum as an inevitable
victory for his revolution. Chavez launched his "No"
campaign under the direction of the "Comando Maisanta," which
sold the Chavez twist that the mere calling of the
referendum, provided for by his own Bolivarian Constitution,
was a victory for the participatory democracy espoused by his
revolution (ref A).


4. (C) If the numbers as of August 19 are correct, Chavez
appears to have successfully mobilized lower class Venezuelan
voters who have historically abstained from elections. The
GOV issued identity cards or "cedulas" to undocumented
Venezuelans as well as foreigners through an accelerated
program "Mision Identidad" and put them on the national voter
registry before rolls closed July 10. In June, the GOV
naturalized 105,000 foreigners within one week, as part of
its goal to naturalize 200,000 before July 10. The average
number of naturalizations per year previously had only been
3,000 to 4,000. The GOV unabashedly linked cedulas to votes
for Chavez (ref B).


5. (C) To mobilize the poor, he also fed them various
populist programs. High oil prices throughout the campaign,
in addition to control over other ministry budgets, gave
Chavez the revenue not only to launch the "No" campaign media
blitz but also to provide populist food, health, and literacy
programs for the poor. Known as "misiones," these programs
literally put cash into the hands of key voters. Further,
Chavez sent the clear message to voters that the opposition
elite would take away these programs if they returned to
power.


6. (C) One of the biggest assets to the "No" campaign was
Chavez, himself. Throughout the campaign period, he
continued his "Alo, Presidente" radio programs, held multiple
marches and public addresses, and stepped up his vitriolic
language against the U.S., the Bush Administration,
neo-liberal economic policies, and "Yankee Imperialism." Our
policy to avoid bilateral feuding and keep the focus on the
referendum itself weakened Chavez's strategy of making us a
central issue. His anti-American message and the idea that
President Bush was his true opponent, however, resonated
among those Chavistas who continue to believe the USG was
behind the events of April 2002.

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Controlling the CNE
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7. (C) Strongly favoring Chavez was his control of the CNE
and, by extension, the international observer missions. The
three pro-government members on the CNE, Francisco
Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez, and Oscar Battaglini, often
appeared more ready to impede democratic expression than to
facilitate it, and made it difficult for the opposition to
collect the signatures necessary to convoke the referendum.
Chavez suffered a blow after the signature appeals process,
but ultimately, he benefited from the drawn out, seven-month
signature collection and verification process that exhausted
the opposition. Chavez campaigned during this time, while
the opposition was busy wrangling with the CNE over the
validity of thousands of signatures and rules for the appeals
process.


8. (C) After the appeals process and clear Chavista
dissatisfaction with the outspoken role of the Carter Center,
Organization of American States (OAS),and the Group of
Friends of the OAS Secretary General on Venezuela, the CNE
set rules and regulations limiting international observer
participation in the referendum. The CNE also instituted
automated voting over manual voting despite the opposition's
concerns that an untested, computerized system would leave
room for fraud and manipulation (ref C).


9. (C) The possibility for fraud and manipulation of
Smartmatic machine software and CANTV transmissions called
for more extensive international observation of the process.
Instead, the CNE initially delayed invitations to
international observers, limited the number of observers per
mission and their activities and movement, and banned "quick
counts" as a methodology to check the accuracy of final vote
tabulations. Such limitations led the European Union to
decline its invitation to observe. The Carter Center and OAS
accepted the invitations but had to negotiate with the CNE to
secure the "minimum conditions" under which they would
participate as observers. Only three days before the
election did the Carter Center get all of its requested
observers and technicians accredited by the CNE.

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Creating a Climate of Intimidation
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10. (C) The GOV also created a climate of uncertainty and
intimidation for opposition supporters to suppress the "Si"
vote. Questionable criminal indictments and detentions of
opposition figures, including Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles,
Sumate directors Maria Corina Machado and Alejandro Plaz,
Gente de Petroleo leader Juan Fernandez, retired Army General
Manuel Rosendo, and Asemblea de Educadores leader Leonardo
Carvajal, coupled with inexplicable dismissals from
government service of employees who had participated in the
signature drive contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust.
The CNE's decision to use fingerprinting machines
"cazahuellas" to verify a voter's identity led to the
widespread belief that a person's vote would not be secret.


