ARGENTINA CRACKS DOWN ON PIQUETEROS IN SANTA CRUZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 002912

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND INL
NSC FOR TOM SHANNON AND MIKE DEMPSEY
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL AR PROTESTS
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA CRACKS DOWN ON PIQUETEROS IN SANTA CRUZ

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1104

B. BUENOS AIRES 1029

Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Early in the morning of Saturday October 2,
85 members of an elite Gendarmeria riot control unit,
assisted by provincial police, broke up a roadblock and
forcibly ended the piquetero occupation of an oil depot in
the town of Caleta Olivia in President Nestor Kirchner,s
home province of Santa Cruz. Thirty-six piqueteros were
arrested and three remain in detention at present. A
reliable source indicates that those close to the President,
and possibly the President himself, ordered the Gendarmeria
operation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a decisive operation, an elite Gendarmeria riot
control unit broke up a roadblock and ended the piquetero
occupation of an oil depot in the Santa Cruz town of Caleta
Olivia on October 2 (see reftels). While press reports
indicate that the swift GOA response was a local action
undertaken by the Gendarmeria and Provincial Police, POLOFF
has been informed that it was the work of an elite
Gendarmeria unit ordered into action by the Casa Rosada.
During an October 3 meeting with POLOFF, General Roberto
Nieva Malaver, Chief of Operations for the Gendarmeria
(number four in the organization),outlined the details of
the operation.


3. (C) Malaver stated that at approximately 1000 hours on
October 1 his office received instructions "from the Casa
Rosada" to immediately take action to end the oil depot
takeover. He stated that the original instructions demanded
action by 1700 hours that day, but that he informed his
Interior Ministry contact that normal deployment procedures
would necessitate a few days to transport the nearest riot
control unit to Santa Cruz. He reported that the Interior
Ministry then contacted the Argentine Air Force to provide
needed airlift capability. Malaver ordered the riot control
unit stationed in La Pampa to immediately mobilize for
deployment, and the 85-man unit was airborne with all
equipment, including attack dogs, by 1600 hours. While the
unit was airborne, a federal prosecutor issued a warrant
authorizing them to disband the protesters. He reported that
by 2200 hours the unit had established a command base in
Caleta Olivia and after coordination with local police and
medical units, moved on the Piqueteros at or around 0200
hours. Malaver relayed that the action "took less then 15
minutes" once it started. According to Malaver, the riot
control unit was supported by a large contingent of
provincial police, and three ambulances, in case of injury.
He stressed that the unit went into action fully armored but
without the use of billy-clubs, water hoses or teargas. He
stated the decision not to use billy-clubs was made to limit
possible injury to the Piqueteros; weather conditions
prevented the use of teargas. He reported that the
Gendarmeria suffered two minor casualties. A Molotov
cocktail burned one soldier and another was stabbed by the
sharpened point of a piquetero,s stick. Malaver also
reported that the protesters suffered no serious injuries.
(NOTE: A Vintage Oil executive confirmed to ECONCOUNs that
the Gendarmeria had cleared the piquetero roadblock on the
highway in Caleta Olivia, but asserted that the provincial
police removed the 35 piqueteros that were occupying the top
of one of the oil tanks in the depot, thereby suggesting two
separate actions carried out by two distinct groups).


4. (C) Thirty-six piqueteros were detained and three remain
in custody at present. There have been press reports and
subsequent protests claiming human rights abuses occurred to
detained piqueteros, but Malaver was quick to point out that
the alleged abuse reportedly took place after the Gendarmeria
had handed the detainees over to the Provincial Police.
Santa Cruz Governor Sergio Acevedo told DCM that he
suppported the law enforcement action, which he claimed was
conducted at his request. He also said that he had agreed to
look into the allegations of police abuse.


5. (C) Malaver was clearly proud of his unit's success, and
talked at great length about the difference between the five
Gendarmeria riot control units and those available to other
forces. He stated that, as opposed to federal and provincial
police forces consisting of regular duty officers that engage
protesters individually, often resulting in a general melee,
his forces "move in like the Roman Legion; they don't fight
as individuals they are trained to stay together and move as
one unit." He also pointed out that these five units,
located in strategic areas including Buenos Aires Province
and La Pampa, train year round solely for this sort of
mission. He opined that the Gendarmeria was the only force
that had units trained and equipped to break up protesters
with a minimum risk of injury posed to either the soldiers or
the protesters. The meeting with POLOFF ended abruptly when
an aide to Malaver entered the room to remind him he had to
leave for the airport. Malaver confided in POLOFF that he
had been ordered to travel to Santa Cruz to start the process
of establishing a sixth elite riot control unit to be
permanently based in the President's home province "as soon
as possible."


6. (C) After Malaver,s departure, POLOFF continued the
meeting with Hector Schenone, the Gendarmeria General in
charge of narcotics control, who explained that the Interior
Ministry had recently approved the recruitment of 8,000 more
Gendarmeria over the next four years. He stated this was at
least partially in recognition of the increased public
security role that the force was playing, especially in the
Province of Buenos Aires. He intimated that a major obstacle
facing the force was that its training facility was overtaxed
with both Gendarmeria recruits and almost 400 recruits for
the new Buenos Aires Police Force. He stated that at the
present time only 1,000 of the 2,000 recruits authorized for
this year were in training, and it was clear he did not like
the idea of provincial police recruits taking training slots
from his force.


7. (C) COMMENT: Although reaction to piquetero activities
are historically much harsher in the provinces than the
potentially-explosive Buenos Aires, this had not been the
case in Caleta Olivia, the site of repeated labor strife. It
is clear that this rapid deployment ordered from the
President's office marks a much more proactive approach by
Kirchner to protests that affect his traditional center of
power. It is of course possible that Kirchner authorized the
use of force because he has a higher degree of trust in the
Gendarmeria to intervene without bloodshed than the Federal
and Provincial Police in the Buenos Aires area. His order to
establish a Gendarmeria riot control unit in Santa Cruz seems
to indicate that he will not brook future piquetero protest
in the province. END COMMENT.


GUTIERREZ