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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS3729
2004-09-03 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU OFFICIALS ON IAEA IRAN REPORT: NOT READY FOR

Tags:   KNNP  PARM  PREL  MNUC  TRGY  IR  IAEA  EUN  USEU  BRUSSELS 
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						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003729 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC TRGY IR IAEA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS ON IAEA IRAN REPORT: NOT READY FOR
UNSC REFERRAL

REF: STATE 188960

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Poloff discussed reftel with Council
nonproliferation and nuclear policy advisors September 2 and


3. While acknowledging serious unresolved issues, they
assessed DG El Baradei's new report as "overall more positive
than the last one," and said that EU BOG members were
unlikely to go along with our desire for UNSC referral, at
least not before November. One questioned why we were in
such a rush. They argued that without a plan for handling
the issue at the UNSC, any BOG referral risked backfiring and
undermining the UN's credibility. They confirmed that the
DG's report and a briefing by the EU-3 would feature
prominently at the informal Gymnich meeting of EU FMs
September 3 and 4, and thought that European countries might
have a clearer idea about how to proceed in the short run
after that meeting. END SUMMARY.

THE DG'S REPORT: OVERALL BETTER THAN THE LAST


--------------------------





2. (C) Poloff discussed reftel on September 2 and 3 with
Andreas Strub, Deputy to WMD Rep Giannella and longtime
Solana advisor, and Stephan Klement, Council nuclear policy
advisor and former IAEA official. The two had just finished
writing an assessment of DG El Baradei's report for HiRep
Solana and DG Cooper to use at the September 3-4 Gymnich
(informal meeting of EU FMs). Strub promised to report our
demarche and pass our paper to both men in advance of the
Gymnich meeting. In contrast to our interpretation, Strub
and Klement assessed the DG's report as "overall more
positive that the last one," while also acknowledging that
Iran was far from being off the hook on outstanding
questions. Klement highlighted HEU contamination of imported
enrichment equipment and the Iranian P-2 program as the most
serious of remaining open issues, but said that both would
require better cooperation from third countries (presumably
Pakistan) to resolve. Many of Iran's explanations could be
plausible, he said (referring especially to the HEU
contamination issue), but there is no way the IAEA can
determine that yet.

NOT YET TIME FOR UNSC REFERRAL


--------------------------





3. (C) Strub and Klement argued that the time was not right
for referring the issue to the UNSC. Citing the more
positive tone of this report compared to the last one,
Klement said the IAEA should be given more time to learn
about third countries. He also said there was a risk that
the larger General Conference, convening just after the BOG,
could undertake efforts contradictory to the BOG if the BOG
reported the file to the UNSC. He thought the DG's report
did not warrant taking such a political risk and said that
the November BOG would be the earliest politically savvy
opportunity for any UNSC referral. Strub agreed that now was
not the time for a referral and thought that EU Member States
on the BOG would be much more inclined to entertain arguments
for referral at the November meeting.

WHAT WOULD YOU DO ONCE THERE?


--------------------------





4. (C) Strub also questioned the wisdom of proceeding to the
UNSC without a clear strategy for success once there. He
said that if the Iranians decided to test the determination
of the Security Council as well, and if the Council was
unable to unify around a tough sanctions plan and path
forward, it would be disastrous and undermine the credibility
of the UN system. (COMMENT: The desire to defend the UN's
credibility and to enhance its role at the center of EU
efforts to promote "effective multilateralism" is a very
powerful motivator among EU policymakers. END COMMENT).
Strub thought that very few European leaders would consider a
UNSC referral without a clear and workable strategy for
handling the next steps.

THE EU-3 AND GYMNICH


--------------------------





5. (C) Strub confirmed that EU FMs, led by France, Germany
and the UK, hoped to agree on a new or revised near-term
approach to Iran at their September 3-4 Gymnich meeting in
Maastricht. Our demarche would certainly feature prominently
in discussions, he said. Another Commission contact
confirmed that RELEX Commissioner Patten is frustrated that
the EU does not speak with one voice on Iran, but accepted
that the tone of EU discussions would depend heavily on what
the EU-3 have to say. Council official Klement was careful
to distinguish between IAEA and EU-3 efforts, saying that
while Iran has failed in its commitments to the EU-3, that
was a separate issue and should not influence the IAEA's
process.
McKinley