Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS1087
2004-03-30 17:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ: RELATIONS COULD NOT GET
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 301732Z Mar 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001087
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
USCINSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ: RELATIONS COULD NOT GET
WORSE
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reason 1.4(d)
--------
Summary:
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001087
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
USCINSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ: RELATIONS COULD NOT GET
WORSE
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reason 1.4(d)
--------------
Summary:
--------------
1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister Jesus Perez said the relationship between the U.S.
and Venezuela could not get worse. Perez said there was a
lot of fear in the GoV that the USG was planning to overthrow
the Chavez regime. The Ambassador told him that there is no
USG plan to topple Chavez, but noted that relations could
indeed get much worse unless Chavez tempers his anti-U.S.
remarks, personal insults and invective. The Ambassador said
it was in the GoV's interest to speak with the USG so that we
can understand their point of view. The Ambassador
reiterated that U.S. policy seeks a democratic solution and
noted our concern that the GoV was slowly taking control of
public institutions. End Summary.
--------------
Could Relations Be Worse?
--------------
2. (C) On March 23, the Ambassador met with newly-installed
Foreign Minister Jesus Perez for a frank and open exchange of
views on U.S.- Venezuela relations. The Ambassador brought
up an interview with Perez published March 21 in the Caracas
daily El Universal, in which Perez said the relationship
between Venezuela and the U.S. "could not be worse." The
Ambassador noted with surprise that this article included a
version of the Ambassador's last conversation with Perez.
The Ambassador stressed that diplomatic conversations are
confidential. He told the Foreign Minister that contrary to
SIPDIS
what Perez had told the reporter, bilateral relations could
indeed get worse. Relations, he continued, are bad because
President Chavez appeared determined to use the U.S. as a
foil to build his own domestic support.
3. (C) Perez responded that he wanted to be transparent and
honest and hoped to compliment the Ambassador by calling him
disciplined. He then backtracked somewhat and said the
article misquoted him and distorted what he had told the
reporter. Perez said he hoped that he and the Ambassador
could be "sincere" and solve whatever problems in the
bilateral relationship the Ambassador saw needed improvement.
He recalled telling a colleague that the relationships
between our governments are "tense," but that he could "speak
to Shapiro as a man," not just as a government
representative. Perez noted that the rhetoric between
Presidents Bush and Chavez was "very hot," but the Ambassador
and FM could speak with mutual respect. Perez said his job
was to work with the Ambassador to see ways in which they
could improve matters between their countries.
--------------
Fear of the U.S.
--------------
4. (C) Perez said there was a lot of fear in the GoV that the
USG was planning to overthrow the Chavez regime. He pointed
to Haiti, and said remarks by POTUS at the recent Summit in
Monterey had not helped. The Ambassador responded that there
is no USG plan to topple Chavez, and that such rumors were
only the product of a vivid imagination. On the other hand,
the personal insults and invectives hurled at the USG by
Chavez in regular broadcasts are from the highest levels of
the GoV. The Ambassador listed personal attacks against
President Bush, the Secretary and the National Security
Advisor, insults that contained elements of racial slurs, or
profanity, and suggestions that the Bush administration
represented the activity behind the assassinations of Martin
Luther King and President John F. Kennedy. Perez said he
thought relations could improve if the two presidents were to
meet. The Ambassador replied that it is most unlikely that
President Bush would meet with someone who regularly insults
him.
5. (C) Perez distanced himself from Chavez's remarks, noting
that he had been trained in Europe and was therefore
unaccustomed to engaging in such displays. Perez said that
while he trusted Chavez implicitly, he recognized that Chavez
was a military man who held the "people in his heart." Perez
said it was his assignment, and that of the Ambassador, to
communicate with their respective presidents and eliminate
such excess language. Perez said he believed in a stronger
relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela in the future.
But it was difficult now because the USG speaks with the
opposition. Perez also asserted that the U.S. is unpopular
because of its international policies. If the U.S. can talk
with Libya, he added, then surely Venezuela and the U.S. can
talk. We have to solve this, said Perez, and not allow the
press to invent problems between the two countries.
6. (C) The Ambassador told Perez the USG speaks with
representatives of both sides and would continue to do so to
gain a thorough understanding of the country. The Ambassador
noted that few from Chavez's ruling MVR party would speak
with emboffs, but that was in spite of the USG continuing to
extend invitations. The Ambassador said it was in the GoV's
interest to maintain contact with the Embassy so that we can
understand their point of view. If one reporting overly
represents the views of the opposition it is because the GoV
has ordered its officials and supporters to have to contact
with the Embassy. Perez acknowledged that the GoV has
embargoed the Embassy.
