THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY: CAPTAIN COLLINS GOES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004730

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY: CAPTAIN COLLINS GOES
TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: USEU Defense Policy officer, Mark Brunner for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) USEU Pol/Mil team met mid-October with British Navy
Captain Paul Collins, currently seconded to the European
Defense Agency Establishment Team (AET),for a readout on his
recent Voluntary Visitor Program visit to the US. Collins
summarized US reaction to his trip as a "relief", and noted
that US officials were surprised to learn the Agency
currently employs just six personnel, though the Agency has
plans to increase staff to 80 in 2005. While the EDA is
currently in start-up mode, it is already focusing on some
early projects. The first will be tackling the EU's
capabilities shortfalls by conducting "assessments" of
several high cost European defense programs in order to
illustrate for member states the "true cost" of the
capability throughout the life of the program. The
assessment will also demonstrate to Defense Ministers how
yearly maintenance of legacy programs drains scarce Euros
from modest defense budgets. These evaluations can be used
by HiRep Solana to prod Defense Ministries into transforming
their procurement processes and increasing investment on
practical, usable capabilities. Collins believes the EDA
will succeed in jump-starting the EU capabilities engine
where previous European capabilities initiatives have failed,
because 2004 was a "watershed year" for ESDP, and Ministers
are committed to transforming the EU Defense Processes. End
Summary.

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Allaying US Concerns
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2. (C) In a debrief with USEU polmil officers, Captain Paul
Collins summarized the reaction to his October trip to
Washington as "relief" from many of his US counterparts. He
characterized many of his interlocutors as apprehensive that
the EDA would bring about the creation of a "fortress
Europe," and added that a number of his US contacts had
imagined the EDA employed a few thousand personnel. He also
assured us that EDA Chief Nick Witney would schedule meetings
with counterparts in the US once the Agency got "on its
feet". Collins compared the state of the EDA to an auto
repair shop with car parts "lying about the floor", but also
stressed that Agency hires are beginning to assemble the
auto's frame, and will move on to the key components shortly.
Collins was supremely impressed with the Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) organization and its views on
transformation. He sees the EDA and ACT missions as mutually
compatible and noted, "EDA needs to weld itself to ACT".


3. (C) Although the EDA has an ambitious agenda, it is
still developing as an organization. Despite the EDA's small
staff, Collins warned against underestimating its influence
in the long run, "People (in the US) need to game plan in
their minds and to think about what they want to do with a
stronger European Defense Market, " and added that it's not a
question of if the EDA and EU will develop a more
comprehensive and successful approach, but "when and how
fast."


4. (C) During his visit, a majority of the questions from
US officials to Collins about European Defense plans focused
on the future of ESDP and NATO. Many asked about the added
value of ESDP and why the EU is duplicating NATO. Collins
said there was a common mis-perception during his US tour
that there were a "few thousand people over at EDA furiously
buggering (working) away" on EU defense initiatives. He
explained that at the time of his trip, the EDA only had 2
employees (now 6). The EDA plans for a staff of 26 by the
end of 2004, with a target of 80 for 2005. The senior agency
executives have been barraged with over 1,000 applications
for 80 available slots.


5. (C) Collins also suggested that there is a dichotomy
between US desire for the EU to be more effective militarily,
and the US fear of the EU becoming "too strong." His
perception is that the US wants to ensure the EU does not
develop too strongly industrially and compete with the US.
His follow-up question to us was a basic one, asking what the
US really wants the EU to do. As for the concern in some
circles that the EDA would prompt the EU to develop into a
"fortress Europe", he suggested -- without further
elaboration -- that the real danger in transatlantic
relations was a development of a "fortress US."
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Why an EDA?
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6. (C) Collins pointed to a "change in the mindset in
Europe" with regard to defense. He strongly asserted that
Europeans are "sick" of NATO "telling people what to do".
When asked by USEU Pol Mil how the EDA's approach would be
more successful than NATO's, Collins argued that the EDA
would be more effective by helping the nations achieve
results instead of just identifying problems. The EDA is not
intended to be an armaments agency, although Collins
acknowledged that such an evolution is possible in the
future.


