EU/DPRK: SE DETRANI DISCUSSES 6PT, KEDO,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004881

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014
TAGS: PREL KNNP PHUM EAID PINR IR KN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/DPRK: SE DETRANI DISCUSSES 6PT, KEDO,
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND MISSILES

REF: A. USEU TODAY 11/10/04

B. USEU BRUSSELS 4756

C. USEU BRUSSELS 1119

D. USEU BRUSSELS 1081

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations November 9 with Special
Envoy Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K Director Jim Foster, EU
officials underscored the EU's firm support for the Six-Party
Process and willingness to play a constructive role when the
time comes. They urged the US to consult early if the EU is
ever expected to provide assistance as part of any resolution
of the nuclear issue. DeTrani and Foster urged the EU not to
agree to anything with Iran that the DPRK could cite as
precedent for demanding something short of full disarmament
itself. Commission interlocutors said the EU is grappling
with what to do about KEDO, and hopes for a signal from the
US about its 2005 funding plans. On humanitarian assistance,
the EU is disappointed with North Korea's lack of cooperation
and decision to quit participating in the UN Common Appeals
Process, but will look for other ways to coordinate
international assistance. DeTrani and Foster, accompanied by
INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, also delivered a briefing on
the DPRK's ballistic missiles program. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Special Envoy for North Korea Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K
Director Jim Foster met on November 9 with EU Council,
Commission and Member State officials to discuss the
Six-Party Process and other DPRK issues in advance of a visit
to North Korea by the EU's Regional Director-level Troika
(ref. B). DeTrani and Foster also met with the EU Political
and Security Committee and, accompanied by INR Anthony
Ruggiero, briefed cleared EU officers on North Korea's
ballistic missiles program.

SIX-PARTY TALKS
--------------


3. (C) DeTrani briefed his interlocutors on US thinking about
the Six-Party Talks and thanked them for the EU's consistent
support. He expressed US hope that China will be able to
bring North Korea back to the negotiating table in late
November or early December, and asked the EU to urge China to
increase its pressure on North Korea. Council DG Robert
Cooper said he thought we were entering a critical phase
because, with President Bush now re-elected, Pyongyang had to
decide whether to return to the table or wait out another
four years in the unrealistic hope that something might
change. DeTrani agreed, and said he was guardedly optimistic
that North Korea would make a strategic decision to
re-engage.


4. (C) Several interlocutors, including Cooper, wanted to
know if the US had a "Plan B" for if the Six-Party Talks
failed to resolve the nuclear issue. DeTrani and Foster
explained that the US saw the Six-Party Process -- a
multilateral mechanism involving all major regional parties
-- as the only viable way to ensure North Korea's complete,
verifiable and irreversible disarmament. The ultimate prize
for North Korea was full normalization with the international
community. The DPRK needs to make a fundamental decision
about what kind of state it wants to be. Until then, there
was little the international community could do except keep
the pressure on and the Six-Party avenue open. While not
ruling out options as a matter of principle, the US was not
contemplating any kind of unilateral or military solutions to
the problem.

EU WILLING TO HELP, WILL NEED EARLY CONSULTATION
-------------- ---


5. (C) DeTrani's interlocutors were grateful for the timely
US briefing on the Six-Party Process. They reiterated the
EU's willingness to play a supportive role when the time is
right (refs. C, D). Council Secretariat North America and
Human Rights Director Jim Cloos said the EU was ready to help
in any way it could, while "recognizing our secondary role."
Commission External Relations Director Richard Wright pointed
out that even though the EU is not part of the Six-Party
Talks, the EU would expect to contribute if the talks result
in a long-term plan, and therefore should be kept in the loop
along the way.


6. (C) In separate meetings, Council DG Cooper and HiRep
Solana Policy Advisor Chris Holtby urged the US to consult
early if it wanted the EU to provide incentives and
assistance to the DPRK as part of an eventual resolution of
the nuclear issue. The EU will need time and will want input
from the US if it is ever expected to play a role, Holtby
said. Cooper said the EU would need to know early if the US
wanted it to play a bigger role. "It will be easier for us
to help you," he said, "if we feel consulted early, rather
than just handed a bill." DeTrani and Foster thanked the EU
for its willingness to help and said they would bear in mind
the EU request for early consultation when the time comes.

EU LOOKING FOR SIGN ABOUT FUTURE OF KEDO
--------------


7. (C) During a meeting with Commission Director Richard
Wright and members of his staff, Wright asked about US
intentions toward the Korean Energy Development Organization
(KEDO). The KEDO issue is becoming time-sensitive for the
EU, since they must decide whether to fund KEDO next year.
Wright said the EU is inclined to continue support for KEDO's
administrative costs (Euros 1 million per year),but to
discontinue the Euros 4 million they provided for suspension
costs last year. The fact that the US is not contributing
this year "is not helping," Wright said. He asked for some
sort of signal from Washington to indicate whether the US
will fund KEDO next year, so the EU can make an informed
decision on whether to continue funding. He also pointed out
that the legal basis for EU contributions to KEDO runs out at
the end of 2005. If KEDO is terminated, Wright said, there
will be "contingent liabilities," and "we do not consider
ourselves at risk for these."


