U.S.-EU OSCE CONSULTS FOCUS ON RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004183

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN RU USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU OSCE CONSULTS FOCUS ON RUSSIA


Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The September 21 U.S.-EU OSCE consultations
focused largely on Russian intransigence toward outside
influence in its "near abroad." Both sides agreed that the
CIS Astana Declaration is an attempt to undercut the OSCE
role in human rights and democratization. Similarly, the EU
reported a "growing gap" between it and Russia on the
"European neighborhood" countries (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine,
Georgia),with Russia openly declaring that region to be of
"more interest to Russia than to the EU." On Kazakhstan, the
Kazakh desire to hold the 2009 OSCE Chairmanship should be
leveraged to promote progress on democratization. On
appointing OSCE Special Representatives for anti-Semitism and
discrimination, the EU bottom line was that all forms of
racism be equally acknowledged. U.S.-EU agreement on Russia
opens the way for cooperating with the EU on initiatives to
oppose Russian attempts to marginalize the OSCE. END SUMMARY.

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Participants
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2. (U)

EU Delegation
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Netherlands (current EU Presidency):

Frank van Beuningen, Head of Delegation, Security Policy
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA Hague
Mark Versteden, Senior Policy Office OSCE, MFA Hague

Luxembourg (successor to Netherlands in EU Presidency):

Ronald Mayer, Ambassador to the Council of Europe
Beatrice Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative to the OSCE
Fabienne Rossler, Attache, MFA

European Commission
Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe,
DG for External Relations
Mario Mariani, OSCE Desk, DG for External Relations
Louise Head, Adviser, DG for External Relations
Nicole Taillefer, EC Delegation to the internal organizations
in Vienna
Raul de Luzenberger, Moldova Desk, DG for External Relations
Konstandinos Vardakis, Kazakhstan Desk, DG External Relations
Robert Liddell, Caucasus and Central Asia Unit, DG for
External Relations

EU Council Secretariat
Alison Weston, Administrator, OSCE & CoE Desk Officer, (DG E
IX)
Carl Hartzell, Moldova/Belarus Desk Officer, Policy Unit

U.S. Delegation
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Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE
Bruce Connuck, Political Counselor, USOSCE Vienna
Steven Steger, Political Officer, USOSCE Vienna
Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels
Sean Kimball, Intern, USEU Brussels

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ASTANA DECLARATION: A RUSSIAN TRIAL BALLOON?
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3. (C) USOSCE Ambassador Minikes characterized the CIS
Astana Declaration of September 15 as a Russian "trial
balloon" to see how far Russia could go in perverting OSCE
priorities and principles in its own interests. He warned
that not responding would encourage Russia to go farther in
weakening OSCE commitment to promoting human rights and
democratization in the former Soviet space. Dutch OSCE
Office Director Frank van Beuningen agreed, observing that
Russian frustration with the OSCE had been building for a
long time. He said Astana did not bode well for achieving
consensus with Russia and other CIS states on important
issues at the upcoming OSCE Ministerial in Sofia. European
Commission Head of Unit for OSCE Affairs Gilbert Dubois
pointed out that the Astana Declaration explicitly
characterized itself as having been built upon the July
Moscow Statement, which forcefully called on the OSCE to
observe "(the fundamental Helsinki principle of)
non-interference in internal affairs...of States."


4. (C) USOSCE PolCouns Connuck said that the Moscow and
Astana declarations substantively contained nothing new --
the documents' themes pulled together what Russia had pushing
for day-in, day-out in Vienna for a long time. Connuck also
pointed out that the Astana Declaration's language on
reinforcing OSCE efforts against terrorism by "reducing OSCE
expenditures in the highest-cost-prone sectors" was a thinly
veiled attempt to undercut OSCE field missions.


5. (C) Minikes said that the Russians had traction on their
attempts to marginalize the OSCE because not all OSCE members
bought into OSCE principles on human rights and democracy.
Minikes said, and the EU agreed, that the U.S. and EU needed
to decide when to say "enough." One way to do so might be
some sort of explicit recommitment to OSCE principles at
head-of-state level.

