EU/CHINA ARMS: SLOWING THE RUSH TO THE SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004474

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS ETTC PHUM CH EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/CHINA ARMS: SLOWING THE RUSH TO THE SUMMIT

REF: A. BERLIN 3497


B. USEU BRUSSELS 4376

C. THE HAGUE 2605

D. LONDON 7653

E. PARIS 7470

F. USEU BRUSSELS 2896

G. USEU BRUSSELS 3435

H. USEU BRUSSELS 3421

I. STATE 222102

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: US approaches to EU member states have slowed
the rush to end the arms embargo before the December 8 summit
with China. Nevertheless, following the October 11 GAERC
discussion of China, EU Member States appear to be gearing up
to signal to China at the summit that they have agreed in
principle to lift the EU arms embargo, but will need more
time to iron out the details. Negotiations on changes to the
EU's Code of Conduct appear stalled, and could delay EU
readiness to move ahead. We have slowed this train, but not
derailed it. To do so will require a more vibrant public
debate, building on coverage inaugurated by PM P/DAS Greg
Suchan in his visit to Brussels October 7. A public
diplomacy campaign that energizes natural allies in European
parliaments, NGOs and among commentators could create enough
bottom-up political pressure to prevent the EU from making
any hasty commitments at the EU-China summit. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Thanks in large part to the approaches made by US
embassies in member state capitals, the October 11 GAERC held
inconclusive discussions on ending the China arms embargo.
According to our discussions here, the EU is not yet prepared
to lift its arms embargo on China, but the trend among Member
States continues to move in that direction. Brussels-based
EU diplomats understood that the mandate that emerged from
the GAERC is to re-double their efforts to reform the Code of
Conduct and finalize discussions on a "Toolbox" of measures
for post-embargo states. But as ref (C) makes clear and
other reporting suggests, there is no committed opposition
within the EU to lifting the embargo. It appears less likely
than ever that individual Member States will stand up and
challenge the widespread assumption that the embargo should,
at least in principle, be lifted. FM Straw's post-GAERC
statement to the press -- "We are not in any sense against
lifting the embargo, but it has got to be done in a proper
and sensible manner..." -- should serve as notice that the EU
is moving beyond "if" and is now discussing the when and how
of lifting the embargo.


3. (C) While EU governments may have agreed tacitly that the
embargo should in principle be lifted, time will still be
needed to work out a formula that keeps all Member States on
board. The outlines of that formula have been clear since
July: strengthening the Code of Conduct on arms sales (ref.
G); creating a "Toolbox" to monitor transfers to post-embargo
countries (ref. H); issuing a political declaration stating
the EU's intent to remain vigilant on arms sales to China;
and perhaps getting token progress from China on human
rights.


4. (C) Differing Member State views on each of these elements
are serious, but not insurmountable. We were told by an
informed Council contact, for example, that the Code of
Conduct and Toolbox "could be agreed tomorrow" if the French
removed their objections to draft provisions calling for a
higher degree of transparency and regularity in Member State
arms licensing consultations. Discussions on strengthening
the Code of Conduct are also currently stalemated over
whether to make it legally binding; Dutch Presidency contacts
suggest the final decision on this will be political, not
technical. It is possible, but not likely, that the EU will
be able to iron out all these differences in time for a full
lifting of the embargo prior to the December 8 EU-China
summit. The most likely scenario, however, would be for the
EU to achieve sufficient consensus over the next two months
to go to the summit and confidently signal to China that the
end of the embargo is near; that it will be lifted as soon as
Member States finish ironing out the "modalities." Beijing
might even help the process along by sending some positive
signals, whether genuine or not, on human rights, or by
intimating that the summit itself could be endangered by a
lack of EU progress. In other words, even though the EU does
not appear likely to lift the embargo by December 8, it might
still be able to make a commitment to China that we and other
concerned parties would be unable to walk back later.


5. (C) The EU still has several opportunities to make
progress on the issue before the EU-China summit. Foreign
Ministers will meet again at the November 2 and November 22
GAERCs (joined by Defense Ministers at the latter),and Heads
of Government will gather for a summit on November 5. At
each of these meetings, we should expect those pushing for a
rapid lifting of the embargo to aggressively pursue their
agenda, especially after Chirac's performance in China last
week. Whether a formal agenda item or just the topic of
debate on the margins, the China embargo will be a theme in
each of these meetings. The goal of the pro-lift camp will
be to achieve sufficient consensus to go to the EU-China
summit with a solid pledge to lift the embargo in the very
near future. Under these circumstances, our goal should be
to make that a politically unpalatable thing to do.


6. (C) Changing the political calculus of EU governments that
have so far acquiesced to pro-lift arguments will require
continuing our diplomatic efforts while raising the level of
our public outreach (ref. F). PM P/DAS Greg Suchan's
on-the-record public appearances in Brussels on October 7
(ref. B) were an excellent start. His remarks helped launch
a public debate in Europe that until now had been
conspicuously absent. Numerous commentators, NGOs and
Parliamentarians from across Europe have begun weighing in
with compelling arguments that lifting the embargo would be
foolish on both strategic and human rights grounds. In an
editorial following Suchan's visit, the influential Financial
Times even acknowledged, "Washington is on solid ground on
this matter of international security." We have only seen
one commentary in the last week defending the pro-lift
argument, and that was in a low circulation weekly that
caters almost exclusively to EU bureaucrats.


7. (C) On-the-record public outreach by US officials helps
get out our key message concerning the embargo. Far more
effective, however, is public political debate in EU member
states. To the extent possible, our public diplomacy efforts
should aim to encourage influential NGOs such as Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International to speak out. (For a
European audience, the presence of Amnesty International's EU
director alongside P/DAS Suchan at a press event on October 7
added tremendous credibility to our message.) Likewise,
European parliaments should be encouraged to take a stand,
holding hearings on the issue and clarifying their concerns.
Liberal MEP Graham Watson is initiating a debate in the
European parliament in mid-November (date tbd). Similar
efforts in member state capitals can help raise the ante as
foreign ministers and heads of government face this issue,
and should be encouraged.

Schnabel