Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS3772
2004-09-08 05:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

GYMNICH RESULTS ON BURMA, SUDAN, MIDDLE EAST AND

Tags:  PREL EAID IZ BM SU SR IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003772 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2014
TAGS: PREL EAID IZ BM SU SR IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: GYMNICH RESULTS ON BURMA, SUDAN, MIDDLE EAST AND
BALKANS HOLD NO SURPRISES

REF: BRUSSELS 3749

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003772

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2014
TAGS: PREL EAID IZ BM SU SR IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: GYMNICH RESULTS ON BURMA, SUDAN, MIDDLE EAST AND
BALKANS HOLD NO SURPRISES

REF: BRUSSELS 3749

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) The EU Foreign Ministers' informal "Gymnich" meeting
in Maastricht on September 3-4 proceeded as expected
(reftel). The EU will go ahead with the Asia-EU (ASEM)
Summit in Hanoi on October 7-9, as long as Burma attends at
the FM or lower level, but the FMs also announced further
sanctions they would impose unless Burma's human rights
record improves by then. To underline their concerns about
the situation in Darfur, EU FMs asked the Council Secretariat
to prepare a draft list of sanctions the EU could consider
imposing on the Sudanese Government in the future. The EU
declared it would be prepared to respond positively if the
African Union requests an EU Police Mission for Sudan. On
Iraq, the general EU mood was positive on member states
responding to requests for financial support of a UN
multinational force, although no Community funds can be spent
on the force. The EU also underlined the need for the next
Quartet meeting in New York to propose "concrete steps"
forward. There was no agreement that the EU should support
IAEA referral of Iran to the UNSC in September, but the EU
still hoped to send a "clear signal" to Teheran. Regarding
the Balkans, the Commission got approval to talk separately
to the Serbian and Montenegrin governments about negotiating
a Stabilization and Association Agreement, although the EU
insisted the two republics should remain one country. The
EU consensus on developments in Kosovo tracked very closely
with the recent report of UN envoy Kai Eide. End Summary.

ASEM/BURMA: TIGHTENING SANCTIONS, WHILE AGREEING TO TALK
-------------- --------------


2. (U) EU FMs agreed on a non-paper outlining the EU's
strategy, which should now be formally endorsed at the
September 13 GAERC meeting in Brussels (copy faxed to
EUR/ERA). In short, EU is going ahead with the ASEM meeting
(it would be an "affront to the Asians" to cancel it, Bot

told the Dutch press). The EU's "expectation" is that, if
the Burmese don't meet the EU's three demands (release of
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, an end to harassment of
the National League for Democracy, and a "genuine open debate
in the National Convention) by then, the Burmese participant
should be "lower than at the the level of Head of
State/Government" and the summit will be "an opportunity to
confront Burma" on human rights concerns. EU would also
adopt a revised Common Position on Burma that would "tighten
existing measures" by: an expansion of its visa ban to all
officers at Brigadier General and above and their families;
prohibiting EU companies from "making any finance available
to named state-owned enterprises; EU Members States voting
against IFI loans to Burma; and consideration of proposals to
address illegal logging. The EU would also increase its aid
to health and education, in consultation with the NLD.

SUDAN/DARFUR: KEEPING THE SANCTIONS OPTION OPEN
-------------- ---


3. (U) FM Bot said the EU remains concerned about the
situation. It will continue its humanitarian support, and
stands ready to provide
necessary support to the African Union. Specifically, the EU
would consider launching an EU Police Mission on an
initiative from the AU. (Bot, External Relations
Commissioner Patten and High Rep Solana were all keen to
underline the need for the AU, not the EU, to have
"ownership" of the Sudan problem.) The EU Council also "does
not exclude the possibility" that it will in the future need
to impose sanctions on the GoS, and has tasked the Council
Secretariat with drafting a list of possible sanctions the EU

SIPDIS
could impose, including a discussion of their implications.
Asked about an oil embargo, Bot said FMs did not discuss what
specific sanctions should be on the list, but expressed
skepticism an EU oil embargo would be effective.

IRAQ: NO EU MONEY FOR UN FORCE, BUT MAY BE FROM MEMBER STATES
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Bot said he "launched an appeal to colleagues" to
make further contributions to fund the "1800 troops" in a
"protection force for the UN". He said he hoped the UN force
could be established soon, and that EU members could fund it.
Council contacts said that no EU Member States made any firm
commitments in the Gymnich discussions, but the attitude was
positive that the money could be found. Bot said
"we'll see what happens in the coming days." The EU is also
moving ahead on other measures to contribute to Iraq. The
Dutch Presidency was given a mandate by the EUFMs to
elaborate in the coming weeks on recommendations for EU
actions from the recent exploratory mission to Baghdad and
earlier Patten/Solana proposals. The EU's focus is on police
training (training the trainers, Solana clarified, since he
said security makes it "practically impossible" to do more
on-the-ground training),technical assistance to other
administrative forces such as border or customs forces, and
support for upcoming elections.

