Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS103
2004-01-12 12:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ TURNS UP THE HEAT ON CENTRAL BANK FOR

Tags:  ECON EFIN PGOV VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000103 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR WHA/AND, EB
NSC FOR SHANNON
TREASURY FOR OASIA - GIANLUCA SIGNORELLI
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2008
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ TURNS UP THE HEAT ON CENTRAL BANK FOR
TRANSFER OF RESERVES

REF: 03 CARACAS 3941

Classified By: Ambassador Charles S. Shapiro for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000103

SIPDIS


STATE FOR WHA/AND, EB
NSC FOR SHANNON
TREASURY FOR OASIA - GIANLUCA SIGNORELLI
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2008
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ TURNS UP THE HEAT ON CENTRAL BANK FOR
TRANSFER OF RESERVES

REF: 03 CARACAS 3941

Classified By: Ambassador Charles S. Shapiro for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) President Chavez has renewed his struggle with the
Central Bank over USD 1 billion in international reserves,
which he has demanded be handed over to the GOV for
agricultural spending. The Bank has to this point resisted,
citing controlling legal restrictions. The National Assembly
joined the fray January 7 with a non-binding resolution
passed on partisan lines urging the Central Bank to comply
with Chavez's request. Despite the political upside for
Chavez in this fight, the downside for Venezuela's economy if
he succeeds in tapping the reserves would be severe. End
summary.

--------------
Chavez Hits BCV (Again)
--------------


2. (U) In his December 28 "Alo, Presidente!" telecast,
President Chavez renewed his call for the Central Bank of
Venezuela (BCV) to transfer USD 1 billion of its USD 21
billion in international reserve holdings to the GOV for use
in "agricultural reactivation." Since then Chavez has used
every public appearance to repeat his demand. Chavez cites
provisions of the 1999 Constitution that generically require
the BCV to promote the overall economic health of the
country, including agriculture. (Note: Article 320 of the
Constitution and Article 32 of the Central Bank Law
specifically prohibit the BCV from using reserves to fund GOV
budgetary items. End note.) He has continued his threats to
appeal to the Supreme Court or call for a referendum on the
issue if the BCV does not yield. In one major difference
from his November statements on the issue (see reftel),
Chavez has specifically targeted the corn and sugar sectors
for receipt of the funds. He has not been specific about
what the process for distribution of the funds would be.

--------------
Agricultural Credit Problems
--------------


3. (U) The conflict between the President and the BCV over
the "millardito" (little billion),as Chavez calls the

demanded amount, exists against the backdrop of a struggling
agricultural loan program. The Special Plan for the Resupply
of Agriculture is an agreement between the BCV, the Ministry
of Finance, and commercial banks that requires agricultural
credits be 12 percent of bank loan portfolios. According to
the plan, these loans are to have a preferential
"agricultural interest rate" calculated at 85 percent of the
rate for oil project loans. This rate currently stand at
approximately 16 percent, which is about 10 percent below the
prime lending rate. Banks that do not meet the required
percentage in their loan portfolios face fines; most are
gladly paying the fines rather than issue high-risk, low and
even negative return loans.

--------------
BCV Holds Firm
--------------


4. (U) The BCV has been steadfast in its refusal to bow to
pressure from Chavez. BCV President Diego Castellanos and
Director Domingo Maza Zavala both made statements to the
press December 29 that said any such transfer would violate
the Constitution and that they would welcome a Supreme Court
ruling on the matter. Following a pro-Chavez "millardito"
demonstration outside the BCV January 7, the bank issued a
statement to the press and to all diplomatic missions,
including the embassy, that detailed the constitutional and
other legal restrictions on the use of international reserves
to finance government spending. (Note: The BCV statement
characterized the agricultural loan program as having
"satisfactory results." End note.)


--------------
National Assembly Speaks
--------------


5. (U) The National Assembly passed a resolution January 7
urging the BCV to transfer the reserves. The expected
partisan wrangling colored the debate over the non-binding
resolution. MVR Deputy Willian Lara echoed Chavez when he
claimed the transfer was legal under the provisions of the
Constitution requiring the BCV to support national economic
development. Opposition deputies were dubious about the
prospects for meaningful results from a prospective draw down
of reserves; Proyecto Venezuela Deputy Vestalia de Araujo
noted that the administration has had five years to improve
the agricultural sector and has failed. The resolution
passed by a vote of 51 to 37. Pro-Chavez members of the
Assembly plan to deliver the resolution to the BCV during a
march January 11.

--------------
Chavez Speech Rattles Bond Issue
--------------


6. (U) The fallout from the Chavez/BCV conflict has been felt
as far away as New York. The GOV issued USD 1 billion in new
30-year bonds January 7 (details septel). In an almost
disastrous alignment of events, a Chavez speech in Zulia
state at the inauguration of a food processing facility in
which he railed against the BCV sent a momentary jitter
through the bond operation. The Ministry of Finance quickly
issued a statement clarifying Chavez's position with
assurances that all funds from the BCV were subject to legal
controls that the GOV had no intention of violating. Finance
Minister Nobrega claimed January 8 that the executive branch
was only seeking to utilize "unused assets" from the BCV's
monetary desk.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) This issue is a win/win demagogic jewel for Chavez in
the short term. The vast majority of his intended audience
has little understanding of the importance of BCV
independence. Therefore, he is able to frame this issue
squarely in terms of elite "haves" keeping down poor
"have-nots." The message requires others to engage in damage
control as Nobrega's tortured explanation to international
financial markets illustrates. The ultimate danger lies not
in this first attempt to commandeer the BCV's reserves, but
in the addictive effect it could have on future GOV budget
operations. This administration does not have a good track
record of fiscal responsibility; the laudable Macroeconomic
Stabilization Fund (FIEM) intended to protect against oil
price shocks has disappeared with little accountability at a
time of record oil prices. A policy of artifically high,
exchange control-fueled reserves is an invitation to even
higher inflation that was already 27.1 percent in 2003. Our
agricultural contacts, as well as our FAS counselor, are
highly skeptical that any of the proposed transfer would
become productive investment in that troubled sector.
SHAPIRO


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