Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS1724
2004-05-18 21:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

SCENARIOS FOR VENEZUELA'S SIGNATURE APPEALS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001724 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR VENEZUELA'S SIGNATURE APPEALS

REF: CARACAS 1507

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4 (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001724

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR VENEZUELA'S SIGNATURE APPEALS

REF: CARACAS 1507

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4 (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The May 27-31 signature appeals process ("reparos") is
a critical juncture in the opposition's attempt to remove
President Hugo Chavez via a recall referendum. The National
Electoral Council's rigid appeals system will likely result
in a slim margin of victory or defeat, which could increase
the uncertainty in the political environment. Scenarios for
how the appeals process will play out depend on whether the
opposition wins or loses, by a little or a lot. Factors
affecting the possible scenarios include the numerical
capacity of the appeals system, violence, transparency,
social protests, and the military's reaction. End summary.

--------------
What If The Opposition Wins?
--------------


2. (C) Scenario 1: Opposition Wins Big. The opposition
needs a net gain of about 550,000 signatures during the May
27-31 appeals process to activate the recall referendum
against President Hugo Chavez. The NGO Sumate believes the
most optimistic scenario is to hit a maximum of 2.66 million
signatures, well above the 2.46 million threshold needed to
activate the referendum. A cushion of 200,000 such as this
would hand a moral victory to Chavez opponents and give them
momentum for a possible referendum on August 8. A
comfortable margin of victory would also limit the
possibility of the National Electoral Council's (CNE) denying
the referendum based on technicalities.


3. (C) Chavez would have difficulty digesting this type of
loss as it would suggest that his assertions of "megafraud"
-- that no more than two million people actually signed --
were incorrect. He would likely appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court's (TSJ) Constitutional Chamber, which presently
is disposed to rule in his favor. The TSJ deliberations
would take days or weeks, especially if the opposition
opposes the Constitutional Chamber's jurisdiction (over that
of the Electoral Chamber). Whether the public, the
international community, and the Venezuelan military would

respect a TSJ decision depends on the merits of the case. If
opinion is against him, presumably Chavez would be forced to
submit to the referendum. Alternatively, he could try to
delay the referendum past August 19 -- after which time a
successful recall would replace Chavez with the Vice
President. Though less likely because of the political
costs, Chavez could thumb his nose at the referendum
altogether and cause a major constitutional crisis.


4. (C) Scenario 2: Opposition Squeaks By. Winning by a slim
margin -- 50,000 or less -- would not guarantee the
referendum takes place. The lesson of the process thus far
is that the CNE is willing to revisit rules and procedures in
favor of the GOV. Factors such as transparency and the
influence of international observers will be critical to
ensuring the integrity of the results. Even if the CNE is
compelled by slim margins, and by national and international
opinion, to convoke the referendum, the GOV will snipe at the
decision as an "electoral coup d'etat," pressing allegations
the opposition only crossed the threshold through fraud.
There is some speculation, perhaps far-fetched but possible
nonetheless, that the majority of pro-Chavez CNE directors
might resign in protest rather than certify the appeals
results, causing the electoral equivalent of a mistrial. In
this scenario, Chavez would likely resort to the TSJ as
outlined in Scenario 1.

--------------
What If Chavez Opponents Lose?
--------------


5. (C) Scenario 3: Opposition Bombs. Falling significantly
short of the 2.46 million would break the backbone of the
opposition, namely, the Coordinadora Democratica (CD). The
majority of Venezuelans will blame utter failure primarily on
the opposition, not the GOV, regardless of how much tricks,
irregularities, or fraud influenced the outcome. With the
referendum clearly extinguished (the Constitution allows only
one chance per term, per official),the opposition would
fragment further as groups diverge into new strategies of
resistance. Political parties would switch attention to the
September 26 state and local elections, though anti-Chavez
candidates will have been stained by "losing the referendum."
Some groups would become more radical and join those already
advocating for an extra-constitutional exit for Chavez via (a
hoped for but unlikely) military uprising.


6. (C) A CD belly flop is the scenario on which Proyecto
Venezuela founder Henrique Salas Romer is betting. Salas
would probably try to form a new opposition front geared at
defeating Chavez in the 2006 elections. Chavez supporters
would rally for the September regional elections and possibly
sweep them in the face of a crushed opposition. National
Assembly elections in 2005 would become the next
battleground, where a Chavista landslide would consolidate
Chavez's control over the state. Chavez himself would press
more stridently for development and implementation of
revolutionary programs.