11. (C) Other examples of intimidation included attacks on
media outlets and acts of violence by hard-liner Chavistas
following the appeals process, accusations against national


telecommunications company CANTV and GOV threats that Plan
Republica was prepared to intervene. There were also rumors
that the GOV would cut off gasoline supply to the eastern
neighborhoods of Caracas, as had happened during the appeals,
and thinly-veiled threats of violence by senior GOV officials
(like VP Jose Vincente Rangel) if there was evidence of
"sabotage" by the "terrorist" opposition.

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Failed Opposition Campaign
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12. (C) The opposition's "Si" campaign bloomed late. The CNE
announced June 3 that preliminary calculations indicated the
opposition had collected enough signatures to activate the
recall referendum, and on June 8, set August 15 as the date
for the vote. The opposition's Coordinadora Democratica,
however, did not launch its presidential recall "Si" campaign
until June 25. One Coordinadora advisor noted that an
agreement between media owners and the GOV brokered by the
Carter Center weakened the opposition's "air" forces. The
opposition, he said, then had to rely on its "ground" forces,
and Coordinadora political parties and NGOs began working at
the grassroots level.


13. (C) Some critics of the Coordinadora do not think the
"Si" campaign really got off the ground until August 1, when
its leaders signed the "National Accord for Social Justice
and Democratic Peace," establishing a framework for an
opposition-led transition government and recommending a
primary election to determine the unified opposition
candidate in a follow-on presidential election. Many
observers saw this Governance Accord as a tangible
demonstration of unity by a politically diverse opposition,
but it did not emerge until less than two weeks before the
vote (ref D).


14. (C) Polling data before the referendum showed that the
"Si" campaign was failing to bring in new supporters,
according to an opposition political consultant. The
Coordinadora convinced itself that it was sufficient to have
Chavez run against Chavez and ran a weak media campaign aimed
at undecided voters, while others believed the focus should
be on buttressing core support.


15. (C) The financing for the "Si" campaign was also lacking.
Coordinadora advisors told us in mid-July that Chavez's
success in projecting himself as the winner and polling data
in his favor led to a drying up of funds from
opposition-affiliated business executives. They speculated
that businesses were reluctant to donate money, and those
that did, did so in lesser amounts, because they were
unconvinced the opposition would win and did not want to be
identified with the opposition if Chavez won. Movement to
Socialism (MAS) President and Coordinadora member Felipe
Mujica confirmed there was a lack of financial support for
the "Si" campaign when the GOV was clearly outspending the
opposition (ref E).

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Failed Opposition Leadership
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16. (C) The opposition relied on the substantial number of
Venezuelans already dissatisfied with the Chavez
Administration, the triumph of the signature appeals process,
anti-Chavez messages already being transmitted by
opposition-friendly media outlets, and marches to energize
opposition supporters - but it did not rally behind a single
leader. Even though Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza
emerged from the appeals process victory as the likely
front-runner in a potential face-off with Chavez, the
Coordinadora opted to stick with the Chavez vs. Chavez
strategy.


17. (C) The June 18 meeting of Venezuelan media magnate
Gustavo Cisneros, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and
President Chavez behind closed doors at Fuerte Tiuna
undermined Coordinadora leaders - particularly Enrique

Mendoza - and led opposition supporters to believe business
leaders had decided to work with the GOV (ref F). Other
rumors that Democratic Action (AD) leaders might be cutting
deals with Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) counterparts had the
same damaging effect, although to a lesser extent, on the
"Si" campaign.

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Final Comment
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18. (C) There are many reasons for Chavez's apparent victory.
Even if Chavez could not have won the vote outright, he
successfully narrowed the margin in the run up to the
referendum and controlled the CNE so that he probably could
have stolen it, if necessary. Identifying the strengths of
Chavez's campaign, the pressure points within the Venezuelan
electoral system, and the weaknesses of the opposition's
campaign and leadership is important, however, for the next
electoral match against Chavez.
Shapiro


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2004CARACA02671 - CONFIDENTIAL