EU MILITARY COMMITTEE ADVICE ON THE AU MISSION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 005014

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA (MBITTRICK) AND PM/PPA (RFEATHERSTONE)
DOD FOR USDP (BRZEZINSKI AND WHALEN)
PASS USAID FOR DCHA AND AFRICA BUREAU
PASS USUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL MOPS SU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU MILITARY COMMITTEE ADVICE ON THE AU MISSION IN
DARFUR

Classified By: USEU political military officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. USEU was passed the text of the European
Union Military Committee's military advice to the Political
and Security Committee on the AU Plan for the AMIS II mission
in Darfur. It was likely passed with the intention to
influence, as well as inform. The Military Committee finds
significant risks for the operation and concludes that some
of the AU's assumptions are unrealistic. They express concern
that the AU has shifted away from its original planning as
the result of "uncoordinated donor action" and political
pressure for rapid action. End summary.

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Excerpts
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2. (C) Begin salient portions of text from the European Union
Military Committee Advice. Internal paragraph numbering does
not reflect the original text:


3. (C) The EU Military Committee considers that in general,
the plan is realistic and structured and constitutes a
significant improvement to the current mission. It
introduces a more proactive monitoring approach and there is
a clear intention for the early deployment of additional
MILOBS. It takes a positive view on a liaison with non-AU
organizations in particular the UN. Furthermore, the
intention to include a police component as an integrated
element of AMIS II demonstrates recognition of the need to
take a comprehensive approach to improving security
conditions. Overall it is the EUMC opinion that the plan
would contribute to the achievement of the political aim, "to
assist the parties to reach a political settlement in Darfur,
contributing to a stable, peaceful and united Sudan."


4. (C) The plan hinges on the assumption that all parties
will comply with the HCFA and therefore implies that
violations of the HCFA would be isolated and sporadic rather
than structural. The Government of Sudan (GoS) has primary
responsibility for the protection of its civilians.
Furthermore, and of equal importance, there is an underlying
assumption that the GoS is capable of, and willing to
exercise appropriate control over armed militias and
Janjaweed who are not signatories to the HCFA. The EUMC
considers that these underpinning assumptions are not
supported by a threat assessment of the situation and
consequently that the plan carries a high level of risk.


5. (C) The EUMC considers that in general terms the military
mission supports the political intent and the mandate for
AMIS II. It is clear that AMIS II is not mandated to enforce
compliance. Certain tasks ("match threat levels as well as
demonstrating an increased military presence where
necessary.") would seem to go beyond what was originally
intended in the mandate. The non-availability of ROEs
however does not allow assessment of this question. The
current formulation of protection tasks, albeit contingent
upon means and capabilities, will undoubtedly create
expectations which cannot be met by a force the size of AMIS
II in an area the size of France. The EUMC therefore is
concerned that AU Protection Elements operating beyond the
mandate could be drawn into "enforcement" operations for
which they are neither prepared nor equipped.


6. (C) The expansion will lead to a new force consisting of
some 530 MILOBS out of whom 450 will be working in
operational observing teams. The ratio between the actual
number of MILOBS and the Protection Element is 450:1703
(1:4). Although it is understood that this ratio has been
largely based on UN experience of peacekeeping operations
elsewhere, the EUMC has difficulties to estimate if this
ratio is sufficient for success due to absence of a risk
assessment and the size of the Area of Operations.


7. (C) The EUMC is concerned that command relationship
between the MILOBS teams and the Protection Element is not
clear. Both are (under the local tactical control of) their
respective Sector Commanders, however it is not clear who
decides on actions where operations need to be conducted
across sector boundaries. The EUMC believes that in addition
to creating command and control complexities and increasing
overall levels of risk, the limited presence of EU and US
observers could have an impact on rebel parties acceptance of
the expanded mission.


8. (C) Although the plan provides and Exit Strategy, this
focuses on the political/strategic End State. The EUMC
considers the criteria for success very ambitious, which
could result in a mission of long duration. Furthermore, the
plan does not provide a military end state, just some
benchmarks for the Military Component. The EUMC notes that
the plan does not provide for a periodic Mission Review
process that could measure the progress towards the desired
End State.