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RUSSIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA, GEORGIA/CHECHNYA BMO
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6. (C) Van Beuningen reported that the EU was looking for
ways to "internationalize" negotiations on South Ossetia, but
that Astana was yet another sign that Russia was unlikely to
agree to such internationalization (neither in South Ossetia,
nor in Moldova). Minikes reported that, in South Ossetia,
the Russian flag was now flying alongside the South Ossetian
flag. Van Beuningen remarked on a recent radio interview in
which South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity said South Ossetia
would never be a part of Georgia. The atmosphere, he said,
was worsening, and Russia was probably playing a role in
those developments.


7. (C) According to van Beuningen, if the mandate for the
Georgia/Chechnya Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) is not
extended beyond December 31, the EU will consider, with
partners such as the U.S., another type of international
presence. Minikes said, with instability in the region even
worse after Beslan, the BMO must continue; the U.S., EU, and
OSCE must engage Moscow to that end.

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MOLDOVA: A RUSSIAN 'NYET' TO THE EU
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8. (C) Ronald Mayer, the Ambassador of Luxembourg to the
Council of Europe, reported that Moldova discussions at a
September 20 EU Political and Security Committee Meeting with
Russia had been "strikingly negative." Russia rejected any
EU role in five-sided talks on Transnistria; a proposed
resolution to the schools crisis; and the withdrawal of
ammunition from Moldova in line with the Istanbul
commitments. (According to Mayer, the Russians said they
"need the ammunition" in the area.) Carl Hartzell,
Moldova/Belarus Desk Officer in the Policy Unit of the EU
Council Secretariat, confirmed that Russian resistance to EU
influence in the region through tools such as the European
Neighborhood Policy was "becoming greater every day."
Hartzell said the EU was facing "a tremendous challenge" -- a
"growing gap" between the EU and Russia on dealing with an
area that for both of them was the near abroad. Hartzell
said the EU would continue to work with the U.S. to create a
"broader international platform" to deal with
Moldova/Transniestria. He said the EU was deliberating
whether the Security and Stability Pact for Moldova proposal
might be a basis for progress.


9. (C) European Commission Moldova Desk Officer Raul de
Luzenberger said the "double-checking" proposal for Moldovan
steel was in the final stages of preparation. He said the EU
should have a common proposal by the end of September, after
which there would be an exchange of letters with Moldova and
the system would be put in place. On border monitoring, de
Luzenberger said the European Commission was ready to
participate, but that the border first had to be demarcated.
Hartzell said the EU would like to compare notes with the
U.S. on possible further measures, such as freezing assets,
to "make the status quo uncomfortable" for Transnistrian
leaders. Van Beuningen said the EU wanted the schools crisis
solved before resumption of the five-sided talks. Hartzell
asked rhetorically whether it would be wise to invite Russia
to such talks, given the risk that Russia would reject the
offer.

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BELARUS: EU UNDECIDED ON ODIHR REFERENDUM OBSERVATION
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10. (C) Mayer said the EU was divided on whether the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
should accept Belarus' invitation to observe the October 17
referendum on eliminating presidential term limits, because
of concern about possibly "legitimizing" the referendum. It
would therefore be unlikely that there could be an EU
decision to push ODIHR to observe the referendum. Minikes
responded that the OSCE would not be able to comment
authoritatively on the referendum if ODIHR did not accept the
invitation.