--------------
Dynamics of the Bilateral Relation
--------------
7. (C) The Ambassador said the press had not invented
problems between the USG and the GoV. Diosdad Cabello and
A/S Noriega had agreed to avoid "microphone diplomacy."
Nonetheless, the GoV had almost immediately implemented a
public relations campaign about alleged U.S. intervention in
Venezuela. The USG does not publicly respond to insults by
Chavez because the issue is not a bilateral one, but a
problem between Chavez and his Venezuelan opposition. The
USG policy is to support OAS Resolution 833, i.e., to find a
peaceful, democratic, constitutional and electoral solution
to the on-going crisis, and to support the on-going efforts
by the OAS and the Carter Center in their roles as observers
and facilitators.
--------------
Democracy With an Asterisk
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador concluded that our hope is that
Venezuela will prosper in peace and democracy with an
improving economy. But this cannot be a democracy with an
asterisk, where the GoV slowly takes control of public
institutions, or where GoV officials including Chavez say
that signing a petition permitted under the constitution is
considered the equivalent of conspiring against the
government. Perez conceded that the GoV had overreacted and
had in fact gone beyond the constitution. But he justified
those actions as the result of April 2002. Just as the U.S.
responded to September 11 by infringing somewhat on citizens'
rights, so too had the GoV responded to the "coup" of 2002
and the "economic sabotage" of 2003.
--------------
Update on Approval for New Ambassador
--------------
9. (C) The Ambassador asked for an update on the pending
request for agreement for the new Ambassador. Perez
apologized for any delay and said the ministry bureaucracy
had been very busy, but hoped the paperwork would be done in
a week or so. The Ambassador explained the internal process
in the U.S. to confirm a nominated ambassador through the
Senate, and noted that during an election year, the
legislature would be out of session sooner than normal.
Accordingly, getting the approval from Venezuela would be
particularly helpful. Perez agreed to look into it.
--------------
Comment:
--------------
10. (C) Perez speaks in platitudes and shows little
understanding of the complexities of the U.S.-Venezuela
governmental relationship. He largely built his life in
France, and peppers his conversation with references to his
experience there, having little regional experience from
which to draw. He demonstrates a fundamental lack of
understanding of the United States government and culture.
He is, however, smooth, and so serves the GoV as a
shock-absorber in the wake of the tough Chavez statements.
It is doubtful that Perez will be a useful conduit to Chavez.
He has some access to Chavez-- he is said to be Chavez's
half-brother or, if not, a childhood friend. But it is
unclear that Chavez will listen to him.
SHAPIRO
NNNN
2004CARACA01087 - CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
USCINSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ: RELATIONS COULD NOT GET
WORSE
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reason 1.4(d)
--------------
Summary:
--------------
1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister Jesus Perez said the relationship between the U.S.
and Venezuela could not get worse. Perez said there was a
lot of fear in the GoV that the USG was planning to overthrow
the Chavez regime. The Ambassador told him that there is no
USG plan to topple Chavez, but noted that relations could
indeed get much worse unless Chavez tempers his anti-U.S.
remarks, personal insults and invective. The Ambassador said
it was in the GoV's interest to speak with the USG so that we
can understand their point of view. The Ambassador
reiterated that U.S. policy seeks a democratic solution and
noted our concern that the GoV was slowly taking control of
public institutions. End Summary.
--------------
Could Relations Be Worse?
--------------
2. (C) On March 23, the Ambassador met with newly-installed
Foreign Minister Jesus Perez for a frank and open exchange of
views on U.S.- Venezuela relations. The Ambassador brought
up an interview with Perez published March 21 in the Caracas
daily El Universal, in which Perez said the relationship
between Venezuela and the U.S. "could not be worse." The
Ambassador noted with surprise that this article included a
version of the Ambassador's last conversation with Perez.
The Ambassador stressed that diplomatic conversations are
confidential. He told the Foreign Minister that contrary to
SIPDIS
what Perez had told the reporter, bilateral relations could
indeed get worse. Relations, he continued, are bad because
President Chavez appeared determined to use the U.S. as a
foil to build his own domestic support.
3. (C) Perez responded that he wanted to be transparent and
honest and hoped to compliment the Ambassador by calling him
disciplined. He then backtracked somewhat and said the
article misquoted him and distorted what he had told the
reporter. Perez said he hoped that he and the Ambassador
could be "sincere" and solve whatever problems in the
bilateral relationship the Ambassador saw needed improvement.
He recalled telling a colleague that the relationships
between our governments are "tense," but that he could "speak
to Shapiro as a man," not just as a government
representative. Perez noted that the rhetoric between
Presidents Bush and Chavez was "very hot," but the Ambassador
and FM could speak with mutual respect. Perez said his job
was to work with the Ambassador to see ways in which they
could improve matters between their countries.
--------------
Fear of the U.S.