8. (C) DeTrani told Wright that the U.S. continues to see
KEDO as a viable entity, but that the KEDO light-water
reactor project is not viable. Wright responded that as part
of an international settlement, "I don't think we'd object"
to termination of the light-water reactor project.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) Commission Director Richard Wright said that a major
goal of the EU's November 13-16 Troika visit to North Korea
(ref. B) was to assess recent changes in the climate for
humanitarian aid and development projects. Wright said the
EU was disappointed by North Korea's recent decision to
terminate the UN's Common Appeals Process (CAP),but said the
EU would find other ways to coordinate aid to the DPRK. He
underscored, however, that monitoring was "non-negotiable"
for the EU.


10. (SBU) During its November 13-16 trip, the EU Troika also
plans to conduct monitoring visits to ongoing development
projects, Wright said. The EU was trying to develop a better
sense of the economic situation, and hoped to see a deepening
of the economic improvements observed in recent Troika trips
to North Korea, including an influx of Chinese electronics
and revitalization surrounding the Kaesong industrial zone.

11. (C) Over dinner with other EU and third-country
officials, Wright also mentioned that the EU had two pilot
development projects on the books that "could be launched in
just a few weeks if North Korea did the right things." But,
as we have seen with regard to humanitarian assistance, the
DPRK seems to be "going backward rather than forward," he
said. Japanese Mission DCM Yoshihisa Kuroda cautioned the EU
not to invest too much of itself in planning for possible
development projects. He underlined that the first priority
of Japan, the US, and others in the region was security, not
the development of North Korea. The EU does not have to live
in North Korea's neighborhood, he said, and should be very
careful not to say or do things that undermine the security
interests of those who do. EU interlocutors reassured
Yoshihisa that the EU fully supported the Six-Party Process
and saw North Korea as a grave global threat. The EU would
take its cue from Six-Party partners about the timing and
design of any future increase in economic engagement.

BRIEFING THE PSC: DPRK-IRAN PARALLELS?
--------------


12. (SBU) In a meeting with the twenty-five Member State
Ambassadors to the EU Political Security Committee (PSC),
DeTrani provided an overview of the Six-Party Talks, then
opened to the floor to a range of questions from the
audience. Ambassadors asked about the future of KEDO, the
possible impact of a nuclear agreement with Iran on the
Six-Party Talks, a possible "Plan B" if the Six-Party Talks
remain at an impasse, and the climate for humanitarian aid to
North Korea.


13. (C) DeTrani noted that the EU should be very careful
about any potential agreement with Tehran over its nuclear
activities, because North Korea could use any relatively weak
deal with Iran to try to leverage concessions in the
Six-Party Talks. As with North Korea, the international
community should accept nothing less from Tehran than the
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all
nuclear-related programs. DeTrani and Foster also made this
point in their other meetings throughout the day. EU
interlocutors were in listening mode, but several observed in
very general terms that the multilateral track the US was
pursuing with the DPRK was similar in many ways to the EU's
approach to Iran. Only Council DG Cooper underscored the
differences, arguing that geography and regional political
dynamics made Iran the more dangerous -- if also more
potentially democratic -- of the two. At the same time, both
had a history of "lying and cheating" which made them equally
hard to trust, he said (ref. A).

BRIEFING THE EU ON DPRK MISSILES PROGRAMS
--------------


14. (S) INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, who accompanied DeTrani
and Foster, delivered a briefing to cleared EU officials on
recent developments in North Korea's ballistic missiles
program and indications that the DPRK might be preparing for
a new test launch. The EU officials thanked the US for the
briefing -- which went smoothly despite incompatible US and
EU security guidelines that prevented the use of visual aids
-- and expressed hope that North Korea's missiles
proliferation activities could be addressed once the nuclear
issue was resolved. Several officials asked about DPRK links
to outside technology suppliers (especially Russia) and
missile customers (Pakistan, Iran, private groups and
terrorists). DeTrani and Ruggiero said that the DPRK's
willingness to sell complete systems to any country able to
pay was alarming, but noted that Pyongyang did not seem
interested in selling to non-state entities, probably because
of the risks involved. The real danger was that corruption
and established DPRK links to organized crime could result in
unauthorized technology transfers. Commission
representatives said that the EU has raised missiles concerns
in its (low-level) political dialogue with North Korea, and
said the EU would discuss the problem with China during the
December 8 EU-China Summit.

(U) This cable has been cleared by SE DeTrani and EAP/K
Foster.

Schnabel