Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS4144
2004-09-28 14:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EUMS THOUGHTS ON REMAINING SFOR HANDOVER ISSUES

Tags:  MOPS MARR PREL BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004144 

SIPDIS

EUR FOR PDAS BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUMS THOUGHTS ON REMAINING SFOR HANDOVER ISSUES

REF: STATE 195305

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004144

SIPDIS

EUR FOR PDAS BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUMS THOUGHTS ON REMAINING SFOR HANDOVER ISSUES

REF: STATE 195305

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.
5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Some issues related to the end of SFOR and
the beginning of Operation Althea remain to be resolved, but
planners in HR Solana's secretariat are confident that the
transfer will go smoothly. The transfer date has been largely
resolved among commanders on the ground, but the EU political
decision-making apparatus must still agree to a December 1
date. The designation of DSACEUR as the successor to
COMIFOR's final authority under Dayton is a more significant
sticking point. EUR PDAS Bradtke raised many of these issues
with the PSC Troika September 27. (See Septel.) End summary.


2. (C) Mission polmiloff recently spoke with Didier Lenoir, a
defense policy planner on the Military Staff within CFSP High
Representative Solana's Secretariat General. We raised the
outstanding SFOR handover issues contained in reftel in order
to gauge the latest thinking on the Military Staff. We found
areas of agreement in principle, and subjects that may
require further discussion.

Date of Handover
--------------

3. (C) Lenoir reiterated what he has told us previously
concerning the date of the Transfer of Authority. The PSC, in
its early political discussions of the mission, has been
using December 16 as the target date for the TOA. This is an
unofficial date, since Operation Althea will only take place
following a high-level decision to launch the mission. The
date will be set at that time. As a practical matter, the EU
planners understand the U.S. requirements regarding the
scheduling of withdrawal of its forces, and on the ground,
there is a recognition that the U.S. withdrawal will be
phased. Lenoir said there are a number of ways to resolve
the discrepancy in working dates, but that the resolution
must be arrived at in discussions between NATO and the EU,
not on a bilateral basis. He said the PSC could opt to adopt

an earlier date, the EU and NATO could agree that there would
be a two week lapse in coverage in Task Force North, or the
Finns could agree to operate under NATO for those two weeks
until the TOA. In any event, he did not anticipate any
problem in reaching an understanding and observed that on the
military side, things will be largely in place by December 1.

SOFA
--------------

4. (C) Lenoir had just received a paper from his legal
services on the issue of whether or not a new SOFA would be
needed for the new mission. The paper was inconclusive, and
Lenoir said there remained two schools of thought on the
subject within the EU. The first school, headed up by the UK,
holds that there is no need -- or desire -- for a new SOFA.
The second school argues that under the rubric of increasing
Bosnian "ownership" of its own affairs, discussion, and
perhaps renegotiation of a SOFA is desirable. Lenoir's
conclusion was that the SOFA would be the product of
consultations rather than imposition even if its terms
remained unchanged.

COMIFOR
--------------

5. (C) Lenoir agreed completely on the need for a
coordination mechanism to manage potential areas of
overlapping or unclear responsibilities between the NATO HQ
and EUFOR. He said he has been making precisely such an
argument since planning began for the Althea mission. He
declined to endorse DSACEUR as the appropriate mechanism,
arguing that such an arrangement created the impression that
EU forces were somehow being "chopped to NATO." Still, he
insisted that there is a need to find a way for NATO to call
upon EUFOR for assistance or support if needed. The issue of
who will exercise the overarching authority ascribed to
COMIFOR is one of the difficult questions that Lenoir said
have been "kicked down the road" by EU political
decisionmakers.

Reserves
--------------

6. (C) The EU planner was adamant that ambiguity in the
decision chain for deploying reserves was "no way to plan a
military operation." He agreed with the U.S. call for
agreement on the procedures between NATO and the EU, even
though difficult discussions might ensue. (Note: Other more
senior officials, such as DG Robert Cooper, express comfort
with the ambiguity and "parallel decision-making." End Note)

POLAD and UNSCR
--------------

7. (C) After conferring with colleagues, Lenoir assured us
that Bruce Maclean's nomination as POLAD to NATO HQ in
Sarajevo would be welcome. High Representative Ashdown looks
forward to working with Maclean again we were told. On the
issue of an exchange of letters between NATO and the EU to
codify arrangements established by a new UNSCR, Lenoir
expressed his personal view that such an exchange would be
unnecessary, but if it were needed for political reasons, he
saw no disadvantage.

McKinley