--------------
4. (C) Perez said there was a lot of fear in the GoV that the
USG was planning to overthrow the Chavez regime. He pointed
to Haiti, and said remarks by POTUS at the recent Summit in
Monterey had not helped. The Ambassador responded that there
is no USG plan to topple Chavez, and that such rumors were
only the product of a vivid imagination. On the other hand,
the personal insults and invectives hurled at the USG by
Chavez in regular broadcasts are from the highest levels of
the GoV. The Ambassador listed personal attacks against
President Bush, the Secretary and the National Security
Advisor, insults that contained elements of racial slurs, or
profanity, and suggestions that the Bush administration
represented the activity behind the assassinations of Martin
Luther King and President John F. Kennedy. Perez said he
thought relations could improve if the two presidents were to
meet. The Ambassador replied that it is most unlikely that
President Bush would meet with someone who regularly insults
him.
5. (C) Perez distanced himself from Chavez's remarks, noting
that he had been trained in Europe and was therefore
unaccustomed to engaging in such displays. Perez said that
while he trusted Chavez implicitly, he recognized that Chavez
was a military man who held the "people in his heart." Perez
said it was his assignment, and that of the Ambassador, to
communicate with their respective presidents and eliminate
such excess language. Perez said he believed in a stronger
relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela in the future.
But it was difficult now because the USG speaks with the
opposition. Perez also asserted that the U.S. is unpopular
because of its international policies. If the U.S. can talk
with Libya, he added, then surely Venezuela and the U.S. can
talk. We have to solve this, said Perez, and not allow the
press to invent problems between the two countries.
6. (C) The Ambassador told Perez the USG speaks with
representatives of both sides and would continue to do so to
gain a thorough understanding of the country. The Ambassador
noted that few from Chavez's ruling MVR party would speak
with emboffs, but that was in spite of the USG continuing to
extend invitations. The Ambassador said it was in the GoV's
interest to maintain contact with the Embassy so that we can
understand their point of view. If one reporting overly
represents the views of the opposition it is because the GoV
has ordered its officials and supporters to have to contact
with the Embassy. Perez acknowledged that the GoV has
embargoed the Embassy.
--------------
Dynamics of the Bilateral Relation
--------------
7. (C) The Ambassador said the press had not invented
problems between the USG and the GoV. Diosdad Cabello and
A/S Noriega had agreed to avoid "microphone diplomacy."
Nonetheless, the GoV had almost immediately implemented a
public relations campaign about alleged U.S. intervention in
Venezuela. The USG does not publicly respond to insults by
Chavez because the issue is not a bilateral one, but a
problem between Chavez and his Venezuelan opposition. The
USG policy is to support OAS Resolution 833, i.e., to find a
peaceful, democratic, constitutional and electoral solution
to the on-going crisis, and to support the on-going efforts
by the OAS and the Carter Center in their roles as observers
and facilitators.
--------------
Democracy With an Asterisk
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador concluded that our hope is that
Venezuela will prosper in peace and democracy with an
improving economy. But this cannot be a democracy with an
asterisk, where the GoV slowly takes control of public
institutions, or where GoV officials including Chavez say
that signing a petition permitted under the constitution is
considered the equivalent of conspiring against the
government. Perez conceded that the GoV had overreacted and
had in fact gone beyond the constitution. But he justified
those actions as the result of April 2002. Just as the U.S.
responded to September 11 by infringing somewhat on citizens'
rights, so too had the GoV responded to the "coup" of 2002
and the "economic sabotage" of 2003.
--------------
Update on Approval for New Ambassador
--------------
9. (C) The Ambassador asked for an update on the pending
request for agreement for the new Ambassador. Perez
apologized for any delay and said the ministry bureaucracy
had been very busy, but hoped the paperwork would be done in
a week or so. The Ambassador explained the internal process
in the U.S. to confirm a nominated ambassador through the
Senate, and noted that during an election year, the
legislature would be out of session sooner than normal.
Accordingly, getting the approval from Venezuela would be
particularly helpful. Perez agreed to look into it.
--------------
Comment:
--------------
10. (C) Perez speaks in platitudes and shows little
understanding of the complexities of the U.S.-Venezuela
governmental relationship. He largely built his life in
France, and peppers his conversation with references to his
experience there, having little regional experience from
which to draw. He demonstrates a fundamental lack of
understanding of the United States government and culture.
He is, however, smooth, and so serves the GoV as a
shock-absorber in the wake of the tough Chavez statements.
It is doubtful that Perez will be a useful conduit to Chavez.
He has some access to Chavez-- he is said to be Chavez's
half-brother or, if not, a childhood friend. But it is
unclear that Chavez will listen to him.
SHAPIRO
NNNN
2004CARACA01087 - CONFIDENTIAL