TSJ LAW TAKES EFFECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001817

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
USAID DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: TSJ LAW TAKES EFFECT


Classified By: A/DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASONS 1.4 (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice came
into effect May 20 after the National Assembly (NA) passed it
on May 18. The Internal Policy committee of the NA made
several substantial changes in the law between its second
reading and the final vote, which the opposition claims
violates parliamentary procedures. These changes increase the
power of the Constitutional Chamber of the court, granting it
supervisory power over other chambers and give legislators
greater influence over the judiciary. Constitutional expert
Tulio Alvarez_ has challenged the validity of the law before
the TSJ.

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Substantial Changes in Law
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2. (C) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice
(LOTSJ) came into effect on May 20 after the National
Assembly (NA) passed it on May 18. The final version of the
law contained substantial changes made by the Internal Policy
Commission (IPC) of the NA without discussion in the plenary.
Opposition deputies criticized the changes, noting that
Assembly commissions do not have the authority to do so. The
IPC made the final changes under unusual circumstances. After
the IPC's president, Nicolas Sosa (MAS) failed to gather a
quorum to discuss the Commission's report required for the
bill to go to its final reading, the commission's vice
president, pro-Chavez deputy Iris Valera (MVR),called the
pro-Chavez majority of deputies to order without opposition
presence. The pro-Chavez quorum then made the changes to the
law.


3. (U) In addition to the irregularity of making changes
between second and final readings, opposition deputies have
protested that reducing the bill from 179 articles to 23 to
overcome an opposition filibuster violates law-making
principles. The pro-Chavez majority also changed National
Assembly rules six times in the 16-month discussion of the
bill when the opposition used existing rules to block the
bill.

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Super Chamber
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4. (U) NA Deputy Gerardo Blyde (Primero Justicia) found more
than 34 changes to the law done by the committee. The version
of the law passed on second reading attributed to the full
court, the right to "resolve the conflicts of whatever nature
which may arise among the chambers", and to "review the
sentences dictated by any of the chambers". The version of
the law presented by the IPC to the plenary for final
approval gave these powers to the Constitutional Chamber. It
also gave the chamber the right to take over jurisdiction of
a case when fundamental constitutional principals are at
stake. This was not in the law as passed on second reading at
all.


5. (C) NA Deputy Leopoldo Martinez (Construyendo Pais) told
PolCouns 19 May that the changes turn the Constitutional
Chamber into a super chamber, a supreme court above the
supreme court. In the version of the law passed on second
reading, the full court, consisting of all the judges from
all the chambers, had that role. Martinez called this
increase in power especially dangerous given the
Constitutional Chamber's demonstrated bias in favor of
President Chavez. Another change eliminated the requirement
that members of the NA and TSJ justices have no family
connections. Numerous newspaper reports have pointed out that
the Second Vice President of the NA, Noheli Pocaterra is
married to TSJ justice Carlos Oberto Velez.

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LOTSJ Challenged in TSJ
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6. (U) Constitutional expert Tulio Alvarez_ challenged the
constitutionality of the new law before the TSJ on 24 May. He
specifically challenged articles 13 and 23 of the LOTSJ.
Article 13 deals with the Nominations Committees for TSJ
justices. Alvarez_ claims, as does Gerardo Blyde, that
articles 264 and 270 of the 1999 constitution state that the
nominations committee is dependent on the Judicial Power, not
the Legislative Power. The new law gives the power to elect
the nominations committees to the NA.


7. (U) Article 23 of the law gives the Moral Power (Human
Rights Ombudsman, Attorney General, Controller General) the
authority to suspend justices indefinitely, pending the
two-thirds vote in the NA that the 1999 constitution requires
to remove a justice. Alvarez_ and Blyde call this article one
of the most dangerous parts of the law. Alvarez_ argues that
it clearly usurps the power of the NA, and subverts the power
of the TSJ. (Note: Under these provisions, the suspension of
a judge is tantamount to removal, according to Chavez
opponents, because of the present control the executive
enjoys over the legislative and moral branches of government.)

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Last Stand?
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8. (U) Critics of the law, fear it will permanently
compromise the judicial system. The liberal daily El Nacional
editorialized on 20 May, "The new Supreme Court law ... is
nothing less than the end of the rule of law and of checks
and balances ... the door has been opened to establish an
outdated and militaristic dictatorship with a deep repressive
and police-heavy orientation. There is no longer justice in
Venezuela." Referring to the changes made by the IPC of the
NA, Tal Cual editor Teodoro Petkoff wrote May 20, "What the
governing-party majority has done with the (law) during the
session in which it was given final approval goes beyond the
limits of the abuse of power, arrogance and the most absolute
disrespect for public opinion. There is no longer any
pretense of hiding behind a fig leaf."

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Comment
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9. (C) The TSJ law puts the judiciary firmly under Chavez'
control. The changes made in the Assembly's commission
demonstrate the pro-Chavez majority's willingness to bend
parliamentary rules and use its simple majority to push the
Chavez agenda through the NA. This Chavista success gives the
opposition cause to be concerned about future legislation
such as the media, anti-terrorism and national police bills
which are designed to advance Chavez' revolution. The
Constitutional Chamber coup, slipped in in a technical
session, suggests the GOV may be willing to use blunter
instruments to give Chavez what he wants.
SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA01817 - CONFIDENTIAL