WHAT'S NEXT FOR CHAVEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001889

SIPDIS


NSC FOR C. BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: WHAT'S NEXT FOR CHAVEZ


Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d)
.

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Pending announcement of the official results of the
appeals for the presidential recall referendum signatures,
there are rumors and indications that President Hugo Chavez
may be willing to accept a National Electoral Council (CNE)
decision that results in a recall referendum. If so, the
National Electoral Council would proceed to schedule a recall
referendum. Alternatively, some believe the President may
push for early elections, a move complicated by legalities
and feasible only if political agreements can be reached.
End Summary.


2. (C) President Hugo Chavez acknowledged publicly June 1
that the opposition, though "having engaged in some fraud,"
might have come up with sufficient valid signatures in the
appeals process for the presidential recall referendum. They
may be a winner "by a hair," the President said, "nothing
more." Vice President Rangel followed the President's
comments June 2, saying that if the National Electoral
Council (CNE) determines that the opposition indeed has
sufficient signatures, the GoV is prepared to go to the
recall. Vice President Rangel's chief of staff, Rene
Arreaza, told the ambassador June 2 that Chavez will/will
accept the results of the appeals. Other GoV officials, such
as Minister of Culture Jesse Chacon, and Fifth Republic
Movement leader Elias Jaua, have echoed what appears to be
Chavez line.


3. (C) National Assembly Secretary and Podemos deputy
Eustoquio Contreras (protect) told DCM June 2 that Chavez and
his top political advisers discussed all options, including
the "hard line" of simply telling the CNE to rule against the
Opposition which Chavez ruled out, at a late night meeting
June 1. The outcome, however, was that Chavez was inclined
to accept a CNE decision that would permit a referendum to go
forward. The meeting participants, according to Contreras,
acknowledged that the Comando Ayacucho had been excessively
optimistic in assessing the Coordinadora's capabilities, and
in its own ability to persuade people to withdraw their
signatures. The Comando Ayacucho reportedly believed that
the Coordinadora had obtained only some 80,000 signatures
beyond the minimum required. Chavez and his advisors also
discussed what next if Chavez lost the referendum. Arreaza
told the Ambassador that there will be a series of meetings
at Miraflores beginning June 4 in which they will decide if
they go to the recall or move to early elections.

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Early Elections
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4. (C) Aragua State Governor Didalco Bolivar told the
Ambassador June 1 that he was seeking a meeting with the
President to advise him that he should call early elections
to attenuate the loss before the CNE announces the results.
Other pundits and politics watchers have speculated that
Chavez would make such a move to catch the opposition
unprepared for an electoral contest. In a second
conversation with Arreaza, the Chief of Staff reiterated that
Chavez will accept the results; the question is whether to go
to the recall or call general elections. The Political
Committee (the cabinet, key MVR party members, and the key
Chavista mayors and governors) are to discuss the options in
Miraflores June 4. Arreaza also confirmed the assessment OAS
SYG Cesar Gaviria had given the Ambassador earlier: that
PDVSA President Ali Rodriguez and VP Rangel favor accepting
the results while hard-liners such as Chacon, Libertador
Mayor Freddy Bernal, and National Assembly Deputy Tarek Saab
oppose.

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Obstacles
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5. (C) The main obstacle to calling early elections,

however, is that there are currently no legal provisions for
Chavez to call early elections, according to former Attorney
General and law professor Ramon Escobar Salom. Early
elections would require a constitutional amendment, an option
the opposition discarded during the OAS talks in 2003
because, they say, former President Jimmy Carter backed the
recall referendum solution and they did not believe they
Chavez would agree to the idea. Under the Constitution, the
President with the Council of Ministers can introduce an
amendment which the CNE must then put up for ratification via
a referendum within 30 days. The amendment requires approval
by majority of voters to come into effect. Escobar told
PolCouns June 1, however, that it is conceivable that Chavez
could make a political deal to short cut the legalities of
the Constitutional amendment path.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) The important news is that Chavez, for whatever
reasons, appears to have decided to accept a referendum. He
will continue to portray this, however, as the result of CD
fraud, and GoV magnanimity. Medium term, the important news
is that the GoV knows it has lost a big one, and is concerned
it may lose even more. The combination of international
observers, opposition organization and public opinion was
critical, and will continue to be so in a referendum.
SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA01889 - CONFIDENTIAL