EU IN UN: IO A/S HOLMES IN BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004107

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2014
TAGS: PREL UNGA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU IN UN: IO A/S HOLMES IN BRUSSELS

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 2292


B. B) STATE 167370

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with IO Assistant Secretary Kim
Holmes on September 15-16, EU officials:

--stressed EU commitment to "effective multilateralism with
the UN at its core;"

--continued their push for enhanced status for the European
Commission (EC) in UN bodies (EU additionality);

--agreed that engaging the EU in the UN before EU positions
had been decided was difficult but necessary;

--stressed strengthening the African Union (AU) in Darfur;

--were noncommittal on EU next steps in Iraq;

--predicted the EU would agree to UNSC referral of Iran's
nuclear program if no deal were made by November;

--did not predict whether a WEOG rotation in the UN Human
Rights Commission (UNCHR) could be worked out.

The EU is determined to increase its influence in the UN --
one official's speculation about a future permanent EU UNSC
seat, although long-range, reflects how far the ambition
goes. We must keep engaging the EU on these issues,
including on additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are
taken into account. END SUMMARY.

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The EU, the UN, and "effective multilateralism"
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2. (C) Robert Cooper, EU Council Director-General for Common
Foreign and Security Policy, expounded on the essence of EU
policy toward the UN: "effective multilateralism with the
United Nations at its core." A world in which states are
governed by law is an important EU aspiration, Cooper said,
adding that, while law is nothing if not backed by power,
power without law is barbaric. Given this EU view of the
world, Cooper said, the UN is key to providing legitimacy for
international action, even if it is not always the best venue
"for getting things done." Here Cooper stressed EU consensus
on the importance of the UN, noting that it was not just
something that "idealists" (like Sweden) believed in -- even
the UK, France, and Germany supported it. Returning to the
subject of power, Cooper also noted the occasional necessity
of "multilateralism with muscle." He said he expected most
future EU military operations would be "UN-mandated." Even
exceptions to this rule would likely occur under some sort of
UN context.


3. (C) Holmes noted that "effective multilateralism" had
originated as a U.S. concept. He added that the U.S. defined
"effective" as fulfilling a purpose. He said it was not the
process itself that lent legitimacy, but what was being
accomplished. Holmes said, and Cooper agreed, that the U.S.
had done more productive work in the UN than it was often
given credit for, and that the multilateralist-unilateralist
debate over Iraq had produced more fog than clarity. Holmes
remarked that he had seen an improvement in relations among
UNSC members, including on Iraq. Cooper replied that, from
an EU perspective, the wounds had not yet healed.
Furthermore, he said, encouraging EU member states to get
engaged in Iraq when it looked so risky and expensive was
difficult work. He added that the current Dutch EU
presidency was pushing hard to that end, perhaps "harder than
the market will bear," and that strong divisions remained
among member states. On a rational level, he said, everyone
wanted Iraq to be a success--but politicians, and especially
heads of state, were not always rational.


4. (C) On the effect of Iraq on transatlantic relations,
Cooper did not think Europe would ever take a unified stand
against the U.S. Cooper said the U.S. could usually find
numerous EU allies ("at least 10") to support its positions.
He dismissed the possibility of the EU's becoming a
"counterweight" to U.S. influence.

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Additionality: EC Push Continues, US Stance Clear
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5. (C) Holmes raised EU additionality (the European
Commission's push for enhanced status in international
organizations and UN conferences) in meetings with Fernando
Valenzuela, Deputy Director-General for External Relations in
the European Commission (EC),and Christoph Heusgen, Director
of the EU Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.
Valenzuela, who is slated to take up his new appointment as
EC Ambassador to the UN in New York in early 2005, said
traditional observer status for the EC in the UN was no
longer adequate. While stressing several times that the EC
did not dispute that voting rights belong only to UN member
states, he said "full participant" status (on which he did
not elaborate) "below the level of voting member" would best
fit the EC's international weight in areas in which the EC
shares EU decision-making power with EU member states.
Valenzuela said he was not pushing for any change in UN rules
-- he wanted a "pragmatic solution for better results in the
UN." Raising the current dispute regarding the World
Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR -- see reftels),
Valenzuela maintained that EC know-how on dealing with
international disasters eclipsed that of the EU member
states, thus pragmatically justifying full WCDR participation
short of voting.

6. (C) Holmes explained that, while the U.S. welcomes EC
expertise and does not want to stifle EU participation in UN
agencies and conferences, the UN Charter defines the UN as an
organization made up of member states, with only member
states having the right to be represented in decision-making.
Going beyond that for the EC would pose not only a legal
problem but also give the EU an unjustified additional voice,
thus putting the U.S. and other UN member states at a
disadvantage compared to the EU. In addition, it would set a
precedent that would open the way for other regional
organizations to request similarly advantageous status.
Holmes emphasized that the issue was not whether the EC could
contribute its input in EU deliberations but whether a non-UN
member should have a role in UN decision-making.