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KAZAKHSTAN 2009 CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE CANDIDACY
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11. (C) Robert Liddell of the Caucasus and Central Asia Unit
of the European Commission expressed concern over the
fairness of the September 19 elections in Kazakhstan, but
said that the EU nevertheless saw Kazakhstan as the most
viable leader in Central Asia, a region that needed
leadership. Konstandinos Vardakis, European Commission
Kazakhstan Desk Officer, said the EU expected Kazakhstan to
be exporting as much oil in 2012 as Russia does today.
Therefore, it was in the EU's vital interest to promote
democracy and stability there. Minikes proposed that the
U.S. and EU look at ways to cooperate in leveraging the
Kazakh candidacy for OSCE CiO in 2009 to push for substantial
progress on human rights and democracy. Minikes suggested
meeting with the Kazakhs regularly, not to single them out,
but to help them. Connuck reported that the Kazakhs at the
working level in Vienna believe they have enough momentum for
2009 as to make their candidacy unstoppable, partially
because there has not been a concerted effort to leverage the
Kazakh CiO candidacy. The Kazakhs and some other CIS states,
he said, are convinced that they hold the U.S. and EU hostage
on this issue, not the other way around. Van Beuningen
agreed that action on leveraging the Kazakh candidacy had to
come soon, or it would be too late.

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CHOOSING A NEW OSCE SECRETARY GENERAL
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12. (C) Van Beuningen said that there was no EU candidate to
succeed OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis as of yet. Van
Beuningen expressed annoyance at Bulgarian FM and OSCE CiO
Passy's letter in which he created a "fait accompli" by
stating that the SecGen candidate should have a "political
profile." Minikes stressed that the candidate for OSCE
SecGen should be equal in stature to the NATO SecGen. Van
Beuningen agreed that a high profile figure would bring in a
large network with access to other key leaders, but cautioned
that the issue for the EU was not just the SecGen, but the
leadership of the OSCE and the role of the CiO in providing
political direction.

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OSCE REFORM AND SCALES OF ASSESSMENT
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13. (C) Both sides agreed that reform could not be
accomplished through the creation of more rules and that,
while they were open to discussion, they thought reform
should be done carefully, not with undue urgency.
Underlining U.S.-EU concerns that some OSCE members wanted to
use OSCE reform to undercut field missions, Connuck reported
that CIS countries might be considering letting the mandates
of OSCE field missions in the CIS expire as of January 1
(which they can do by withholding consensus on mandate
renewals at the end of the year). On scales of assessment,
Van Beuningen said the OSCE should consider the possibility
of how to prevent the organization from coming to a
standstill in the event of failure to come to a timely
agreement. He said CiO Passy's presentation to Dutch FM
Bernard Bot of the "Chair's Guess" paper so irritated Bot
that it had become more difficult to find a solution to the
scales of assessment issue at a political level. Van
Beuningen affirmed that the EU supported the U.S. position on
having two scales, and Nicole Van Taillefer from the
Commission Delegation to the OSCE reported that the Russians
had again insisted on one scale in a September 20 meeting in
Vienna.

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SPECIAL REPS ON ANTI-SEMITISM, RACISM, XENOPHOBIA
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14. (C) Van Beuningen said the EU's bottom line was that all
forms of discrimination needed to be combated. Whether there
should be one, two or three envoys was undecided, he said.
The EU agreed with the U.S. that the special
representative(s) position(s) should be temporary
appointments and modeled on the Maarti Ahtisaari position of
OSCE Special Rep for Central Asia -- no bureaucracy and no
additional OSCE staff.

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KOSOVO FOLLOW-UP: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TORTURE
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15. (U) Mayer asked whether the U.S. could hasten resolution,
via NATO, of the Council of Europe (CoE) and Kosovo
Stabilization Force (KFOR) negotiations on implementation in
Kosovo of the European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Serbia and Montenegro committed itself to implementing the
Convention when it joined the CoE in April 2003, but
implementation in Kosovo is subject to negotiations with
KFOR. The U.S. side promised to pass the request on.

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COMMENT: U.S.-EU CONSENSUS ON RUSSIA
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16. (C) These consultations affirmed a U.S.-EU convergence of
views on the gravity of Russia's campaign to marginalize the
OSCE and reassert Russian dominance in the CIS region. Both
sides agreed also that U.S. and EU inaction would encourage
Russia to push even further. The EU agreed in principle to
explore the proposal of publicly recommitting the OSCE to its
founding principles (see para 5) -- opening the way for
U.S.-EU common action in making clear our commitment to
promoting human rights and democracy throughout the OSCE
region. END COMMENT.


17. (U) USOSCE has cleared this message.

MCKINLEY