Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS4758
2004-11-05 16:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

DSACEUR'S EU POLAD CLARIFIES DELINEATION OF TASKS

Tags:  PREL MOPS PHUM BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004758 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA
S/WCI FOR AMBASSADOR PROSPER
SARAJEVO FOR AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY AND JENIFER MOORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS PHUM BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DSACEUR'S EU POLAD CLARIFIES DELINEATION OF TASKS
ISSUES

REF: A. MEMORANDUM ON "DECONFLICTION AND DELINEATION OF
TASKS (HQ EUFOR AND NHQ SA" FROM
COMEUFOR TO DSACEUR DATED OCTOBER 24

B. AND SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS.

Classified By: Col. Michael Ryan, USEU Defense Advisor for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004758

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA
S/WCI FOR AMBASSADOR PROSPER
SARAJEVO FOR AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY AND JENIFER MOORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS PHUM BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DSACEUR'S EU POLAD CLARIFIES DELINEATION OF TASKS
ISSUES

REF: A. MEMORANDUM ON "DECONFLICTION AND DELINEATION OF
TASKS (HQ EUFOR AND NHQ SA" FROM
COMEUFOR TO DSACEUR DATED OCTOBER 24

B. AND SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS.

Classified By: Col. Michael Ryan, USEU Defense Advisor for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a retransmission of Brussels 4731. Paragraph 4
has been corrected for clarity.


2. (C) Summary: EU Council Secretariat planners are unhappy
with a number of points in the Delineation of Tasks between
COMEUFOR and Commander Nato Headquarters (COMNHQ),but they
will not raise further objections. Some aspects of the
agreement between commanders on the ground contravene the
guidance given by the EUMC to COMEUFOR. End summary.


3. (C) USEU pol-mil officers met November 4 with DSACEUR's EU
POLAD for Operation ALTHEA, who is also a lead planner in the
EU's Council Secretariat, to get the Council Secretariat
views on progress between COMEUFOR and Commander Nato
Headquarters (COMNHQ) Sarajevo on working out arrangements on
the ground for delineating tasks between EUFOR and NHQ
Sarajevo. DSACEUR intends to submit a letter November 4 to
both the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military
Committee laying out the agreed way forward in the document
"Deconfliction and Delineation of Tasks (HQ EUFOR and NHQ Sa."

--------------
Reporting to the Military Committees
--------------


4. (C) DSACEUR Reith's original intention was to ask the
Military Committee's to "note" this agreement between the
respective commanders. Our contact pointed out that this
"note" might cause problems within the EUMC, since the agreed
way forward at this point is not in line with the EUMC
Military Guidance of 27 Jul 04 on the subject; specifically,
the "Agreed Mechanism" for task number G2 "Import and export
of weapons and ammunition" states "Dual signature by (both
COM's) on all import / export decisions." The preferred EU

language, which was transmitted to DSACEUR yesterday, is
"COMEUFOR will decide, following appropriate consultation and
coordination with NATO SMR Sa." The EU Council Secretariat
sees this as a compliance issue only and, therefore, as an
EUFOR-only decision. The EU Council Secretariat asked that
General Reith instead simply say that, as directed, the
relevant commanders have developed implementation mechanisms
for the delineation of tasks that in their view will work
well, and that DSACEUR as Operational Commander has full
confidence in the agreed procedures. In the Council staff's
view, asking the EUMC to "note" the agreement would cause
political friction since it would require the EUMC to sign up
an agreement that is in some respects contrary to their
guidance.

--------------
Consultation Mechanism
--------------


5. (C) The second possible point of contention for the EU is
item G-9 "AFBiH Commanding Generals and General Staff
Officers (ACGS)". Our contact reports that the EU side has
absolutely no problem with this consultation taking place
informally and on a regular basis. He did note, however,
that this forum runs the risk of presenting opportunities for
BiH participants to misperceive the relationship between
COMEUFOR (compliance) and COMNHQ Sa (defense reform). To
that end, they asked DSACEUR to add the following note under
Agreed Mechanism: "Co-chairmanship runs the risk of allowing
the ACGS to exploit a perceived weakness in the structure.
Therefore, for reasons of clarity and reflecting the EU lead,
this should be an EU chaired group with NHQ Sa full
participation. (EUMC 11560/3/04 dated 28 Jul 04)." Having
made that recommendation, their clear preference is to remove
the item altogether on the "quite acceptable" understanding
that the commanders on the ground would normally employ such
a mechanism in any case for its intended purpose.
Highlighting it in this document, in their view, only results
in increased tensions internally in the EU.

--------------
No Problems on PIFWC Language
--------------


6. (C) On PIFWCs and CT the EU Council Secretariat has no
problems with the recommendations. Clearly, they are
concerned that COMEUFOR might not be adequately informed
regarding operations that could potentially involve forces
under his command. At the same time, they are confident that
the agreed arrangements will prevent such an occurrence.
Specifically, their suggested language for item P-1 under
Factors strikes out the phrase "NATO and EUFOR have similar
mandates for support to the ICTY with PIFWC related
operations" replacing it with "EUFOR will provide support to
ICTY and relevant authorities, including the detention of
PIFWCs. NATO will continue to provide support to the ICTY
and will also have authority to detain PIFWCs." In addition,
they would like to strike the word "troops" from the second
bullet. Our interlocutor did note that the word "mandate"
has a particular connotation -- hence their disagreement with
the phrase as originally written. The EU Council Secretariat
does not believe they have, nor do they seek, a mandate for
EUFOR in PIFWCs.

--------------
The Way Ahead
--------------

7. (C) The EU side does not/not intend to raise any issues
regarding the agreement. They will, rather, place their
confidence in DSACEUR as the person charged with executing a
vague political agreement. It is clear from talking with the
EU staff that any political gain at this point would come at
an operational cost; a trade-off they are unwilling to make.
In the end, they don't really like the outcome, but in the
interest of a successful operation, they are willing to live
with it.


8. (C) In the event the EUMC does not accept the document, a
re-drafting exercise will be necessary. The EUMC guidance,
which this document apparently contravenes on the issue of
dual-signatures on arms export/import authorizations, is not
repeated in either EU political documents or NATO documents,
but it was, however, repeated in references in the CONOPS and
OPLAN according to our source.

Schnabel