7. (C) Expressing a different view than that of the EC and
Valenzuela, Heusgen said EC status was not a top concern for
the EU Council. Heusgen echoed Valenzuela's arguments about
the EC's "special competence" in many areas, but said that
when the EU gains a "legal personality" under the new EU
constitutional treaty, the EU should be represented as one
unit. Therefore, he said, this issue should be put off until
after the treaty enters into force. (NOTE: if approved by
voters in the EU member states that are holding referenda and
ratified by member-state parliaments, the constitutional
treaty would probably enter into force in early 2007. END
NOTE.) Looking ahead, Heusgen predicted an eventual
permanent EU UNSC seat, but declined to specify whether this
would supplement or replace the British and French P-5 seats.


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Coordinating with EU Before Positions are Set
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8. (C) Holmes stressed to Heusgen the U.S. desire to engage
the EU in international bodies before the EU has decided on
positions it is unwilling or unable to change. Heusgen
agreed that it was difficult for the EU to take outside input
into account, remarking that it had been hard to coordinate
among the EU-15 and would be even harder with 25 member
states. However, he said, EU positions on most issues were
now evolving earlier due to the increasing development of
EU-wide perspectives among member states and better
member-state coordination. The establishment of a unified EU
external relations service under the constitutional treaty
would enhance this process, he predicted, and make the EU
much easier to deal with than under the current six-month
rotating presidencies.

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Sudan: EU Wants to Bolster AU
--------------


9. (C) On Darfur, Holmes expressed hope for an agreement at
the UN on an expanded monitoring force. Cooper said the EU
wanted to get the AU to function and to make use of the EU
military planners waiting in Addis Ababa. Holmes said
continued pressure was needed on Khartoum to allow access for
the international community -- maintaining the threat of
sanctions was important to keeping the pressure on. Outside
the UNSC, the international donor community and NGOs must
follow through on their commitments to provide needed
logistical and financial support. Underscoring the depth of
U.S. concerns, Holmes summarized a recent State Department
report in which some 1,700 interviewees painted a
"devastating" picture. Heusgen said that the EU Council had
gotten a mandate from EU FonMins to consider sanctions; a
working group was examining the matter. In his view, the
most important next step would be to increase the number of
observers -- adding to the 150 observers could do more than
inserting a poorly trained protection force. Heusgen added
that the EU would be happy to help with training, but that
nothing had been decided.

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EU Noncommittal on Iraq
--------------

10. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked for Cooper's views on the
timeline for elections in Iraq and whether the EU would
provide any support for the UN protection force. Cooper
replied that the EU was "scrambling around" for funding, but
he thought it would work out in the end. There had been a
discussion in the Council about EU funds to support the UN,
but the Community budget could not legally be used for
military operations. External Relations Commissioner Patten
was casting around for alternatives, but Cooper did not think
it would be possible to get around this legal prohibition.
The amount of money--25 million euros, or only one million
per member state--was so small that Cooper expected the EU to
find a way to provide the support. He felt that police
training would be "on the margins" of what may be possible
for the EU, however. The Council Secretariat was interested
in police or judicial training, but this would require
member-state backing. There was also the additional question
of physical security, Cooper noted. But his organization was
continuing to pursue these possibilities.

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November Turning Point on Iran?
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11. (C) On Iran, Cooper said that the EU-3 (France, Germany,
UK) had each briefed him after most meetings with Iranian
representatives. Cooper's impression, based on all three
countries' read-outs, was that they really did want to bring
the rest of the EU along with their efforts. Ensuring the
backing of all 25--which Cooper would continue to work
toward--would be important in the run-up to what he foresaw
as "crunch time" later this fall. If a deal could not be
worked out with Iran by November, he expected the nuclear
issue to be referred to the UNSC. In response to Cooper's
question about the likely content of a UNSCR, Holmes said
that an IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) report recommending
IAEA referral to the UNSC would assume advance support or at
least non-opposition at the UN from reluctant members (China
and Russia)-- who would have had to have agreed to the IAEA
referral. Meaningful Council action would require more than
a technical referral; the details of the IAEA referral would
form the basis for the UNSCR and would outline the areas in
which Iran needed to take action. Holmes sketched likely
next steps, and said that the threat of sanctions would
probably be the most severe option a UNSCR would contain.
Judging from his reading of the EU mood, Cooper said that he
had the impression that November's BOG meeting would be
different than previous ones, re-emphasizing that "we are
coming to a crunch." "But the Iranians are clever at evading
at the last minute," he noted.

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EU Noncommittal on WEOG Rotation
--------------


12. (C) Holmes also raised U.S. interest in changing the WEOG
rotation at the Human Rights Commission. Explaining that the
U.S. now accepted remaining off for two years out of 21, it
was up to other WEOG members to agree to the same
limitations. Heusgen did not predict how the EU would
respond, but did say that there had been lengthy debates when
reform had come up several years ago. At that time,
countries did--after tough discussions--agree to sit out
terms.


13. (C) COMMENT: The 25-member-state EU's commitment to
"effective multilateralism" and to increasing its influence
in a strengthened UN have considerable implications for U.S.
ability to pursue its interests multilaterally. Heusgen's
speculation about an eventual permanent EU UNSC seat,
although long-range, reflects how far the EU's ambition may
go. We must keep engaging the EU, including on EU
additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are taken into
account. Our persistence is paying off -- Valenzuela's
approach to Holmes on additionality was more conciliatory
than EC officials have been in previous meetings, indicating
the Commission is realizing that U.S. red lines will have to
be taken into account. END COMMENT.


14. (U) A/S Holmes has cleared this message.

MCKINLEY