7. (C) Scenario 4: Opposition Misses By An Inch. A slim
margin of failure would look a lot like scenario three, but
with greater rancor toward the GOV. The CNE would declare
the referendum process terminated, which would touch off
social protests against Chavez. The opposition would
challenge the results in the Supreme Court, only to be
frustrated by the blocking power of the Chavista magistrates
there. Opposition unity would slowly decline as Chavez
opponents face the reality of the referendum's death.
Opposition parties may still win some key states and
municipalities in the regionals, but probably fewer than they
currently hold. The GOV would continue its program of
intimidating opposition groups, though it may attempt a modus
vivendi with some parties to develop a "loyal opposition."
Perhaps more so than in Scenario 3, Chavez would push his
revolutionary programs. Without a clear win, his political
position would need to be buttressed further with hostile
rhetoric.

--------------
Critical Factors Affecting Outcome
--------------


8. (C) Appeals Process Infrastructure. The CNE has designed
a three-day process that will see long lines and only two CNE
workers receiving the appeals at each of the 2,659 centers.
Mathematically, this puts a cap of around 800,000 for the
number of appeals that can be received, lower than the 1.19
million potential appeals and not including those who may
wish to be removed from the 1.9 million valid signatures.
This scenario does not take into account possible harassment
from Chavez supporters, bad weather, or CNE incompetence.
The opposition hopes it can familiarize people with the
process sufficiently beforehand to maximize the number of
persons attended.


9. (C) Violence and/or Social Protests. An outbreak of
violence -- or threats thereof -- during the appeals could
discourage turnout. A Chavez speech calling on his followers
to stop the "megafraud" during last year's signature drive
dissuaded people from signing, according to CD analysts.
Social protests, peaceful or otherwise, may also play a role,
especially as Venezuelans wait for the CNE to announce the
results. If the opposition announces a big win on June 1,
after the appeals centers close but before the expected
official announcement o/a June 4, Chavez supporters are sure
to take to the streets. Chavez opponents might act similarly
if the process is compromised by GOV dirty tricks.


10. (C) Fraud and Manipulation. Fraudulent acts committed by
either side could be a determining factor in a narrow victory

or defeat. The pro-GOV campaign committee Comando Ayacucho
has already alleged that Chavez opponents plan to falsify
identity cards for the appeals process. The Coordinadora,
too, claims that the GOV has been issuing identity documents
to supporters in the name of persons whose signatures have
been deemed valid and have not reason to attend the appeals
process. A major fraud accusation during the three days of
appeals could cause the CNE to modify rules in a manner that
affects the outcome of the process. International observers
will be key for damage control in this case. Also, although
CNE rules state that the appeals will simply be counted at
the tables and totaled by the CNE, it cannot be ruled out
that the CNE will manipulate the process by elaborating a new
"verification" process that scrutinizes the individual
appeals.


11. (C) Reaction of the Military. The army, acting under
"Plan Republica," will provide security and logistical
support for the appeals centers and transportation of CNE
materials. The military will probably perform as it did
during the signature drive, generally fulfilling its mission
with few disruptions by local commanders. Whether the
military was soured by its heavy repression of citizen
protests in February and March, and whether it is hesitant to
repeat such oppression, is uncertain. The military's
response to blatant electoral tinkering by Chavez is anyone's
guess.


12. (C) The Weather. Opposition organizers believe a key
factor affecting possible turnout will be rain, and the end
of May is solidly in Venezuela's rainy season. Counting on
maintaining a maximum flow of people at the signature
centers, losing even a few hours because of a rainstorm, will
be significant. Coordinadora advisor Jorge Casado, for
example, told PolCouns that during the May 8 simulation they
clearly saw the possible negative impact of the weather at
several locations around the country.

--------------
Comment: The Known Unknown
--------------


13. (C) The success of the opposition's collection of
signatures in November surprised Chavez, his lieutenants
having assured him that his opponents would fall short.
Faced with overwhelming numbers of signatures against him,
Chavez first cried "mega-fraud" and then had the CNE commit
its own fraud by invalidating hundreds of thousands of
legitimate signatures during the verification process. We
cannot predict what Chavez will do, but we do not expect him
to be a passive observer of the appeals process. He will act
to defeat the process, by hook or crook, but maintaining a
fig leaf of plausible deniability.


14. (C) Most polls show an overwhelming preference by
Venezuelans on both sides to have a referendum to settle the
country's political impasse. With less than two weeks to go,
Chavez opponents remain energized and confident that they
will have the turnout needed to succeed. The allegations of
Colombian paramilitary invasion, however, have already become
a major distraction and a GoV damper on opponents with
concerns about a possibly harsher crackdown. Additionally,
the GOV smirks of unusual confidence -- from Chavez down to
CNE Director Jorge Rodriguez -- give rise to suspicions that
Chavez may indeed be planning something that will keep the
opposition from crossing over the threshold. We thus believe
the appeals will result in the less decisive scenarios (2 or
3). Much will depend on the referee work of international
observers, or at least their cataloguing the GOV's electoral
transgressions.
SHAPIRO


NNNN

2004CARACA01724 - CONFIDENTIAL