Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS1350
2004-04-21 21:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ RAISES OIL CUT-OFF AGAIN

Tags:  ENRG PREL EPET VE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001350 

SIPDIS


ENERGY FOR PUMPHREY AND LOCKWOOD
TREASURY FOR OASIA - SIGNORELLI
NSC FOR SHANNON AND BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: ENRG PREL EPET VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ RAISES OIL CUT-OFF AGAIN

REF: A. CARACAS 708


B. CARACAS 851

Classified By: Economic Counselor Richard M. Sanders. REASON: 1.5 (B)
AND (D).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001350

SIPDIS


ENERGY FOR PUMPHREY AND LOCKWOOD
TREASURY FOR OASIA - SIGNORELLI
NSC FOR SHANNON AND BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: ENRG PREL EPET VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ RAISES OIL CUT-OFF AGAIN

REF: A. CARACAS 708


B. CARACAS 851

Classified By: Economic Counselor Richard M. Sanders. REASON: 1.5 (B)
AND (D).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) President Chavez has again raised the threat of
stopping oil sales to the U.S., this time in response to
President Bush's alleged "intervention." The remarks, made
to an Italian newspaper, follow several weeks in which this
theme had lain dormant (although he has turned to other forms
of U.S-bashing). He suggested that China and Brazil could be
alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum. Meanwhile,
Venezuela's latest effort to diversify oil sales away from
the U.S. involves a food-for-fuel swap to Argentina. We
remain convinced that withholding oil to the U.S. is likely
to be technically difficult and financially costly, but
clearly this high risk option remains on Chavez's mind. End
summary.

--------------
Stop Intervening -- Or Else
--------------


2. (U). In an April 18 interview with newspaper
"Liberazione," organ of the Italian Communist Refoundation
Party, published in Spanish on the web site of state news
agency Venpres (and summarized in an Associated Press story
of the same day) Chavez referred at some length to the
prospect of Venezuela cutting off oil sales to the U.S.
Asked if oil could be a weapon for Venezuela, he said "It's
one thing for me to say that I do not want to use it, and
another that they make me use it. In (President) Bush's
case, he should cease the madness of directly intervening in
Venezuela's internal affairs. That would spark a conflict
here, and it would be absurd to continue selling oil to them.
Not only the U.S. exists. Oil doesn't deteriorate. Oil is
sold."


3. (U) He went on to add that oil could be sold to Europe
and Asia. "Chinese companies have asked that I increase
their quota of business with Venezuela. We can't because we
are part of the OPEC quota. We sell a million and half
barrels per day to the United States. It wouldn't cost much
to place it in other places. Brazil imports petroleum. It

has to buy it in the Middle East. Why? Because the strategy
of the Venezuelan oil company for many years has been linked
only to U.S. interests. In the event of conflict,
contractual obligations would be broken."

--------------
Previous Version
--------------


3. (U) Chavez previously raised the prospect of cutting off
oil sales to the U.S. in a February 29 speech to political
supporters (ref A). There, he had said that "not a drop of
oil would arrive from Venezuela" if the U.S. were to seize
CITGO or otherwise "blockade" Venezuela. He also noted that
the U.S. had "plenty of installations" in Venezuela that
could be seized in retaliation. Following these highly
publicized remarks, he adopted a more conciliatory tone. In
a March 9 ceremony, hastily organized at GOV insistence, to
mark the award of an important natural gas concession to U.S.
major ChevronTexaco (ref B),he stressed Venezuela's
reliability as an energy supplier and his recognition of
ChevronTexaco as "brothers from the U.S. who come not to
attack us nor show a lack of respect but come to unite with
us." Since then, until this most recent comment, Chavez and
his government had dropped the oil threat although other
anti-U.S. themes have in fact become more prominent in his
discourse in recent weeks.

--------------

Diversification Drive
--------------


4. (U) As the oil threat rises and falls, efforts to
diversify Venezuela's energy relations away from the U.S.
have received some prominence of late. Venezuela will
reportedly provide Argentina with up to 8 million barrels of
fuel oil to make up for energy shortages arising from
insufficient availability of natural gas, and in exchange
will take quantities of Argentine powdered milk, soybean oil,
beef and yellow corn. Chavez was quoted in Buenos Aires
daily "La Nacion" on April 19, defending the decision in the
face of allegations that the high sulfur product was
incompatible with Argentine power generators.

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (C) Chavez thinks in political and personal terms, not
economic. His threats may just be an effort to unnerve or
annoy the U.S., but we believe they also reflect his desire
to become the Latin American David to the USG Goliath. As we
have noted before (ref A),making good on a threat to cut off
oil to the U.S. would be very costly to Venezuela, given that
its heavy crudes are best marketed to the dedicated
refineries in the U.S., and even its more desirable light
crudes would need to be sold at steep discounts to conquer
new markets. And the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
remains available to counter the effect on world prices that
a sudden withdrawal of Venezuelan oil could create.
Venezuela has high foreign exchange reserves to mitigate the
domestic economic impact of a cut-off in sales to the U.S.
Nonetheless, such an oil boycott (in effect a self-imposed
repetition of the December 2002-February 2003 general strike)
could have sharp internal consequences. These include a
crash of the bolivar on the quasi-legal parallel market,
which is responsible for half of Venezuela's foreign exchange
needs, possible legal efforts by those customers left in the
lurch to attach GOV and PDVSA assets abroad, and a
generalized collapse in business and consumer confidence
leading to an end to the current modest and extremely fragile
economic recovery.


6. (C) That said, Chavez clearly has not given up on the
idea. By making his comments to a European newspaper, he
gives the lie to the assertions of spin-doctors Bernardo
Alvarez (GOV ambassador to the U.S.) and Ali Rodriguez (PDVSA
President) that such statements are entirely aimed for
domestic political consumption and should be ignored by the
international community. We note that he has ratcheted up
the threat this time and personalized it, raising the
prospect of taking the initiative to impose an oil boycott if
President Bush doesn't "cease the madness of intervening" as
opposed to doing so only if the U.S. seizes CITGO assets or
"blockades" Venezuela. At the same time, read in the context
of the interview as a whole which rambled through the full
range of political and economic issues, Chavez's oil threat
did not appear to be particularly immediate or even made with
forethought. Refusing to sell oil to the U.S., far and away
Venezuela's largest customer, would be at best a high risk
throw of the dice, which Chavez is likely to consider
seriously only if our bilateral relations have deteriorated
considerably more than they have already and he sees such a
move as important to his survival in power or to his
ambitions to replace Castro as a regional "anti-imperialist"
leader.
SHAPIRO


NNNN

2004CARACA01350 - CONFIDENTIAL