VENEZUELA'S VP DISCUSSES REFERENDUM AND HR CASES,

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002515

SIPDIS


LIMA PLEASE PASS TO A/S NORIEGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S VP DISCUSSES REFERENDUM AND HR CASES,
PROPOSES IMPROVEMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS


CLASSIFIED BY: DCM Steve McFarland, for reason 1.5 (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) DCM (charge at the time) met July 30 with Venezuelan VP Rangel.
Rangel was upbeat and dispassionate on broad range of issues:
the referendum, which the GOV will win; international observers,
whom he welcomed; campaign violence and intimidation, which he
agreed that the GOV and opposition should work to end;
extradition; foreign exchange for US companies; the alleged USG
role in the April 2002 coup; USG concerns about passports; and
the Capriles and Sumate/NED court cases. On the last issue, the
VP insisted that the judiciary and prosecutors were independent;
he did, however, hear out USG concerns, and subsequently noted
them publicly. Rangel urged that the USG and Venezuela talk the
day after the referendum to mend their political relationship.
DCM said the proposal was interesting, but that events of the
next two weeks would influence strongly our ability to improve
our relations. The discussion of the Capriles arrest and the
Sumate/NED treason accusations established a useful precedent
that we hope other governments will follow. End Summary.

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Referendum:
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2. (C) Rangel, accompanied by chief of staff Rene Arreaza, was
confident the GOV will win handily. GOV polling and grassroots
presence in the barrios indicated that Chavez would win by 10 or
15 percentage points. The opposition is disorganized and its
message unclear; many persons who are not Chavistas will vote to
keep Chavez because there is no alternative. The GOV's big
concern is that the opposition will not accept the results.
The DCM said that we believed that either side could win; this
was why there had to be a strong international observer
presence. No one disputed Venezuelan sovereignty nor the
authority of the CNE, but there was a large sector of the
population that needed to hear the opinion of the international
observers. Rangel agreed, and said that they were welcome. The
DCM also said that the USG believed it was in both the GOV's and
opposition's best interests to make every effort to end any
intimidation or violence. Rangel agreed, but said he believed
that the opposition, or at least part of it, would not accept a
loss, whereas the GOV would respect an adverse result. The DCM
replied that the USG believed that everyone would have to accept
the results of a fair, transparent process. The USG had made
clear that it would do so.

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Capriles and Sumate/NED cases
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3. (C) The DCM told Rangel that he needed to discuss two
sensitive cases: the incarceration of opposition mayor Henrique
Capriles, and the accusations of treason against NGO (and NED
grantee) Sumate. While the DCM was not going to comment
directly on a judicial case, the arrest of a prominent
opposition mayor, and the allegations of treason against an NGO,
sent a very strong message in this electoral environment to
foreigners (note: Washington Post editorial had appeared that
morning). Was this really the message the GOV wanted to convey?
Rangel replied drily that the prosecutors and judges were
independent of the executive branch, just as the DCM had earlier
noted regarding the US judicial system (see below). The DCM
said that in the case of Sumate, the accusations also involved
the NED, therefore we -- and senior members of both parties in
the US -- felt the need to respond. He stressed the bipartisan
nature of the NED; its focus on democracy; its similarities to
the German stiftungs. Rangel responded that Venezuelan
democracy didn't need such programs; if there were carried out,
then they should be carried out in accordance with local law,
which Sumate failed to do. The DCM ended by reminding Rangel
that the NED accusation would be a prominent part of our
bilateral relationship, no matter which party was in power in
Washington. He said he understood the GOV's stance, and would
transmit it to Washington, but that it was important that the
GOV know how much these actions resonated throughout the US,


including prominent leaders in both parties and inside and
outside government. The GOV needed to appreciate the
implications of pursuing these cases.

