THE COMMISSION'S EXPLANATION OF EU'S "TWIN TRACK"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004265

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014
TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD SR MW ICTY EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: THE COMMISSION'S EXPLANATION OF EU'S "TWIN TRACK"
APPROACH TO SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reason 1.4 B/D

SUMMARY
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1. The Commission reports that its new "twin track" approach
to Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) met with an enthusiastic
response in both Belgrade and Podgorica. Further details
still need to be hashed out, however, on when, whether and
how a feasibility study on negotiations for a Stabilization
and Association Agreement could begin. A visit by Patten and
Solana on October 5 is supposed to firm up at least some of
these details. On one point the Commission remains firm:
SaM's cooperation with ICTY must improve if SAA negotiations
are to begin in 2005. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Therese Sobieski, Head of Unit for Serbia and
Montenegro at the European Commission (EC),tried to explain
the EU's "twin track" to negotiations on a Stabilization and
Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro in a recent
meeting with USEU's PolOff and USAID Advisor.

A "TWIN TRACK" TOWARD A SINGLE AGREEMENT
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3. (SBU) According to Sobieski, the impetus for the "twin
track" came from growing frustration in the Commission that
the EU's preferred strategy of dealing with Serbia and
Montenegro as a single economic unit was making no progress.
Meetings this past July had been "a moment of truth" that the
EU must recognize the reality of the two republics' growing
authorities. Therefore, the EC had proposed the EU drop its
insistence on economic harmonization and elaboration of an
Internal Market Action Plan (IMAP) as a precondition for
SaM's next step on the path of European integration: a
Feasibility Study on whether SaM is ready to begin
negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the EU. Previously, the EC had insisted an IMAP
was needed before it could evaluate SaM's economy in a
feasibility study. Now, the EC was reconciled to the need to
prepare separate sections on the economies of Montenegro and
Serbia. Sobieski insisted, however, that the EU Foreign
Ministers, in endorsing the EC's proposal were still keen to
continue the EU's policy in support of keeping the State
Union together. The EC would prepare only one feasibility
study, and eventually, negotiate a single SAA, with separate
sections, protocols or annexes as necessary for the two
republics.

NEXT STEPS
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4. (SBU) Sobieski said that the EU's first trip in
mid-September to explain the "twin track" approach to
Belgrade and Podgorica had been met with enthusiasm in both
cities, although she acknowledged that this was "maybe not
for the same reasons" in each government (i.e., Belgrade sees
progress toward an SAA, Podgorica sees progress toward
independence). The Serbs and Montenegrins were also asked to
make two commitments: that they will agree between
themselves on which areas should be negotiated by the EU with
the State Union, and which with the respective republic
governments; and that they will not take any steps to
undermine the State Union government. In particular, the EU
stressed that this "twin-track" approach should not be
extrapolated to any other issues, such as WTO membership.
Commissioner Patten and High Rep Solana will visit Belgrade
on October 5 to hear their response, and the EU will then
decide if work on a feasibility study can begin. The
Commission also hopes the Patten/Solana visit with help
clarify what the EU is and is not putting on the table,
although Sobieski noted they fully expect that "everyone will
hear what they want to hear."

POSSIBLE CALENDAR
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5. (C) Assuming that all went smoothly, which Sobieski
thought unlikely, the shortest conceivable calendar for SaM's
progress would be that drafting of a feasibility study would
begin this month, and the study might be finished in February

2005. If the study's conclusion was positive that SaM was
ready to begin SAA negotiations (an unlikely prospect unless
the GoSaM improves cooperation with ICTY -- see next para),
then the Commission would need to seek a negotiating mandate
from the EU Member States in the Council. Actual
negotiations of an SAA were unlikely to start before late

2005. And, as the contrasting examples of Macedonia (six
months) and Albania (going on two years and counting) show,
it is impossible to predict how long such negotiations might
last.

ICTY CONDITIONALITY
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6. (SBU) One message that Sobieski (and several other EU
interlocutors) was keen to stress with us was that the EU's
"twin track" approach in no way implies a relaxing of the
EU's ICTY conditionality. Sobieski said any feasibility
study will include discussion of the "political
conditionality" for SAA negotiations, and key among these was
that the GoSaM is meeting its international obligations
toward ICTY. The Commission hopes that by removing economic
harmonization as a stumbling block for SaM progress toward an
SAA, the "twin track" will actually help focus Belgrade and
Podgorica on the need for improved cooperation. This is a
message Patten and Solana will again deliver clearly on
October 5.

COMMENT
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7. (C) We are unconvinced the EU has fully thought through
the political ramifications of the "twin track." Despite the
EU's insistence it still supports a united SaM, even some EU
officials have told us this change in policy is a weakening
the EU's pressure to keep Montenegro from declaring
independence. But for us, the key issue is that negotiation
of an SAA with SaM remain firmly conditioned on better
cooperation with ICTY. And the Commission appears to be
solid on this point. It is, nonetheless, a point we will
want reconfirm as the Balkans portfolio passes from External
Relations Commissioner Patten to Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn of Finland in the next Commission beginning on
November 1.

SCHNABEL