MEPP
--------------


5. (SBU) The EU said the Israeli government's decision to
expand
settlements "ignores the road map" and "cannot be accepted."
FM Bot also insisted the EU could play a "middle man role" in
making the Gaza withdrawal a "two-sided process." Bot argued
the GoI was becoming more inclined to see a positive EU role
in helping to reduce risk of "chaos" in Gaza after a
withdrawal. Both Solana and Bot said they looked forward to
a Quartet meeting during UNGA week in New York, provided it
can agree on "concrete steps" forward. (Bot: "meeting just
for the sake of meeting doesn't make any sense." Solana:
"If we can't give the meeting content, it may not be
necessary to have it at this point.") (COMMENT: These
latter comments were aimed at the U.S., according to Council
and Commisison sources, although the press seems to have
missed them entirely. While the EU thinks Quartet agreement
on how to address the Gaza withdrawal is possible, the EU is
concerned that US-EU "divergences" over issues such as the
settlements and the fence could make it hard to agree on a
Quartet statement worth making. Our sources said by the end
of the Gymnich session that it looked like planning for the
Quartet meeting was progressing, and were more upbeat on the
value of the upcoming meeting. Nonetheless, there remain
lingering concerns in the EU that the U.S. uses the Quartet
process to -- as one Council contact told us today -- "keep
the Europeans quiet and prevent us from stirring up trouble."
END COMMENT.)

IRAN: A "CLEAR SIGNAL" TO TEHERAN, BUT NOT TO THE UNSC YET
-------------- --------------


6. (U) Bot, Patten, Solana, Fischer all repeatedly talked
about the need for the EU to "send a strong signal" to Iran
on nuke concerns, and that Teheran should "make no mistake
about our message." But they had nothing concrete to add and
did not mention the IAEA BoG meeting in front of the press.
Council and Dutch Presidency contacts tell us there is little
or no EU sentiment in favor of sending it to the UNSC in
September; "maybe in November, depending on that report."

BALKANS: SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, AND KOSOVO
--------------


7. (U) The EU (especially Solana) endorsed the EU's policy
supporting the State Union. Solana stressed that SaM's
progress toward the EU "will be much, much faster in the
context of the State Union." But FMs
also endorsed Patten's proposed "twin-track" approach to
handling "technical" issues "of an economic and commercial
nature", such as negotiating the economic sections of a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Patten said
the aim would be to have one SAA for SaM,
but with some sections where Serbia and Montenegro might be
treated separately. As the AP accurately summarized it: "The
EU agrees to treat the two states separately, while insisting
they should remain one country." Solana argued emphatically
that EU policy toward SaM "has not changed, and will not
change", arguing this shift is just a technical
adaptation of the EU's dealing with the governments in
question. Senior EU officials (Lehne and Priebe) will go to
both Belgrade and Podgorica next week to explain the change,
followed by Solana and Patten in a joint trip by the end of
the month.


8. (SBU) On Kosovo, the Gymnich discussion strongly supported
all of the messages of the recent report by UN envoy Kai
Eide. The EU urged Kosovar Serbs to participate in
elections. It agreed UNMIK should look at transferring more
powers to PISG, as long as the UNMIK SRSG's "control
functions" are also strenghtened (a Solana staffer said
Solana favors a "Bosnia model" where the local authorities
would make the decisions, but could be overruled by the High
Rep). The UN standards process needs to be prioritized (with
protection of minorities and
refugee returns right at the top); and Serb concerns need to
be addressed, with decentralization "absolutely fundamental"
to the whole process. Only Austrian FM (and incoming
External Relations Commissioner) Ferrero-Waldner made any
comment on the status issue, and that was to say it should
only be discussed later.


9. (C) Dutch and Council Secretariat sources confirmed that
EU FMs had no serious discussion of the status question. But
there was a general consensus in favor of Eide's arguments
that further postponement of the status issue would be a
problem, and that it was important there be a positive
standards review in 2005. Solana noted to the Gymnich that
the Contact Group would have to play a leading role in the
process leading to status discussions, and there were no
objections. At the same time, there was little support for
"early" (i.e., in 2004) appointment of an envoy to initiate
discussions on status. In a discussion on Sept. 7, a Solana
staffer elaborated further, noting that as long as the EU
does not discuss the status issue, then Member State
positions will be "all over the map." But the status issue
is far too sensitive an issue to discuss at 25, since it
would surely leak. That is why Solana has been pushing
Member States to accept that the Quint needs to take the lead.


10. (U) Minimize considered.

MCKINLEY