7. (C) Capability Assessments. According to Collins, one of
the primary tasks of the EDA will be to review national
defense plans and assess capability for the EU. EDA's view
is that the majority of EU countries are still maintaining a
cold war structure and are equipped correspondingly. This
cumbersome structure drains needed resources, and inhibits
transformation. The EDA's first assessment of capabilities
will not likely occur prior to 2006. Under this concept, the
EDA may "cost out" the capability of a few large programs to
illustrate the actual life-cycle cost of the entire program
-- including training, maintenance, and additional expenses
beyond the initial price tag. Collins said they would likely
target a few high profile programs to demonstrate how nations
are inefficiently spending defense dollars maintaining older
programs that deliver little in terms of real capability. He
believes these assessments will enable the EDA to prod
Defense and Finance Ministers to better spend the EU's
defense dollars and deliver real capabilities to the EU.
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European Buy-in to ESDP
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8. (C) Delivering the Goods. This conclusion dovetails with
Collins' view that European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) had a "watershed" year in 2004, and that the political
actors are prepared to transform the EU procurement process
and rationalize defense industries. Since a key component of
the EDA's mission is to make actual capabilities available to
the EU military structures, Collins feels that by exposing
the full costs of these capabilities the Agency will be able
to apply pressure for reallocation of defense expenditures.
Some EU member states would also be urged to develop "niche
capabilities" rather than spend resources on expensive
capabilities that already exist within the EU. Importantly,
he also said the EDA has already engaged the European
Commission on Research and Technology (R&T) matters, and
noted this was the first time this liaison had occurred since
the inception of ESDP in 1995.


9. (C) Captain Collins maintained that during 2004, there
was a significant political shift in thinking on ESDP, where
ministers, having agreed in principle to ESDP previously,
have now "signed their minds up to it (ESDP)". He believed
this was a subtle, but important distinction that will propel
the EDA's agenda and eventually, ESDP. He also noted that he
is starting to see governments shifting resources toward
ESDP, notably the Netherlands and Sweden.


10. (C) According to Collins, ESDP Chief Solana's ability to
influence the EDA Steering board will be crucial. Early on,
one of Solana's goals will be to pin down the Steering Board
Members (Composed of EU Ministers of Defense, HiRep Solana,
EDA CEO Witney and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee)
whose nations only contribute legacy hardware and out-dated
systems to make the point "Thanks for your contributions (to
ESDP),but they're still not capabilities". Collins also
asserted that the EDA will make progress where others have
failed previously, because, since the EDA is independent, it
can tell the steering board what it (steering board) doesn't
want to hear. Collins speculated that Solana and the EDA
might have to spend a good part of their time speaking to
national finance ministers. Collins also noted that
information delivery to national Parliaments would be
crucial, since they hold the national purse strings and help
determine defense priorities.

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Comment
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11. (C) Collins offered few specifics to support his grand
predictions of a stronger, transformed, more coherent
European Defense industry able to deliver real capabilities
to the EU military structure. Nor did he offer any insights
why EDA would be more successful in addressing these issues
than we have been through NATO mechanisms. Given the
fragmented and internally competitive European industry, the
EDA may need more than the simple power of persuasion to
effect meaningful changes. Many EU military representatives
have also voiced concern that, given the billions of dollars
at stake in determining defense-related standards and
priorities, the EDA may be driven more by political
imperatives than by genuine military requirements. The EU
member states' Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) -- who set the
requirements -- are said to be particularly apprehensive
about their lack of input into the EDA steering board, since
the Chairman of the EU Military Committee has a seat, but no
vote. Still, by exposing national defense plans to scrutiny
-- especially by Parliaments and the public -- EDA could
achieve some success in improving European defense processes.


12. (U) Mission would like to thank all those involved in
preparing Collins' highly successful VolVis program. We
believe it provided timely input that will have an impact on
future development of the EDA.

SCHNABEL