VENEZUELA: VIEWS FROM ANDEAN REGIONAL CAPITAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002480

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BOGOTA AND LIMA ALSO FOR A/S NORIEGA
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USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: VIEWS FROM ANDEAN REGIONAL CAPITAL

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reason 1.5 (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) While the Coordinadora Democratica in Merida is
divided about local politics and how to run the campaign for
the August 15 Referendum, the leaders of several parties
agree that President Chavez will be recalled. A barely
visible &Si8 campaign for the recall contrasts starkly with
overwhelming &No8 advertisements on the streets of the
regional Andean capital. The varied opposition
representatives concur that on a national level the people
will first unite to oust President Chavez and then require
that the opposition unite behind one presidential candidate.
Chavez supporters and opponents worried about possible
violence after August 15 regardless of the outcome of the
vote. End Summary.

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The August 15 Campaign
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2. (U) In the Andean regional capital of Merida, President
Hugo Chavez's &No8 campaign has an overwhelming visual
presence compared to the Coordinadora,s weak media campaign.
"No" posters, banners, flyers and graffiti appear everywhere.
Comando Maisanta also organized door-to-door visits
throughout many neighborhoods. Chavez supporters are seen
patrolling neighboorhoods and talking to people. In contrast,
the "Si" campaign has a few posters that appear throughout
the city. The "Si" campaign is much more mobile with some
meetings, marches or caravans taking place interspercedly
around the city.


3. (C) Fernando Soto and Ruben Avila of Merida state,s
Comando Maisanta told Poloffs July 22 that in the state of
Merida there are 364 electoral battle units, each with 10-12
people per unit. The roughly 4,000 members go door-to-door to
both Chavista and opposition households to convince
registered citizens to vote for Chavez on August 15. Using
door-to-door visits, posters, banners, flyers and graffiti
urging the populace to vote &No8, they said, the Comando
Maisanta hopes to have between 160-170,000 &No8 votes,
about 40-42% of eligible voters.


4. (C) Representatives of Primero Justicia, People from the
University of the Andes, Movimiento de Trabajo, Accion
Democratica, Movimiento Federal and academic leaders in
Merida agree that despite their not being as organized as
Comando Maisanta, the vote will show the people are against
Chavez. Like the Maisanta campaign, the opposition uses
door-to-door outreaches (scheduled to begin the week of July
26),and posters and some graffitti. They also use forums,
small community meetings and car caravans to garner "Si"
support. Primero Justicia (PJ) mayoral candidate Carlos
Masini said the mood among the opposition is the most
optimistic it has been since January 2004. Some, like Marcos
Pino, the campaign manager for the Coordinadora Democratica
in Merida, claimed that the people are not out marching and
plastering posters because they already know they are going
to vote &Si8 August 15.


5. (C) The various opposition representatives estimated the
&Si8 votes expected in Merida also to reach between
160-180,000 voters, 40-45% of total voters registered. Most
of the Merida opposition representatives agreed that Merida
would mirror the national vote. Some others foresaw a smaller
victory, but a victory nonetheless. All agreed that an
important campaign strategy for the Coordinadora Democratica
to increase the number of people voting &Si8 is to dispel
rumors and inform people the vote is secret.


6. (C) According to Pino of the Coordinador Democratica
voters who support neither Chavez nor the opposition
reportedly are actually a small minority of people in Merida
and nationwide. He said some of them do not support the
opposition or its candidates perse but will vote for whatever
candidate is presented as an alternative to Chavez. In
contrast, Luis Loaiza of the University of Los Andes claimed
that the possibility of a win was still good, but said the
opposition campaign strategy needed to change and to focus on

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING

the undecided voters.

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Primary Possibilities
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7. (C) Assuming a &Si8 win, many opposition representatives
in Merida are looking forward to a presidential primary to
determine who the opposition candidate will be. On a national
level, opposition representatives agreed that there will be
no dissensions and only one candidate will appear as a result
of the primary. Gilberto Belandrini of Movimiento al Trabajo
asserted that the people will support whoever wins the
primary and punish any other candidates who enter the race by
not voting for them.


8. (C) Masini said the primary is the only feasible option if
the &Si8 wins, because the opposition candidate will not be
one of the well-known names being thrown around now. The
candidate, Masini predicted, will be &second string8 since
it is the policies that are important, not the personality of
the candidate. Masini claimed that Miranda state governor
Enrique Mendoza, will not &politically castrate8 himself by
running for this limited presidency. He claimed that if
Chavez were to lose the referendum, he would lose his
momentum and the people would turn against him.


9. (C) Comando Maisanta leaders believe that in the unlikely
event that Chavez were to lose the referendum, his candidate
would still win the presidential elections afterwards. Soto
and Avila saw the opposition as fractured and claimed that
opposition supporters would not be able to agree on one
candidate. They claimed that Chavez supporters were united
and would support the candidate chosen to run. By running
multiple candidates against one Chavista candidate, Avila and
Soto claimed, the opposition would be guaranteed to lose.

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After the Vote*Possibility of Violence
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10. (C) Comando Maisanta's regional leaders Soto and Avila
said if Chavez wins and the opposition is not willing to
accept the decision, which Chavez supporters see as likely,
then those who support Chavez will &use any means necessary
to ensure the future of Venezuela for their children and
grandchildren.8 Chavez opponents thought fraud, or claims
of it, would lead to violence regardless of the decision.
Many opposition representatives said that even if Chavez were
to accept a &Si8 vote, there are politically extreme
factions and &imported guerillas8 who will not accept a
peaceful transition. They alleged that Chavista politicians
and civil leaders who have gained under Chavez's government
think they have too much to lose and will stir the people
into violent revolt. Both sides fear that if Chavez
supporters are persecuted when the opposition wins, this will
play into the hands of political extremists and increase the
risk of violence.

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Inclusion Solution
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11. (C) Unanimously, opposition leaders said that if the
opposition were to win the presidency for the next two years,
they would have to insure tolerance, inclusion,
decentralization and cooperation with factions of Chavez,s
supporters to avoid violence and insure govern ability. They
said that there were some politicians, even those who support
inclusion, who say that those who committed crimes under
Chavez,s rule would have to be prosecuted. They did not see
the need for prosecution and acceptance as mutually
exclusive. Some of the representatives of the opposition
believed that leaving Chavez supporters in control of some
institutions and political seats like the CNE, Supreme Court,
and some gubernatorial and mayoral seats would demonstrate
tolerance and acceptance of opposing ideals and give the new
government legitimacy. Others believed that having Chavistas
with power would be one more problem to be solved.

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Comment
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING


12. (C) Merida opposition representatives agreed that the
current less organized and less visible &Si8 campaign would
still be enough to vote Chavez out of power, although some
disagreed about the margin by which the opposition would win.
Leaders foresaw possible problems to be govern ability and
violence. While they recommended inclusion as a means of
resolving the potential for violence, most disagreed on
exactly what inclusion might mean. Chavez opponents claimed
that if Chavez were to win, it would be a no-holds-barred
attack on the opposition and democracy.
Shapiro


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2004CARACA02480 - CONFIDENTIAL