Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS4335
2004-10-08 10:32:00
SECRET
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

WISHFUL THINKING? EU HOPES G8 CAN KEEP IRAN OUT OF

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP IR EUN IAEA UNSC USEU BRUSSELS 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004335 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO-DIBBLE, NP/FO:FITZPATRICK, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2009
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR EUN IAEA UNSC USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: WISHFUL THINKING? EU HOPES G8 CAN KEEP IRAN OUT OF
UNSC

REF: BRUSSELS 4201

Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASON 1.4 (B,D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004335

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO-DIBBLE, NP/FO:FITZPATRICK, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2009
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR EUN IAEA UNSC USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: WISHFUL THINKING? EU HOPES G8 CAN KEEP IRAN OUT OF
UNSC

REF: BRUSSELS 4201

Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASON 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. In meetings with NEA DAS Dibble and NP
A/DAS Fitzpatrick on October 4-5, EU officials from the Dutch
Presidency, Council Secretariat and Commission expressed
concerns that IAEA referral of Iran to the UNSC in November
would cross a major, negative threshold they want to avoid.
The EU fears Iran would respond by withdrawing from the NPT
and accelerating uranium enrichment, and that moving the
issue to the UNSC would lead to confrontation. The EU is
still deliberating possible European components for a
G8-endorsed "package" of significant incentives to offer Iran
in return for cessation of enrichment, but wants to assemble
as many carrots as possible -- including from the U.S.-- in
one more effort to resolve the matter without recourse to the
UNSC. Should Iran respond in any meaningful way to an
incentives package, even on the eve of the IAEA Board
meeting, EU member states will likely oppose referral to the
UNSC. EU officials are aware this could lead to an
undesirable transatlantic rift, but are unsure at this point
how to reduce this risk. Pushback from the U.S. side focused
on the strategic and legal advantages of involving the UNSC,
Iran's tactic of offering -- and breaking -- pledges to
comply in order to keep the issue out of the UNSC, and the
lack to date of any indication that Iran will consider making
a strategic decision to suspend enrichment and forego a
nuclear weapons program. End Summary.

Points of Agreement...
--------------

2. (S) On October 4-5, NEA DAS Dibble and NP A/DAS
Fitzpatrick, accompanied by NEA/ARPI Waller and S/CT Miller,
met with a wide range of EU and Canadian officials during and
on the margins of the U.S.-EU-Canada Trilateral discussions
on Iran. Canada and the EU agree with the U.S.'s pessimistic
assessment of internal developments in Iran, and shared their
own downbeat assessment of trends in human rights, support

for terrorism, and opposition to a negotiated Middle East
peace settlement. Although EU officials readily acknowledged
that their policy of engagement on Iran has failed, their
only prescription was "more engagement." On WMD, the EU was
interested in Fitzpatrick's briefing on the status of Iran's
work in converting its 37 tons of yellowcake into uranium
hexafluoride, and its efforts to master the complex
centrifuge technology related to uranium enrichment -- two
chokepoints that, once passed, would give Iran a dangerous
breakout capability. Fitzpatrick underscored USG concern
that Iran would agree to suspension on the eve of the
November 25-26 Board meeting, only after it had passed these
chokepoints. A suspension pledge in that case would mean
little, unless Iran turned over the UF6 and centrifuges.

But Divergence over a G8 Initiative
--------------

3. (C) Nearly all EU interlocutors, however, expressed the
hope that a G8-endorsed initiative could entice Iran to
suspend enrichment, and avoid sending the issue to the UNSC
at the November IAEA Board meeting. The EU is still working
on what the possible components of such an initiative could
be. Given the importance of "saving face" for Iran, most EU
officials are convinced that "significant" carrots --
including especially from the U.S. -- are needed to bring
Iran around. The EU favors a G8 approach because, by
including the US, Japan, and Russia, it broadens the appeal
of any initiative for Iran. Also, should a G8 initiative
ultimately fail, moving the issue to the UNSC would then in
theory have the support of Russia.

Referral to UNSC Crosses Major Threshold
--------------

4. (C) Most EU officials shared the conviction that
reporting the issue to the UNSC would shift the issue to an
almost inevitable path toward conflict. Iran, they argued,
would likely withdraw from the NPT, accelerate its
enrichment, or both. One official asked rhetorically, "What
is the advantage in having Iran outside the NPT and pursuing
nuclear weapons?" DAS Dibble and A/DAS Fitzpatrick
questioned this assumption, noting that having Iran pursue
nuclear weapons within the NPT is even worse. They added
that reporting to the UNSC is a necessary step to begin to
ramp up pressure, but would not lead immediately or
inevitably to sanctions or confrontation. The UNSC could,
however, provide a legal basis for "requiring" Iran to
suspend enrichment, and also put Iran's program in a broader
context than its narrower NPT obligations. Most Board
members believe the IAEA can only "call on" Iran to suspend;
the UNSC has clear legal authority to compel Iran to do so.
DAS Dibble observed that Iran will not abandon the NPT
lightly; to do so would would imply that the purpose of its
program is not peaceful, undercut support for Iran among the
NAM and G-77 countries, and further isolate Iran in
international eyes. Unlike the cases of India and Pakistan,
who never signed the NPT, Iran would have to abrogate an
international treaty it has signed.