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Extraditions and Alleged anti-government action in Florida:
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4. (C) The DCM noted that MVR Deputy Maduro had made yet again
some outrageous statements about the U.S. and the extradition
process. The USG rejected such statements. Extradition and
asylum requests were judicial processes; they were not
politicized, and the USG had a clear interest in keeping it this
way. The DCM said that, following up earlier GOV expressions of
concern about alleged anti-Chavez activities of the F-4 group in
Florida, the FBI was pursuing the issue, but had not yet
uncovered any violation of the law. The DCM urged the VP to
share with us any information they might have to the contrary.
Rangel agreed, and then said that the July 25 Carlos Andres
Perez interview was extremely worrisome. CAP was in Miami, and
was calling for the violent overthrow of the GOV and for
violence against Chavez. He wished that the USG had said
something about his interview's prediction/endorsement of
violence. The DCM said the USG was on record as denouncing
violence and endorsing the terms of OAS res. 833. The DCM
reiterated that an effective international observer presence
was critical to election results being accepted by whoever
loses.

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U.S. Companies and Foreign Exchange Controls
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5. (U) The DCM reminded the VP that he had told the Ambassador
that he would help us contact CADIVI (GOV foreign exchange
controls) regarding US companies that needed dollars at the
official exchange rate. There were some $64 million of
outstanding US company requests, and CADIVI was putting off
meeting with us. The VP instructed his chief of staff to get us
a meeting with CADIVI.

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Venezuelan Document Control
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6. (C) The DCM expressed our concerns about the integrity of
the Venezuelan passport issuance system; Rangel replied that he
shared those concerns. He hoped that a new contract to provide
additional and more tamper-proof passports would reduce the
corruption in the passport issuing agency. DCM noted the TDY
assistance provided to Venezuelan immigration and customs
through INL funded DHS personnel.

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Rangel Pitches Improved Relations, and Shrugs Off GOV "Anti-
Imperialism"
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7. (C) Rangel said that the day after the referendum, Venezuela
and the U.S. needed to start discreetly to resolve our
differences; there already was a healthy relationship in oil,
commerce, and counternarcotics; we needed to put the political
relationship on the same footing. If Bush won, he said, he
might want to start his new term with an improved relationship
with Venezuela; if he did not, he might in any case want to turn
over the relationship in better shape. The DCM responded that
the events leading up to and after the referendum would be
crucial to any improvement our entire relationship, and he
reiterated the need to have a fair, transparent referendum
process. Rangel understood. The DCM asked how far the two
countries could progress on the political side, when the
President had announced a few months ago that the revolution was
in its "anti-imperialist phase?" Rangel demurred, saying that


not all Americans were imperialist. The DCM asked how the GOV
could characterize any of us as imperialist, when it was
Venezuela, not the USG, that owned refineries and gas stations
in the US, when it was Venezuela that could say whether we could
or couldn't use their air space for the (CN support) FOL
flights? Perhaps the anti-imperialist analysis made some sense
30 or 40 years ago -- but no longer. Rangel smiled, and he said
that Venezuela was in an electoral campaign, and that afterwards
we could improve our relations.

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And Raises April 2002
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8. (C) Rangel said that we needed to keep the past in the
past; he noted the GOV's concern about U.S. intervention,
including the USG role in the April 2002 coup, for which he had
proof. The DCM said that if the GOV had proof, it should
publish it; Rangel said he might "put all the cards on the
table," but that he didn't want to create another stir. The
DCM said it would be better to have all the cards on the table.
He told Rangel that while he didn't doubt the VP's sincerity,
the USG had investigated the allegations and found nothing; our
recent investigations into 9/11 and into the WMD issue showed we
could do an honest investigation.

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9. (C) Comment:
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Rangel was confident and unusually dispassionate. He, like most
other Chavistas we've met with in the last weeks, says he's
confident the GOV will win -- and he appears to believe it. So,
if the GOV loses, or wins by a hair, they will be extremely
suspicious and combative. On Capriles and Sumate, Rangel didn't
budge -- but we expected no less, given Chavez' personal stake
in these cases. Rangel's hearing us out on these cases,
however, suggests that he's aware of the cases' negative impact
on GOV image. In any case, we have established a precedent of
talking with him on these issues that we hope other governments
will follow. The fiscalia and to varying degrees the courts are
of course beholden to the GOV, and the cases' outcome will
depend upon Chavez. Should the GOV win the referendum cleanly,
Rangel's reiteration of previous proposals for meetings to
discuss the bilateral relationship could be useful.

SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA02515 - CONFIDENTIAL