JULIO BORGES LEANS TOWARDS ACCEPTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001368

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: JULIO BORGES LEANS TOWARDS ACCEPTING


Classified By: DCM STEPHEN G. MCFARLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Julio Borges told DCM and PolOff April 21 that Primero
Justicia would decide whether to participate in the signature
verification process once the National Electoral Council
released details of the plan on April 23 or 24, with an
opposition decision likely 24 hours later. He seemed to be
leaning towards participating in the process, which the DCM
encouraged. Borges stressed the need for the international
community's support. He said the opposition had less than a
50% chance of verifying enough signatures to activate the
referendum.

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Need more information
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2. (C) Julio Borges, the President of Primero Justicia (PJ),
Deputy in the National Assembly, and one of the leaders of
the opposition coalition Democratic Coordinator (CD),met
with DCM and PolOff on April 21. Reacting to the National
Electoral Council's (CNE) announcement the night before of
the regulations for the signature verification (reparo)
process, Borges insisted that PJ needed two more pieces of
information before it could take a decision. One was the
number of tables there would be at each center. Borges is
worried that if there are not sufficient tables, some people
may have to wait up to 7 hours, according to PJ's
calculation. The second point is just which signatures would
have to be verified, and in what areas. According to Borges,
the CNE has already changed the numbers 5 times, and seems to
be blatantly manipulating them. He said that the first
report from the CNE indicated that 50,000 signatures in
opposition controlled Baruta, which is part of greater
Caracas, had to be verified. The figure in the latest report
is 6,000. The signatures to be verified are being
transferred to Chavista controlled states, making it much
harder, and more dangerous, for the opposition to mobilize
people. It also leads Borges to suspect the entire process
is a massive fraud by the CNE. For this reason, Borges wants
to see the final number before agreeing to anything. Jorge
Rodriguez, one of the directors of the CNE, told Borges the
information would be ready by April 23 or 24. Borges said he
thought the opposition would come to a decision within 24
hours of getting the information. He said to forget about
trying to get a referendum before August 19th, because the
GOV will never let it happen.

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Unity of opposition key
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3. (C) Borges declared that the unity of the opposition was
of utmost importance at this time. He said he suspected that
the GOV's real intention with the reparos was to split the
opposition. He saw Proyecto Venezuela (PV),led by Henrique
Salas Romer, as the greatest threat to that unity at this
time. PV has made its opposition to the reparo process well
known. Borges stated that any help the USG could give in
that regard would be very useful to the CD. Borges said that
if the opposition decides to accept the challenge of the
reparos, then it will be the opposition's last chance to stop
Chavez, and the CD must present it that way to the public,
and not as one more attempt to get rid of him. He said he
believed the people wanted to go to reparos, despite the bad
odds, rather than refusing to participate, and challenging
the legitimacy of the CNE.

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Odds not good
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4. (C) Borges stated that the opposition's odds of getting
the needed signatures were not good. Under the best of
circumstances, with no disruption whatsoever from the
Chavistas, he thought the opposition had a 50% chance of
getting the signatures. Even relatively mild interference,
like sending pro-GOV people to wait on line and check if they
were on the lists, could bring that down. Violence and fear
would make it even more difficult.

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DCM encourages participation
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5. (C) The DCM told Borges that A/S Noriega had expressed
great interest in the decision facing the opposition. The
decision was the opposition's to make, but it represented a
very important opportunity and needed to be assessed
carefully. He said the international community would
participate as observers if the opposition agreed. The DCM
indicated that the decision by the Electoral Chamber of the
Supreme Court, that the signatures should be accepted, was
not very useful outside Venezuela, where the objections of
the Constitutional Chamber and potentially the full Supreme
Court tended to nullify the effect of the Electoral
decision.


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International observers
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6. (C) Borges said that the opposition was essentially
jumping into a swimming pool without water by going to
reparos. He supported it because the people wanted to, and
to split the opposition would be worse. He insisted,
however, that it was up to the international community to
tell the world "who took the water out of the pool." In this
regard, Borges declared himself satisfied with the attitude
of the OAS, but thought that the Carter Center, and
especially Francisco Diez, were too wishy-washy in
criticizing the GOV, and too eager to be liked by everyone.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) Borges is clearly leaning towards accepting the
reparos. While he made the case for pursuing more favorable
terms through the court system, he agreed with us that the
judicial route would be long and ultimately fruitless. He is,
however, very nervous that the opposition will lose the
reparos, and thus legitimize the CNE and GOV by accepting
their manipulation of the process. He does not want to be the
one that splits the CD, though, and so will tend to accept a
bad deal, depending upon what more information/rules the CNE
provides the CD on April 23/24.
SHAPIRO


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2004CARACA01368 - CONFIDENTIAL