Once in the UNSC, what then?
--------------

5. (C) EU officials were skeptical that moving the issue to
the UNSC would necessarily be effective. Several questioned
whether the U.S. could obtain nine votes and no veto on a
Chapter VII resolution. Referring the issue only to face
vetoes would undermine the UNSC in dealing with Iran and
future proliferants. Others were concerned that moving to the
Council meant immediately seeking to impose economic
sanctions. Fitzpatrick laid out the several graduated steps
that the UNSC could take that would raise the pressure on
Iran to comply, but were short of the admittedly difficult
step of imposing economic sanctions. Council DG Robert
Cooper stated flat-out that with oil at $50/barrel, the cost
to Europe's economy would be such that the EU would be very
reluctant to move to an oil embargo no matter what happened.
Fitzpatrick also noted that Russian actions at the last IAEA
indicated they might be cooperative; the key was to go into
the UNSC with the support of the EU-3 and European members of
the UNSC; we could then build on this core. Fitzpatrick also
stressed that reporting to the UNSC would not mean taking the
issue away from Vienna. We would expet the UNSC to give its
support to the IAEA inspection process, which in any case
will have to continue.

Could UNSC Referral accompany a Parallel G8 offer?
--------------

6. (C) All EU officials expressed concern that there remains
very little time to develop a G8 package, or give Iran much
time to respond to one, before the November IAEA Board
meeting. Dibble and Fitzpatrick agreed, especially given
that the objective was not to elicit yet another Iranian
tactical ploy to delay referral to the UNSC, but rather for
Iran to make the strategic decision that a network of
relationships with the West would provide greater security
than would nuclear weapons. Dibble and Fitzpatrick pointed
out that there was no reason referral to the UNSC could not
occur in parallel with a G8 initiative. Should Iran respond
to a G8-endorsed initiative with concrete steps to halt
enrichment and, as was the case with Libya, agree to
dismantle its nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure, the UNSC
could refrain from taking punitive action. Ultimately, how
Iran's nuclear program is viewed depends on how Iran responds
to the concerns of the international community. EU officials
were skeptical that Iran would respond to any G8 initiative
following a referral to the UNSC.

Possible EU components of a G8 package
--------------

7. (C) EU officials are still brainstorming possible
elements of a package that they can propose at next week's G8
Political Directors meeting. Annalisa Gianneli, Solana's
Non-Proliferation advisor, avoided details on how such a
package might be structured, but envisaged a combination of
carrots and sticks that should be clearly spelled out.
Elements of the offer could correspond to levels of
compliance, with nothing given to Iran in advance. One idea
might be to propose holding a regional security conference to
address the concerns driving Iran's perception of a strategic
threat. She agreed that "sticks" could include, for example,
a visa ban on Iranian officials as well as the threat of
referral to the UNSC. However, EU officials did not
articulate at what point they would consider Iran to have
rejected a G-8 proposal (i.e., no deadlines or triggers) -
presumably because their thinking has not progressed very far
in that direction.

A U.S. security guarantee as a carrot?
--------------

8. (C) EU officials in all the meetings made references to
the critical importance of some U.S. incentive on Iran to the
success of a G8 package. Bjorn Larsson on the Council's
Policy Planning staff suggested the most compelling offer
would be some kind of security guarantee -- along the lines
of Secretary Powell's public statement that the U.S. respects
the results of the Iranian revolution. DAS Dibble responded
that the Secretary's statement stands, but moving beyond it
would be difficult politically, given Iran's defiance of its
IAEA obligations and the many other outstanding issues where
Iran undermines regional stability (Iraq, terrorism, and
potentially Afghanistan). The U.S. will not give Iran a
"pass" on all these other issues in return for movement on
the nuclear issue alone.

Insight into EU thinking: Some Sound bytes
--------------
9.(C) What follows are some quotes by various EU officials
from the discussions on Iran that illustrate EU thinking.

Council Secretariat

-- Robert Cooper, Solana's Foreign Policy Advisor: "The U.S.
seems concerned that Iran would respond to a G8 proposal (and
thus postpone referral to the UNSC). I'm concerned they
won't respond at all. If Iran does respond to a G8
initiative, even on the eve of the November Board meeting, EU
member states are not likely to support referral to the UNSC."

