Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS1157
2004-04-02 21:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVISTAS SEE REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS DE FACTO

Tags:  PGOV KDEM VE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

022104Z Apr 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001157 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS SEE REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS DE FACTO
REFERENDUM

REF: A. CARACAS 1083

B. CARACAS 1054

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001157

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS SEE REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS DE FACTO
REFERENDUM

REF: A. CARACAS 1083

B. CARACAS 1054

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Pro-Chavez political parties registered their
candidates in March in anticipation of the August 1 elections
for governors and mayors. As with the opposition, the
Chavistas see the regional elections as a referendum of sorts
on President Hugo Chavez. They also see the elections as an
opportunity to extend the Bolivarian Revolution further into
the state and local level. Chavez's campaign committee
imposed discipline over the candidate selection process,
which resulted in consensus candidates in most races.
Chavez's personal selection of many gubernatorial candidates,
many of whom are ex-military officers, rankled some
supporters. Chavistas, wanting to distract from the
presidential recall referendum, have already accused the USG
of meddling in the regional elections. End Summary.

--------------
The De Facto Referendum
--------------


2. (C) Pro-Chavez political parties, under the leadership of
a campaign committee called the "Comando Ayacucho," finished
registering their candidates in March for regional elections
for governors, mayors, and other state and municipal
officials (ref a). For Chavez supporters, the regional
elections represent the political battleground of 2004.
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) National Director of Ideology
Elias Jaua told DCM and poloff March 30 that the elections
will serve as a type of referendum on President Chavez, in
which races will be decided by candidates' devotion to
Chavez's so-called Bolivarian Revolution. The elections are
a more stable vehicle for expressing popular will, Jaua
argued, than the proposed presidential recall referendum.
Jaua asserted that Chavez would win such a vote, but that the
opposition, unable to accept the bitter truth of defeat,
would plunge Venezuela into a Colombia-like conflict.

--------------
Elections Strengthen the Revolution
--------------


3. (U) A propaganda booklet on the elections written by Jaua
in February emphasizes the importance of the regional

elections to the revolutionary process. The booklet says the
fate of the revolution will be determined by the elections.
"Hegemony in macro-social spaces" is not enough, says the
booklet, for ensuring the revolution succeeds. State and
local positions are closer to the daily life of "the people"
and are vital to "decentralizing democracy," the literature
says. Surrendering even one of these spaces to the
opposition, claims the propaganda, will permit them to plan
"coups, regicides, and sabotage" against the revolution. The
booklet also points out that a Chavista electoral win will
demonstrate to the world that the GOV has the support of the
majority of Venezuelans, which will help the revolutionary
government in its international efforts to alleviate poverty,
achieve regional integration, and defeat the Free Trade Area
of the Americas.

--------------
Strategy: Gains and Punishment
--------------


4. (U) Comando Ayacucho leader Willian Lara (MVR) told
reporters March 26 the principal objective of the pro-Chavez
parties is to hold on to and add to the 16 of 23
governorships and 126 of 335 mayoralties already held by
Chavistas. Lara highlighted the need to "recapture" the
positions lost to "traitors," those who have defected from


Chavismo, specifically, the governors of Anzoategui and
Bolivar, and the metropolitan mayor of Caracas. The MVR
electoral booklet discusses important issues for the
campaign. Most emphasized are Chavez's social programs aimed
at the poor, such as Mission Robinson (literacy),Barrio
Adentro (health),and Mission Ribas (education). On the
"tough issues" of unemployment, crime, corruption, and
political violence, members are encouraged to remind voters
that the Bolivarian movement is best equipped to deal with
these problems, but has been hindered thus far by "sabotage"
from the opposition.

--------------
Candidate Selection: Chavez's Big Finger
--------------


5. (C) Jaua said the Comando Ayacucho had succeeded in single
candidates in every state except Trujillo, where a rogue MVR
candidate registered against the consensus candidate (Note:
The press reported several conflicts among pro-Chavez
candidates, most of which were resolved by the time the
candidate registration period closed on March 25). Jaua said
this was much improved over the last elections, when multiple
pro-Chavez candidates faced off in several key contests. The
Comando Ayacucho's technique included public warnings to any
maverick candidates that they would be "automatically
excluded" from their respective party if they went against
the decision of the Comando.


6. (C) MVR National Assembly Deputy Ibrain Velazquez shared
his frustration over candidate selection with poloff on March

26. Velazquez, who was reportedly snubbed by Chavez for the
candidacy of his state of Nueva Esparta, predicted that the
Comando's heavy hand would result in unexpected electoral
upsets (see para 7). Velazquez said bluntly that there was
no candidate selection process, saying that "Chavez is the
only one who decides." Chavez, in fact, has announced many
of the candidacies personally, often surprising those not
selected -- and some who are. Chavez picks are often
ex-military officials. One columnist pointed out that, if
the GOV candidates sweep the elections, ten states would be
governed by former military officials.

--------------
Critical Races
--------------


7. (C) The disgruntled Velazquez asserted that opposition
strength is growing. He thought it possible the Chavistas
could lose the races in the states of Nueva Esparta, ,
Cojedes, Zulia, Bolivar, and Vargas. He was more sure of
victories in the states of Aragua and Carabobo. Jaua
admitted the Chavistas would face an uphill battle in
Miranda, where former Minister of Infrastructure Diosdado
Cabello is running against Governor Enrique Mendoza, the head
of the opposition's Coordinadora Democratica. Jaua believes
Acosta Carles stands a better than even chance at beating
Henrique Salas Feo in Carabobo. Both Jaua and Velazquez were
confident of a win in Caracas, where a three-cornered contest
may give the win to MVR's Juan Barreto. Jaua said the
opposition was favored in the states of Zulia, Apure, and
Yaracuy.

--------------
Running Against the U.S.
--------------


8. (U) Jorge Albornoz, Secretary General of the pro-Chavez
Patria Para Todos (PPT) told reporters March 26 that the USG
is coordinating the opposition's electoral strategy.
Albornoz accused the USG of imposing the candidacies of
Enrique Mendoza and Henrique Salas Feo on the opposition.
The MVR electoral booklet also claims that the opposition,
having lost the fight domestically, has gone to its
international "masters" to beg for intervention in the
country.

--------------


Comment
--------------


9. (C) As Chavez is apparently convinced that the nationalist
card has some value, we expect Chavez and his followers to
step up the anti-U.S. rhetoric to divert attention from the
dreary Venezuelan political and social conditions, hardly
improved after five years of Chavez rule. (In fact, recent
polling shared with the Ambassador indicates that Chavez
supporters do not approve of the anti-U.S. posture.)
Regional elections also distract the public and political
parties from the presidential recall vote, which poses
significantly greater political risk to the revolution. The
elections, as both sides have suggested to us, may size up to
be a referendum on President Chavez.

SHAPIRO


NNNN

2004CARACA01157 - CONFIDENTIAL