9. (C) Although the possibility for deterioration of the
situation is not excluded, the EUMC notes the absence of the
mechanisms for possible evacuation of MILOBS and Protection
Elements.

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Factual Evolution of the Implementation
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10. (C) The plan under assessment is the written plan that
was briefed to the AU Military Staff Committee and
subsequently the AU PSC. However, a different plan has been
subsequently implemented, according to the EUMC's
information, partially as a result of uncoordinated donor
action and political pressure for rapid action. The
principles that underpinned the initial plan developed by the
Technical Assistance Group:

- operational and logistic enablers in place prior to
deployment
- sufficient staff at all levels
- priority to deployment of additional MILOBS
- adequate force protection

have been set aside. Although the revised plan retains the
political intent, military mission and mandate of the
original plan, the implementation and timelines are
significantly altered.


11. (C) The scheme for the expansion of AMIS that initially
foresaw 5 phases was accelerated and condensed concentration
on the deployment of Protection Elements with little regard
to what they might be able to accomplish once deployed. As a
consequence, troops are now being deployed to staging areas.
Follow-on deployment to final destinations is delayed by the
lack of adequate infrastructure and facilities at the final
destinations. This leads to congestion at the staging areas
and possibly to the perception of mismanagement of the
operation and idling troops in the public eye. The current
focus on deploying the Protection Element without the MILOBS
does not directly contribute to the intent of AMIS II ("to
strengthen the monitoring capacity of the AMIS to a level
where it conducts pro-active monitoring and through political
and diplomatic means increase the level of compliance of the
Parties to the HCFA thus discouraging attacks on civilians").


12. (C) Many of the pre-conditions detailed in the first
deployment phases of the original plan have yet to be met
thus increasing levels of risks. The TAG brought this issue
to the attention of the AU in writing when plans were
amended. The continuing absence of a capable AU planning
capacity at all levels (the DITF in Addis, the Mission HQ in
Khartoum and the Force HQ in El Fashir),coupled with a
continuing reluctance to accept international planning
support remain primary concerns.

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Conclusions
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13. (C) Following the analysis, the EUMC concludes that in
general, the plan is realistic, structured, and if properly
implemented - a significant improvement on the current
mission, however the EUMC has identified deficiencies that
might put the whole mission at risk. The EUMC therefore
believes that there is a requirement for the following points
to be brought into the AU attention.

- The assumption that all parties will comply with the HCFA
without taking account of GoS willingness/capability to
control armed militias nor the Janjaweed activities seems to
be unrealistic;
- The absence of a risk assessment is an essential flaw in
the plan;
-Some military tasks could have the potential for mission
creep or, at worst, mission failure. Significantly, a number
of supporting appendices including ROEs are not included with
the document.
-Potentially significant supporting capabilities such as
SATINT and aerial surveillance are not addressed;
-Command and control arrangements are rigid and do not take
account of the need for cross-sector boundary operations and
this could limit the capacity for proactive operations and
speed of reaction to certain incidents.
-The arrangements for liaison with the EU, a principal
partner, are not satisfactory and need improvement.
- The plan is lacking mechanism to review the effectiveness
of the mission
-The plan differs significantly from the plan currently being
implemented by the AU, that carries a significantly higher
level of risk.


14. (C) Against this background, for the support of the AU
interest, the EUMC sees an urgent need for the AU to:
- Establish the DITF in Addis and Force HQ at El Fashir as
soon as possible
-With the framework of the AU ownership, accept international
support wherever needed
-Consider non-AU MILOBS
-Develop and implement ROEs for this operation consistent
with its mandate and international law
-Accept an EU presence, where the EU deems it necessary, at
all levels to increase the situational awareness of one of
its principal donors
-Review its Command and Control structure and be urged to
support this by adequate communications and information
systems.
-Implement a pre-deployment training scheme for both MILOBS
and Protection Elements. End abridged text.

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