-- Annalisa Giannelli, Solana's Non-Proliferation Advisor:
"A G8 deal is preferable to referral to the UNSC. We should
construct a G8 package that includes carrots and sticks. I
think we should be hard on Iran in terms of what it must do,
but generous in the carrots we offer."

Commission

-- Michael Leigh, Deputy DG for Middle East and CIS: "The EU
is not at the point where it could support moving the Iran
issue to the UNSC if Iran responds to a G8 package. We need
to stay in touch, as this could become a transatlantic issue,
and discuss it after the IAEA Board meeting, when new
Commissioners are in place and the U.S. elections are over."
(Fitzpatrick replied that the September IAEA Board resolution
said decisions would be taken at the November Board meeting,
not after.)

-- Christian Leffler, Head of Middle East Department: "There
are two unacceptable outcomes: a nuclear Iran, and resort to
force... The EU insists on engagement and dialogue with Iran,
in part because we have no alternative.... Ultimate recourse
to action on Iran would mean a complete policy failure.
Backlash in the region would be enormous."

Canada and some Dutch are the exception
--------------

10. (C) The exception to the sentiments expressed above
came from the Canadian delegation, and from Dutch IAEA
Mission Counselor Dirk Jan Kop, who said he expected Iran do
"just enough" before the November IAEA board meeting to keep
the board from referring the issue to the UNSC. That said,
he thought there would be enough votes on the Board to refer
in November, if Iran does not agree to full suspension. He
reported that the Canadian Ambassador to the IAEA, who is now
chairman of the Board, is planning a series of dinners in
Vienna between now and the November board meeting in an
effort to persuade NAM members that Iran is a sui generis
case, and its referral to the UNSC would not in any way
diminish other states' rights to pursue peaceful nuclear
energy. Kop and the Canadians were comfortable with a
three-pronged approach:

-- Develop a strategy for explaining the logic for referral
to the UNSC (e.g. enhanced legal authority);
-- Explore a G8 package, including possible incentives from
the U.S.;
-- Outreach to the NAM to address concerns that referral
would undermine their access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Next Steps/Timeline
--------------

11. (SBU) Upcoming meetings offer the EU several
opportunities to discuss and fine-tune their approach to Iran
prior to the November IAEA Board meeting. These include:

Oct 7 restricted PSC discussion of Iran
Oct 11 GAERC -- EU FM's (over lunch)
Oct 13 G8 PolDirs meeting
Nov 5 COUNCIL summit
Nov 11 EU-Russia summit
Nov 22-23 GAERC

Comment: Another Transatlantic Trainwreck?
--------------

12. (C) EU thinking on Iran is beginning to crystallize
around a G8 initiative that would be attractive enough to
elicit Iranian cooperation -- in explicit exchange for not
referring the issue to the UNSC in November. From the EU's
perspective, the onus will be on the G8 to include sufficient
carrots to bring Iran around, and they will want to err on
the side of offering too much rather than too little. The
key, in EU eyes, will be having a substantial U.S. carrot in
the mix, preferably in the form of some kind of security
guarantee. The EU would probably support including some
sticks in the package, too, e.g. if Iran does not cooperate,
it will be referred to the UNSC, visa/travel bans will be
considered, etc. But their clear concern is not to "miss"
the opportunity to avoid referral by being too stingy in the
offer made to Iran.


13. (C) Comment continued. There are several implications
for transatlantic relations in the EU's approach. First, the
EU is not at present prepared to support pursuing a G8
package in parallel with referral to the UNSC. In their
eyes, these are mutually exclusive approaches, and U.S.
insistence on referral in November will be viewed as
explicitly undermining chances for successful G8 initiative.
Failure of a G8 initiative -- either due to the G8's
inability to agree on a package, or due to Iran's rejection
of an agreed package -- could also be laid at the U.S.'s door
if the U.S. is viewed as having prevented agreement on a
package, or is viewed as being unwilling to offer a carrot
sufficiently enticing to bring Iran around. The last place
the EU will look to place blame will be Tehran, absent an
outright Iranian rejection of a G8 package the EU judges to
be "sufficient." We thus risk a break with the EU over (a)
the composition of a G8 package -- specifically, what U.S.
incentives are included, and (b) how the G8 initiative is
linked to referral to the UNSC -- specifically, whether the
U.S. would agree not to seek referral if Iran responds
positively to a G8 initiative. A break with the EU over
either issue could complicate our efforts in the IAEA Board
to refer Iran to the UNSC or, once in the UNSC, our ability
to secure the votes needed to take any action.


14. (U) This cable was cleared by NEA DAS Dibble and NP
A/DAS Fitzpatrick.

SCOTT