AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT RANGEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001998

SIPDIS


STATE FOR WHA, WHA/AND
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR DCHA/OTI-RPORTER
NSC FOR SHANNON AND BARTON
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT RANGEL


Classified By: AMB. CHARLES S. SHAPIRO. REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).

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Summary
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1. (C) On June 16, the Ambassador met with GOV Executive
Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel. Rangel stated that
Chavez and his supporters would accept the results of any
referendum and would act as a democratic opposition if they
lost. He said that the integrity of Venezuela's electoral
institutions has been proven by events and challenged the
opposition to commit in advance to accepting the results of a
referendum if it loses. The Ambassador stressed the
importance of international observers to maintaining
confidence in the electoral process; Rangel said that
observers would be permitted but their presence would need to
be "regulated" appropriately. He asserted that Chavez's
supporters were "galvanized" for the coming referendum while
the opposition was in disarray. He called for rebuilding the
U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral relationship, highlighting
excellent counter-narcotics cooperation. The Ambassador said
that, if, as has been discussed on a preliminary basis,
Rangel's chief of staff visits Washington, he will be
received appropriately. However, he stressed, Chavez's
personal attacks on President Bush have had a very negative
effect. End summary.

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Referendum On Track
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2. (C) On June 16, the Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM,
met with GOV Executive Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel,
who was accompanied by chief of staff Amb. Rene Arreaza.
Rangel led off by offering President Chavez's greetings and
best wishes for the Ambassador and his family. The
Ambassador thanked him and said that he now expected to
remain in Venezuela through the August 15 recall referendum.
He noted that President Chavez was now describing the
referendum as "an achievement of the revolution" since it was
enshrined in the Bolivarian Republic's constitution.


3. (C) Rangel said that he looked forward to winning the
"ratification" of Chavez's tenure in office, and that he
hoped that following the victory, the opposition would accept
the results. If the opposition won, the current government
would form a democratic opposition. "For fifty years, we
were in opposition; we know how to do it," he asserted,
adding that the opposition, to judge by its behavior, did not
know how to behave when it was out of power in a democracy.
Rangel added that he wanted the opposition to state publicly
that it would accept the results of the referendum, win or
lose, but it had refused to do so thus far. He would like to
see a joint ceremony between the opposition and the
government accepting the process's legitimacy.

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Observers OK, But Must be Regulated
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4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the possibility of
alternation in power was essential to democracy, and
established in the Bolivarian constitution. The USG had made
clear, including in statements from the Secretary, that it
would accept the results of a fair and transparent process.
However, the fact was that there was a great deal of
skepticism on the opposition's part regarding the conduct of
electoral institutions; for that reason international
observers were crucial to maintaining a credible process.
The Ambassador of the European Union had told him that the EU
had a mandate to send up to 140 observers to Venezuela once
it had received an invitation. In response to Rangel's
suggestion of a joint ceremony with the opposition blessing
the electoral process, the Ambassador asked if there was any
dialogue going on. Rangel answered negatively, making clear
that opposition acceptance beforehand of whatever outcome the
referendum process produced was the pre-condition of any such

dialogue. The GOV, he added, has been "snakebitten" by
undemocratic opposition conduct in the past and is not going
to talk to it without such a commitment on its part.
(Comment: The opposition has no reason to approve the
conduct of the National Electoral Council ahead of time, and
is not going to do so. End comment.)


5. (C) Rangel stated that the legitimacy of Venezuela's
National Electoral Council had been validated by the
successful conduct of the recall referendum and "reparo"
process. Observers would, he went on, be invited to the
referendum; however, their presence needs to be "regulated"
so that they are there as observers and not "protagonists."
He said that the National Electoral Council, not the GOV
itself, would decide on such regulations; it was looking at
how observation is structured in other Latin American
countries such as Mexico.

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Campaign Going Great
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6. (C) Asked how he saw Chavez's effort to win the
referendum going, Rangel said that the President's supporters
were thoroughly "galvanized," as shown by a recent massive
rally. The opposition ("which is convinced that he is a
dictator") was caught off-guard by his acceptance of the
referendum. While leadership of the pro-Chavez "Comando
Maisanta" campaign organization has been named, the
opposition has yet to do the same.

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Bilateral Relations
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7. (C) Rangel said that U.S.-Venezuela relationship needed
to return to a more normal basis, and that the two countries
had lots of work to do together. He asked rhetorically how
long Venezuela would have to put up with such things as the
USG's recently released Trafficking in Persons Report which
singled out Venezuela as a poor performer when there was no
reason to think the situation here was any worse than it was
in Colombia or Brazil which received better evaluations. He
also mentioned the declassification of a DOD report from 2002
which alleged (apparently based on press accounts) that the
GOV had been colluding with the FARC. He noted that
Venezuelan police had just conducted a massive drug seizure
(six tons of cocaine),and said that the GOV wanted to
continue cooperation in this area.


8. (C) The Ambassador said that he appreciated
counter-narcotics cooperation. In terms of the overall
bilateral relationship, President Chavez's evident decision
to campaign against President Bush rather than the
opposition, and his insulting personal remarks against him
were very poorly received in Washington. Rangel said that
this is something "that could be discussed." The Ambassador
said that there had been consideration of the suggestion that
Rangel's chief of staff, Amb. Rene Arreaza, and MFA chief of
staff Temir Porras come to Washington for discussions. If
the GOV chose to send them, they would be received at
appropriately senior levels. Rangel said that, while a final
decision had not been made by President Chavez, there was "a
good disposition" in this matter. He also said that he was
prepared to be helpful if the Ambassador and his staff were
having difficulties meeting with appropriate GOV officials.

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More on Bilateral Relations
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9. (C) Chief of Staff Arreaza later called the Ambassador
to say that Rangel had liked the idea of broadening the
international observation by inviting the EU and UNDP as well
as the OAS and the Carter Center. He added that at a June 13
cabinet meeting (without Chavez) the consensus was that
Chavez should stop attacking President Bush personally since
these attacks were in fact helping the opposition.

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Comment
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10. (C) Rangel, who can be caustic and contemptuous, was on
his best behavior. (This is the first time that a meeting
between him and the Ambassador occurred at his initiative.)
He seemed confident that Chavez could win the referendum
process, derided the opposition as unprepared, and seemingly
looked forward to the perceived opportunity that a Chavez
victory in the recall referendum could give to reconstructing
U.S.-Venezuelan relations on the GOV's terms -- acceptance
of the Bolivarian revolution and all its works.
SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA01998 - CONFIDENTIAL